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PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

I.—THE NATURE OF UNIVERSALS (III).

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THE attitude of Cook Wilson and of Stout in regard to the nature of universals—that is, of the abstract universal—affords a curious and interesting contrast to that which I have been considering in the preceding articles. For whereas Bradley and Bosanquet have no manner of doubt as to the identity of recurrent qualities, and have difficulty only as to the real separateness of the numerically distinct things in which they appear, Cook Wilson and Stout envisage the problem in the diametrically opposite manner. So far from having any doubt as to the separateness of things, they extend this separateness also to their qualities. The qualities, they declare, are as particular, and therefore, as regards their existence, as numerically distinct from one another as are the things in which they are found. The red in A is no less distinct in its existence from the red in B than A itself is from B. A quality, in other words, is never a universal; and the belief in universals, if it is to be upheld, must therefore be formulated in other than the customary terms. This, at least, is what, on first impressions, Cook Wilson and Stout would seem to be maintaining; how far such first impressions are the whole truth, I shall discuss later.

In certain respects the new formulation is somewhat reminiscent of Hegelian teaching.

“Just as it is the very nature of the universal to be a unity which must take specific forms (number *as such* must be odd or even), so also it is its nature to be particularised. The universal is the

universal of particulars, and its reality cannot be separated from them any more than its unity can be separated from its species."¹

Or as Cook Wilson restates this thesis :—

"Differentiation or different species of the genus, and individualisation or the individuals, are nothing outside the nature of the universal and therefore do not require to be reconciled with it. The universal as genus is not something in the specific universals with the differentia added to it as something outside it, so that the two together constitute the species (as though the species agreed in the genus only and differed in something which was not of the nature of the genus). . . . The individual or particular has not the universal *in* it and something also beside the universal to make it particular. As the whole nature of the species is covered by the genus-universal, so the whole nature of the particular is covered by the universal."²

So far, though with a very different meaning attached to the terms, Hegel might concur. But Cook Wilson discloses the extent of his divergence when he proceeds to add: "[Universality] is a *unique* kind of unity";³ and explains in what the unity consists.

"The total being of the universal is not its unity and identity in particulars, but the whole of the particulars as the particularisation of this unity."⁴

A standpoint somewhat similar to that of Cook Wilson has been developed by Stout; and his statement being much more explicit, I shall use his version as the basis of my discussion.

According to Stout, the universal is one quite special type of unity among others. It is "the unity of a class or kind as including its members or instances."⁵ Further, we may not, in the manner prescribed by the customary view, regard the class or kind as a derivative consequence of the possession by its instances of a common quality or a common relation. Qualities and relations, Stout maintains, are as particular as the things which they characterise. Each billiard ball has its own particular roundness, separate and distinct from that of any other ball. When we say that roundness is a character common to all billiard balls, the phrase 'common character' is elliptical. What we are really saying is that each of them has a character (roundness) which is a particular instance of this class of character. Abstract names are not singular but general terms. Shape stands for all shapes as such, and roundness for all round shapes as such.

¹ Cook Wilson, *Statement and Inference*, vol. i, p. 335.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 335-336.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 336.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 338.

⁵ *The Nature of Universals and Propositions (Proceedings of the British Academy, vol. x, p. 3).*

So far Stout's position, that qualities are as particular as the concrete things which they characterise, and his consequent reduction of the universal to being a name for a class of particulars, would seem to be pure nominalism. This, however, is only one half of his doctrine. The nominalists substitute resemblance for identity. Classification, they hold, depends upon an antecedent apprehension of resemblance; and the class signifies merely those particulars in which such resemblance can be detected. According to Stout's view, on the other hand, particulars are not said to belong to the same class because they are recognised as similar; they are declared to be similar because they are recognised as belonging to the same class.

"Agreeing with the nominalist that characters are as particular as the things or substances which they characterise, the inference I draw from the thesis is not that there are really no universals, but that the universal is a distributive unity."¹

When we say that A is red and that B is red, though we have no right to allege that the red in A is identical with the red in B, none the less we do assert *identity*, namely, that the two reds are identical in *kind*, *i.e.*, are instances of the same *class*.

Clearly, what is most distinctive, if also most debateable, in Stout's position is his doctrine of distributive unity. Distributive unity is, he holds, an *a priori* category, and indeed the most fundamental of the categories. Nothing can be apprehended save as an instance of a class. Such apprehension is not, however, based on, and the result of, the apprehension of resemblance; on the contrary, it enters into and preconditions the latter type of experience. Particulars can be apprehended as similar only in so far as, and because, both have been apprehended as belonging to one and the same class. Consequently, for this reason, if for no other, identity, he argues, cannot be displaced by similarity. ✓

Stout has also, as against the nominalist position, three other arguments.

First, resemblance, being a relation, presupposes like all other relations, a complex unity within which the terms of the relation, and the relation itself fall.² In the case of resemblance, this unity is the distributive unity of a class. And since apprehension of this unity is the *fundamentum relationis* employed in the apprehension of resemblance, the resemblance cannot be the ground for our assertion of the unity.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 7.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

Secondly, even the most extreme of nominalists employs the terms 'all,' 'every,' 'any,' 'some,' and the indefinite article.¹ Yet obviously, the meaning of these words cannot be stated adequately in terms of resemblance.

"Consider the example 'all triangles'. It may be said that this means all shapes that resemble each other in a certain respect. But such formulas presuppose that the word 'all' has a meaning of its own that cannot be reduced to relations of similarity. It is precisely the concept of distributive unity which remains unexplained."²

Thirdly, what can the nominalists mean when they speak of 'resemblance in a certain respect'? They cannot be referring to single qualities indivisibly present in the members of the class, as, *e.g.*, in the case of triangles 'being enclosed by three lines'. Their nominalism consists precisely in the denial of any such qualities.

"Hence in the mouth of the nominalist the answer can only mean that the figures must resemble each other inasmuch as they are all triangles—inasmuch as they are all members of the class 'triangular figures'. This is plainly a vicious circle, when what requires to be explained is precisely the meaning of the words 'class' or 'kind'."³

Stout thus places himself between two fires: he has to defend his doctrine of distributive unity against the nominalists, and he has also to maintain, as against the customary view of universals, that this distributive unity is not determined by possession of common characters. The crucial point evidently consists in the view to be taken of similarity and of its relation to the unity of the class. We have just considered Stout's reasons for regarding as inadequate the nominalists' attempt to treat similarity as an ultimate, unanalysable feature, and as being by itself a sufficient basis of classification. Let us now consider his method of disproving the opposite view that similarity is partial identity, and that it is the occurrence of the same identical character in a number of instances which determines that they should form an actual class. Stout's procedure, if I have understood him rightly,⁴ is first to distinguish between two senses of the term 'similarity,' and then to show that while one of the two senses may seem to support the orthodox view, and to be inconsistent with his own, both senses must be interpreted in the same way, namely, in the terms which his doctrine prescribes.

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 5.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 5-6.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 6.

⁴ I must make this proviso, as I am here going beyond Mr. Stout's published statements, in reliance upon what I have gathered from personal discussion and from correspondence with him; and may very easily, therefore, be giving an incorrect or inadequate account of his position.

The distinction which Stout draws between two senses of the term 'similarity' (or 'resemblance'), a narrower and a wider, is as follows. Things or characters, so far as they can be discerned by direct comparison to be similar, *pro tanto* fall within one class. Thus men can be classed as white, black or yellow. Two shades of red can be classed as red. In all such cases there is a certain respect (or respects) in which the things or characters agree, and which can be discerned by direct inspection of the separate things or characters. When thus discovered, it is the ground of the particular things or characters being so classed. They belong, in each case, to the same class in so far as they are thus similar. This is similarity in the narrower sense.

In the other and wider sense of the term, things or characters are declared to be similar in so far as they are known to belong to the same class; and they need not agree in any respect at all save in thus belonging to the same class. This happens whenever a non-distributive type of unity is the basis of a class, *e.g.*, the class 'parts of this chair'. The legs, the castors, the constituents of the upholstery, etc., may be of the most different materials, shapes and functions. None the less they are so far similar in that they all agree in being parts of the chair. And quite evidently in their case, we do not know them to be members of one and the same class because of a prior knowledge of their similarity. Their belonging to the same class exhausts, or may exhaust, the extent of their similarity.

This latter sense of the term 'similarity' is, Stout maintains, highly important. Is it not in this wide sense, for instance, that colours are said to be all similar to one another? There is, Stout claims, no common character discernible in all colours; and therefore no evidence of similarity obtainable by direct comparison. Red and green, for instance, do not have any quality which is discernible as common to both. If, however, by indirect methods, we can discover grounds for referring all colours to the same class, we shall be justified in asserting them to be *pro tanto* similar, in the wider sense of the term 'similar'. The class 'sensible quality,' to take another example, is not based on a character common to sounds and colours, and discovered in both by direct inspection. Our grounds for so classifying sound and colour are more indirect; and the two sets of *sensa* are to be regarded as similar in so far as they have to be so classed, not *vice versa*.

Our method of classing what is similar in the narrower sense would thus seem to conform to the orthodox view, and

our method of classing what is similar in the wider sense to conform to Stout's view. Stout accordingly sets himself to show that both, and not merely the second, support his general thesis. And he does so, if I have understood him rightly, by contending that it is only because each of the separate characters compared has, prior to the comparison, already been apprehended as an instance of a certain kind, and because on later comparison these kinds are found to be the same, that the characters are said to be similar—similar here signifying 'being instances of the same kind'. If it be the case that in order to be able, through processes of comparison, to recognise two red things as being *both* of them red, we must have already identified *each* as being red, the two senses of the term 'similarity' will no longer be distinguishable in the manner alleged.

In explanation of this contention he points out that a class of characters is not constituted in the same way as a class of *things*.

"A thing belongs to a certain class, only because a character of a certain kind is predicable of it. But we cannot, without moving in a vicious circle, go on to say that characters themselves can belong to classes or kinds, only because other kinds of characters are predicable of them. What I maintain, therefore, is that qualities and relations belong to classes or kinds just because they are qualities and relations. Characters *as such* are instances of universals, and this fact is just what makes so plausible the false statement that they are themselves universals."¹

This, I presume, would be Stout's answer to the objection that his view must refute itself by leading to an infinite series.

"If two things can never have a common character, they cannot both have the common character of having instances of the same colour; they can only have instances of this character. So that they cannot even have instances of the same colour, but only instances of having instances of the same colour and so on *ad infinitum*."²

This objection assumes that, on Stout's view, a class of characters is formed in the same way as a class of things. Were it so, as Stout has himself pointed out in the passage quoted above, his position would be untenable, and the objection would hold. But if, on the other hand, distributive unity be, as he contends, the most fundamental of all the categories, and if belonging to a kind or class be therefore an inseparable feature of any and every known character, the objection must be due to sheer misunderstanding. If no character can be known save

¹ *Relativity, Logic, and Mysticism* (Aristotelian Society, Supplem. Vol. iii), p. 116.

² F. P. Ramsey, *Universals and the 'Method of Analysis'* (Aristotelian Society, Supplem. Vol. v, p. 17).

as an instance, no infinite series can be required in order to find an instance. It may, of course, be that Stout is not justified in his view of distributive unity as being a fundamental category, involved in the apprehension of each and every character; but that would be a very different objection; and the raising of it is not compatible with the objection as actually made.

The criticism which, as it seems to me, should be passed upon Stout's position is that so far are the two senses of similarity from being reducible to the second and wider sense, that on the contrary this second sense, on closer scrutiny, turns out to be reducible to the first and narrower sense. We may take Stout's own instances. The members of the class 'parts of this chair' need not be similar in the sense of all agreeing in any such properties as shape, colour, or kind of material. But they do agree in what surely can be called a common character,¹ namely, that they all function as parts of this chair. This is a common character which can be possessed by things which are extremely diverse from one another, and which just by means of their diversity are in a position to constitute a non-distributive unity.² And in virtue of this common character they are so far still, in spite of their diversity, similar to one another in the narrower sense of the term.

But these points can be even better illustrated by reference to Stout's other example, that of colour. His argument proceeds on the assumption that his readers will be willing to agree—he refers to Johnson³ as also making this assumption—that the various colours have no character in common. Red and green are not, he maintains, partly different and partly the same, as would be required if in addition to their differences they possessed a character in common; the various colours are all similar to one another solely because they belong to the distributive unity of the class 'colour'; their similarity is only in the wider sense of the term, and not at all in the narrower sense. Now surely these statements are open to challenge. How have the diverse colours come to be referred to the same class, and therefore to be included under the same general term, if they have no character in common, save only that of belonging to the class? This latter characteristic they cannot be found to possess prior to our classifica-

¹ Otherwise Stout would be gaining his conclusion only by means of a very arbitrary limitation in the use of the term 'character'.

² The more complexly articulated the non-distributive unity the greater is the diversity required in its constituents.

³ Cf. W. E. Johnson, *Logic*, vol. i, p. 176.

tion of them; and it cannot therefore be the ground on which we base the classification.

In the case of the chair we have a prior-existent non-distributive unity, and by direct experience can learn how all the diverse constituents, in spite of their diversity, or rather just by virtue of it, exercise a common function, that of contributing to compose it; and Stout, I presume, would endeavour to deal with the colours in a similar manner. He would point out that just as the parts of the chair all agree in exercising an identical kind of function, that of contributing to constitute the chair, so all colours agree in exercising, within the extensive field of visual sensa, the function of defining outline and so of defining shape.¹ Any and every visual sensum² which discharges this function we can entitle a colour. But if so,

¹ The fundamental fact of experience, it may be noted, is not colour but colours. Had there been only one colour, we should not have required a special name for it; the visible and the coloured would have coincided, and differences of shape would not have been possible visual experiences. Johnson declares (*Logic*, vol. i, p. 173 ff.) that when red, green, and yellow are classed as colours (primary adjective), this is not done on the ground of any partial agreement (secondary adjective), but on the ground of "the special kind of difference which distinguishes one colour from another". If the difference here referred to is their capacity to delimit one another, this, I should say, is a 'secondary adjective' common to them and to every other colour. But if so, the contrast which Johnson draws between the two propositions, 'Red is a colour' and 'Plato is a man,' on the ground that the latter, but not the former, is based upon an adjectival predicate, will not hold. Abstract names (adjectives), it will follow, can be divided in the same way as concrete substantive class names into singular and general; and the new distinction between determinable and determinates will, in this connection at least, be superfluous. In his method of formulating this last distinction, Johnson almost seems to be vying with supporters of the doctrine of the concrete universal. Colour, he contends, is a single and positive content and is, "metaphorically speaking, that from which the specific determinates, red, yellow, green, etc., emanate; while from shape emanate another completely different series of determinates such as triangular, square, octagonal, etc.". The process of emanation he illustrates by reference to the manner in which "the determinable 'less than 4' generates '3' and '2' and '1' in the sense that the understanding of the meaning of the former carries with it the notion of the latter". This, as he points out, does not happen in the case of a substantive class-name, such as 'the apostles of Jesus'. Certainly this class-name does not, even in Bosanquet's view, generate 'Peter and John and James, etc.'. But does 'colour' generate the specific colours, or 'number' the specific numbers, or 'shape' triangularity and the conic sections? Are they (i.e., the specific colours, numbers, etc.) not generated by the system, natural or conceptual, by which each 'determinable' is conditioned, and from which it gains whatever meaning it may initially have?

² It is important to note that, on Stout's view, the less general can be apprehended (i.e., recognised as of this or that kind) only through discrimination within a wider, previously apprehended kind, and always ultimately in terms of the category of distributive unity.

does it not also follow that in exhibiting this common character the various colours so far resemble one another in the narrower sense of the term, and not merely in the wider sense?

There is also a further respect in which this holds true. In referring us to the non-distributive unity of visual experience, Stout would seem to be overlooking the very essential difference between such a unity and that of a chair. In dealing with the latter, he is in a position to argue that we discover the identity of function in the constituents not by examining each part separately but by noting how they together make up the unity of the whole. When we class white things as being white, we do so by noting how *each* thing has a quality of the kind in question; but in the case of the chair the fact of their exercising a common function is ascribed to each only indirectly through our study of the whole which they compose. Now whether the extensive field of visual sensa be or be not describable as a non-distributive unity does not really arise. It is only by direct observation of the various colours, and by observing how each, in contrast with some other, is capable of defining outline, that we are justified in concluding that in virtue of this common characteristic they can all be ascribed to a single class. In forming the class 'colour' we have really proceeded much in the same manner as when by direct inspection we class different shades of red as being red. Indeed it is probable that observation of resemblance between adjacent shades and the ascription of such resemblance to other shades more dissimilar but still traceably continuous with them has played a considerable part in leading us to group all colours, however diverse—including the greys, as well as the colours strictly so called—in a single class. That the other method cannot, however, be dispensed with, is evident when we consider that our only means of deciding whether two shades of red are or are not the same shade is to set them side by side, and to note whether they are or are not distinguishable, *i.e.*, capable of defining outline as against one another.

To sum up this argument: even where a distributive unity has its source in a non-distributive unity, such as that of a chair, the instances of the distributive unity have a common character, though as being functional it is compatible with, and indeed demands, diversity in the particulars which it characterises. It is the non-distributive unity, and it alone, which determines the nature and limits of the class. Within this class, however, possession of a common character (contributing to this chair) still renders the members similar in

the first sense. In the case of colour, the common character is again functional (and so far is compatible with absence of *other* common characters), but in this case is arrived at by the method of direct comparison of the several colours *with one another*. It consists in the capacity, exhibited by these varying *sensa*, of outlining and being outlined in a visual field. In all respects, therefore, it illustrates similarity of the narrower type.

If these statements are justified, it will follow that there is no such thing as similarity in the wider sense, *i.e.*, no similarity which consists simply in belonging to a distributive unity. Nothing will belong to a class save in virtue of the possession of a certain *kind* of character. In other words, it will be *kind* or *type* or *pattern* that will be alone ultimate: distributive unity or class will be derivative, a consequence of the existence of *kind*, *type*, or *pattern*. 'Kinds,' will be definable in terms of characters, more schematically in proportion as more numerous subspecies intervene between them and the particulars of which they are the kinds, and less schematically in proportion as such subordinate variations of *kind* have not to be reckoned with. Thus while colour has to be defined, in the more general terms, as what can outline and be outlined in a visual field, red is defined in more special terms as what can show up outline as against both orange and purple. A special shade of red requires for its determination yet more specific conditions.

If *kind*, and not *class*, be the really ultimate concept, it will further follow that a universal is not correctly defined in the manner of Cook Wilson and of Stout as "the whole of the particulars as the particularisation of its unity" or as "the unity of a class as including its members or instances". To regard the universal in this extensional manner is to follow Hegel in his contention that the universal contains its particulars, and is not simply what characterises them.¹ Mr. Farquharson traces Cook Wilson's doctrine to the influence of Green.² If this be so, it will explain much that is otherwise difficult to understand in Cook Wilson's modes of

¹ Cf. Cook Wilson, *Statement and Inference*, vol. i, p. 336: "The individual or particular has not the universal *in* it and something *also* beside the universal to make it particular. As the whole nature of the species is covered by the genus-universal, so the whole nature of the particular is covered by the universal. . . . The expression 'particularisation of the universal' has been used instead of particular, or particulars, in order to emphasise the fact that the nature of the individual is nothing but what belongs to the universal itself. Particularisation is of it and in it as much as differentiation."

² *Op. cit.*, p. 344 note.

expression, and more especially the lack of coherence with his otherwise very un-Hegelian teaching. How far, in this matter, Cook Wilson may have influenced Stout in turn, I do not know; but in any case Stout likewise treats the universal as being concrete. For though he recognises that it can have, when not merely collective, possible as well as actual instances, the possible instances are, he maintains, determined by the universal, and are therefore as much its instances as are the actual instances—the universal consisting in the totality of them all, regarded as a unity. Hegel's idealism has frequently, in his left-wing disciples, transformed itself into materialism. Here we should seem to have his logical doctrine of the concrete universal transforming itself into something very closely approximating to nominalism.

But if similarity in the narrower sense be alone allowed as possible, will it have to be interpreted in accordance with the orthodox view? And will Stout's doctrine that characters are particular be no longer tenable? Or is there any alternative? Before attempting to answer these questions, it may be well, at this point, to consider the objections which can be urged against the orthodox view—the view that when A and B are declared to be red, the quality red is as a quality universal, and is one and the same in both.

We have already considered¹ the first and most obvious of these objections, namely, how, if A and B are spatially separate, the red in the one can be identical with the red in the other. If spatial separation justifies us in regarding A and B as numerically distinct, why not also in the case of the characters? What justifies us in saying that though A and B are numerically distinct, the red thus seen in two places is none the less identical in both? The usual reply, as we have seen, is that though a concrete thing cannot be locally separate from itself, characters differ from concrete things precisely in this respect. No amount of spatial separation, and no amount of multiplication can destroy the identity of the colour.

This way of meeting the objection is virtually to assert that a character cannot vary in the amount of its existence; or in other words, that, owing to its being a universal, quantitative predicates are not applicable to it. For, obviously, if a character is always identical with itself, it cannot be increased in amount by the number of things in which it is found; and it will therefore follow that there would be

¹ P. 138 (in first article).

just as much colour in existence as at present, were there only one coloured thing and no more, just as much green in the world if there existed only one blade of grass. For the same reason there must be just as much colour in a small surface as in a large one, in half a blade of grass as in a whole blade. Otherwise, were there more, the more could not be identical with what is there prior to the increase. A character, it is argued, cannot be multiplied, though the things which own it can; and though the things which possess it can be large or small, it itself does not vary in amount. This view will have to be made good in reference to all other characters, sound, heat, weight, etc.; and meantime its seemingly paradoxical consequences may be counted, not indeed as disproving the orthodox view, but as a very serious difficulty, of which it must give a more adequate account than any yet rendered.

A second objection, which is closely connected with this first objection, has been very forcibly stated by Stout. When it is alleged that what is really the same indivisible quality can *appear* in different places and times, advantage is being taken of two quite different senses of the word 'appear'. We say that something may appear to be what it is not, meaning that it may *seem* so to do. We also say that something appears, meaning not that it seems to exist, but that it actually exists, namely, *as an appearance*.

"In this [latter] sense, nothing can really appear except what really is, and really is as it appears. I may, in double vision, have two images of a single candle flame. There then appear or *seem* to be two candle flames, whereas in fact there is only one. But the visual presentations not only appear or seem to exist and be separate. Both they and their separation really appear, are really presented or given, and must therefore really exist. It is only because the images really exist and are really separate that there appear or seem to be two flames."¹

And as Stout therefore concludes, if qualities of separate things really appear separately, and if the separation is a genuine appearance, they must really be separate and not merely seem to be so. Those who like Bradley and Bosanquet do not believe in the ultimate separateness of finite existences may, from their point of view, cope with this objection; but it is otherwise with those who have adopted a pluralist standpoint.²

¹ *The Nature of Universals and Propositions*, p. 8.

² A really adequate discussion of Stout's doctrine of universals would have to take account of a further argument (*op. cit.*, p. 8 ff.) which he regards as one of its main supports, namely, that substance is nothing apart from its qualities, and that its particularity must therefore consist in the

A third objection is that if characters are the same in the different things in which they appear, they might well be expected to be more operative than, by agreement, they are found to be.¹ This, like the first objection, is a difficulty which calls for further explanation than is usually given. It is hardly a sufficient reply to say that this can only be a difficulty to those who regard universals as existing in the manner of concrete things.² For those who make this reply seem, as a rule, to be assuming that the only alternative is the drawing of some distinction between the existent and what they entitle the subsistent. Thus we find Dawes Hicks stating that though it is "an intricate and perplexing matter" to explain what exactly should be understood by the "subsistence" of universals, he is none the less convinced "that not only have we no reason for assuming that the realm of being is coincident with the realm of existence, but that we may be perfectly certain it is not".³ This, like other statements in reference to the subsistent, I find myself quite unable to understand; and if a theory of universals can be propounded which does not require us to resort to any such doctrine, that, I should claim, will itself be an argument in its favour.

particularity of its qualities; or otherwise stated, that if there is an ultimate plurality of substances, characters, as such, cannot be universals. I have not attempted to discuss this very important argument, because, not finding myself in sufficient agreement with it, the questions which it raises, especially as to the nature of substance, could not have been dealt with save by entering upon questions outside the compass of this article. For similar reasons, I abstain from dwelling upon an argument which I should myself regard as supporting the view of certain so-called characters as particulars, but which will have cogency only for those who can agree with the assumptions upon which it proceeds—the argument, namely, that at least certain factors which are usually treated as characters, those which are *sensa* (colours, sounds, 'heats,' etc.), are events, and for this reason alone must be regarded as particular. Each event may be an event of a certain type, but as an event it will be itself particular. I do not wish to suggest that all qualities—this, of course, would be impossible—must ultimately be of this kind. Relations are certainly not events; and if relations are instances of universals it will follow that universals cannot all be conceived as types of events. Some qualities may be so describable and others not. When Whitehead (*Concept of Nature*, pp. 18-19) says that predication is "a muddled notion," he is, I take it, referring to the predication of properties, and is really asserting that the categories of quality and of substance are muddled notions. "The predication of properties veils radically different relations between entities. Accordingly, 'substance,' which is a correlative term to 'predication,' shares in the ambiguity."

¹ Cf. above, p. 139 (in first article).

² Cf. Dawes Hicks, in *Relativity, Logic, and Mysticism* (Aristotelian Soc. Supp. Vol. iii), p. 127.

³ *Loc. cit.*

Such, then, are the main difficulties which lie in the way of a view such as Stout's on the one hand, and of the more customary view on the other; and I shall now endeavour to explore the possibility of an alternative to them. Can universals be defended, while asserting that qualities are as particular as the things in which they appear, and while yet denying that the unity of the universal is the merely distributive unity of a class? In the recent discussion on *Universals and the 'Method of Analysis'*,¹ Mr. Joseph, in maintaining that the distinction of particular and universal is not that of substance and attribute, suggests as a reason for their mistaken identification the fact that language does not have distinct names for a particular quality and the universal of which it is an instance. In order to indicate a particular quality we have therefore to indicate the thing or things which possess it; and it may seem that the things are alone particular, and that the character, as a character, is universal. For this reason, also, the linguistic form of the proposition allows of either mode of interpretation. 'A is red and B is red' can mean either, as on the orthodox view, that A and B have one and the same identical character 'red,' or it may mean that A and B have a character of the same *kind* 'red'. But why, it may be objected, do we bring in the word character at all? It does not occur in the assertions made. Why therefore make the statements cumbersome by introducing it? Why not take the propositions as given, and so as stating simply that both A and B are red? The reply is that when we do so, we leave the question which we are discussing unanswered, and that the propositions therefore continue to be ambiguous.

No one questions that A and B are in some sense instances of red. On any and every view, as to the nature of the universal, this will be agreed.² The question is as to the nature of the red itself. Is it, *as a character*, particular or universal? Or in other words, is a predicate the same as a character, and are both universal? To answer this question, the formulation of the proposition must be made more explicit than is necessary for the purposes of ordinary speech.

¹ Aristotelian Society, Supplem. Vol. v, pp. 8-9. I presume that Joseph is maintaining some such general standpoint as that of Cook Wilson. How far he agrees with Stout, he does not indicate.

² Cf. Stout, *The Nature of Universals and Propositions*, p. 13: "On any view, the division of substances into classes is in some way dependent on a corresponding distinction between their adjectives. It presupposes that, in some sense, a plurality of things share in a common character. The only question is, what is meant by their sharing in a common character? I take this to mean that each is characterised by a particular instance of a general kind or class of characters."

As I have stated, it is not even enough to say that A is an instance of red; the statement is still ambiguous as an answer to our question, for it can still be interpreted in either manner. We may mean that *the concrete thing* A is an instance of red, *i.e.*, that it is the subject of which red is a character. But again no one is concerned to question this. The sole question at issue is as to the nature of the *character*. Is it, *qua* character or quality, a universal, or is it a particular instance of a universal, *i.e.*, of a kind or type? To raise the question therefore involves the bringing in of the term 'character'.¹

The fact that in every case, alike as regards characters and as regards relations, there is only one name, and that if a distinction exist between a character or relation as particular and as universal, it receives no recognition in language, may perhaps be taken as a point in favour of the view that the distinction is not required and is not even possible; but by itself the absence of a linguistic distinction does not prove that this is so. The question under discussion is a strictly philosophical one and as such does not emerge on the non-metaphysical plane. So far as modes of linguistic expression are concerned, we are free to take either view.

To return now to my main question: can we distinguish in every character and in every relation between their existence as particulars and the type of which they are particulars? The fact that while adherents of the orthodox view declare every character and relation, however specific, to be universal, Cook Wilson and Stout have yet found reason to interpret them in the diametrically opposite manner, so far suggests that the *via media* is at least worth exploring. We cannot, I think, hope to justify a distinction between characters, as being some of them particular and some universal. Consider, for instance, the case of a character such as red. Even the most specific shade of red can appear in different places and at different times; and if such separateness of appearance is to be evidence of multiplicity and therefore of the existence of a kind, with instances, it will follow that no distinguishable characters, however specific, are incapable of being so regarded. Nor can we argue that while characters are all alike in being either all of them particular or all of them universal, this need not be true of relations. We might be inclined to take such a view, on observing that concepts, in proportion as they

¹ Cf. Cook Wilson, *Statement and Inference*, vol. i, p. 349: "... in the sentence 'this flower is blue,' 'this flower' is not a particular of 'blueness,' ... the true particular of blueness is the colour of the flower, not the flower itself".

are general, tend to be more predominantly relational (or schematic) in nature. It is so in the case of 'colour': the property which marks it off from other types of *sensa*, its capacity for defining outline in a visual field, is a highly relational type of character. The evidence, however, for the particularity of relations is the same, neither greater nor less, as for the particularity of characters. The relation 'to the right of' appears in different places and at different times, just as does a character, and there seems no reason for believing that what holds of characters (if it does so hold) is not likewise true of all relations, namely, that they exist as particulars.

The view which I am suggesting, as an alternative to the customary view, may therefore be stated in the following terms: that corresponding to *every* character and to *every* relation there is a kind or type of which the character or relation is an instance. If this assertion, and the distinction which it presupposes, can be justified, the universal will be a name for the kind or type, and not for the class or totality of the instances. It will be by its very nature an abstract, never a concrete universal. It will signify what cannot indeed *exist* save in its instances, but as universal will not signify these instances, either severally or in their totality. By a universal we shall always mean simply a type, that is to say, a kind or pattern, which is, or conceivably can be, repeated. The universal, in other words, will be a name for the recurrent.

Now, by general admission, what recurs can never be either a continuant or an event. It cannot be a continuant, because though a continuant can come back into our experience, it does so not as recurrent but simply as continuant. It is the experiences of it—that is, as I should argue, the type or kind of experiences—which alone recur, not itself as experienced. Nor can the recurrent be an event. An event, being a one-time occurrence, also, as such, does not allow of repetition. The only remaining factors in existence, in addition to continuants and events, are characters and relations. These are admittedly, in *some* form, recurrent. On the traditional view, they are regarded as universals; every quality and every relation, it is contended, is capable of appearing in different times and places, and in connexion with numerically distinct things. While dissenting from this view, and agreeing with Cook Wilson and Stout that qualities and relations are, as existences, always particular, I shall argue that none the less each is apprehensible only as a 'so-and-so,' as a 'such,' and that what is recurrent in them is exclusively a type, kind or pattern.

Cook Wilson draws attention¹ to the distinction between a proposition such as 'This flower is a hyacinth,' and the proposition, 'This flower is blue'. In the former proposition, 'this flower' is a true particular of the universal 'hyacinthness' (A-ness) in this sense that there is nothing in its nature as a particular (A), which is not comprised in its having the quality A-ness.² In the other proposition 'this flower' is not a particular of 'blueness,' since blueness does not cover its whole nature. The true particular (A) of blueness (A-ness) is in this case the *colour* of the flower, not the flower itself. Arguing from this distinction, Cook Wilson maintains that it is wrong to say that 'Circularity is a universal'. He does not question that circularity is the universal of which all circles are the particulars. But he none the less contends that it is illegitimate, or at the least misleading, to say that it is a universal. For this assertion, he claims, can only mean that while circularity is itself a universal, it is at the same time in its whole nature determined as a particularisation of another universal, namely, of 'universalness,' *i.e.*, that one universal is a *particular* of another. (Different universals can have a universal common to them, Cook Wilson explains, but not as particulars of this common universal, only as differentiations of it.) But surely the proper analogy upon which to interpret the proposition, 'Circularity is a universal' is the proposition, 'This flower is blue'—regarded in the manner in which Cook Wilson himself regards it. We should then interpret the former proposition as asserting that circularity has a character of the type, being a type, and is therefore correctly describable as being *in this respect* a universal, and indeed as having *in this respect* its *whole* nature determined thereby—that is to say, if I am correct in maintaining that being a type is precisely, neither more nor less than, being a universal. Similarly, when Cook Wilson contends³ that 'universalness' is not a true universal, on the ground that a universal must have some definite quality,⁴ I should reply that 'being a type' is the exact equivalent of 'universalness,' and is the required quality.⁵

There are two chief difficulties which call for consideration. First, if all characters and relations exist as particulars,

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 149, 348 ff.

² The influence of Hegelian teaching, presumably as handed on by T. H. Green, is here particularly evident.

³ *Op. cit.*, p. 351.

⁴ *Cf.* below p. 411.

⁵ The separate typescript, which Mr. Farquharson has given as § 148 (*op. cit.*, pp. 344-348), seems to be an earlier, less successful attempt to formulate the above argument, as given in § 149.

and only types can be general or universal, how is it that types can be truly predicable of characters? And secondly, in what do types, in their distinction from particulars, consist? If types are admitted to be universals, and also to allow of differences in the degrees of their generality, are we not, under the title 'type' or 'universal,' virtually asserting, what we have professed to deny, that characters can exist as universals?

As already stated, I am maintaining that a particular cannot be apprehended save as an instance of a universal, *i.e.*, as a 'so-and-so,' as a 'such'. Recognition, I shall argue, is fundamental in all knowledge—meaning by recognition, not what is popularly so-called, namely identification of a continuant as previously experienced, but apprehension of an existence as a 'such', as being of a kind, type or pattern. An alternative mode of formulating this same thesis is to claim that the judgment or proposition is the unit of thought, and that the distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by description—otherwise between immediate and mediate knowledge—when properly interpreted, is really between elements distinguishable in all apprehension, not between two separate kinds of apprehension.

Types are of two main forms, those which are simple and those which are complex. Let us, then, first consider what can be meant by a type, when the type is simple and is indistinguishable from its instances, as in the case of a precise shade of red. This shade can appear in separate particulars; and in these different embodiments, as regards shade, *i.e.*, type of colour, is indistinguishable from itself. In such a case, when the alleged particulars are thus admittedly exact replicas of the pattern, what precisely is involved in the contention that it is not an identical red which is appearing, but only instances of a type which can be distinguished from them? The reasons for desiring to make such a distinction, whether sufficient or insufficient as reasons, have already been stated. The question which I am now discussing is what, in the absence of observable differences, the distinction can mean, and how it can be possible.

Since there is danger of being carried too far from the question in hand, and also of my stating the issue in a manner so dependent upon what happen to be my own personal views as to be prejudging it, I shall safeguard myself by here making use of Cook Wilson's brief presentation of the question.¹ How, he asks, do we begin to notice things which we have not noticed before, and where therefore these

¹ *Cf. op. cit.*, p. 340 ff.

beginnings are necessarily without language? In other words, what must an act of apprehending anything involve, to be an act of apprehension at all?

"If we notice a particular A_1 , we cannot apprehend it as a mere individual, but as having some distinctive quality A , this quality being individualised in A_1 But, in thus noticing A in A_1 for the first time, we have *ex hypothesi* not more than one instance of A before us in apprehension. What we are apprehending as A is indeed a universal quality in a particular, and so far Aristotle is right [when he says 'perception is of the universal'], but it does not follow that we apprehend it as such, that we have, in his terminology, 'perception of the universal *qua* universal'." ¹

In the apprehension of the universal as a universal there is involved, Cook Wilson maintains, a *three-fold* distinction, between the particulars, the 'something definite' identical in the particulars, and the universal. The two latter are, he holds, connected but yet distinct. The 'something definite' he also entitles the 'characteristic being of the universal,' and distinguishes it from the universal as A from A -ness. Thus if we take, as an illustration, particular reds (A_1 , A_2 , A_3 , etc.), by which as Cook Wilson is careful to point out, we should mean not red things but 'individual red colours,' *i.e.*, 'reds,' then the quality red (A), usually represented by the adjective red, is the 'something definite,' the 'characteristic being of the universal,' and redness (A -ness), of which the particulars are the instances, is the universal. The fact that A is always a 'something definite' (*e.g.*, the red in reds), and consequently is easily confused with particularity, explains, Cook Wilson suggests, why the nominalists have sought to reduce A to A_1 (*e.g.*, red to this and that red). The directly opposite error, he seems to imply, has been committed by the adherents of the orthodox view. Regarding as unnecessary, and indeed as illegitimate, any distinction additional to that between things and universals, they reduce both A_1 and A to the only kind of A -ness which their position allows.

There are certain other points which Cook Wilson regards as essential for an understanding of these distinctions; first, that the 'characteristic being of the universal' is only to be understood by realising what corresponds to the universal in the particular instances; it cannot be known apart from the particulars: and secondly, that the process of noticing, however elementary, necessitates distinction of what is noticed from something else, which is therefore also so far noticed. Thus if we notice an individual A_1 , and notice its quality A as distinct, we need to be noticing at least one other individual,

¹ *Loc. cit.*, pp. 340-341.

B₁. A third, and last point is that we cannot say that in apprehending A₁, in its distinction from B₁, as a particular and as having the 'characteristic being' A, we have therefore apprehended it as a particular of A-ness.

We are now, I think, in position to understand Cook Wilson's answer to our main question.¹ While the apprehension of the difference of A and B, when they thus appear as different qualities in A₁ and B₁, enables us to distinguish A₁ and B₁ as particular beings, and so to recognise, for instance, the particularity of A₁, *we have not so far made any distinction between A and the particularity of A₁*. For though we are apprehending A, 'the characteristic being' of the universal, in its difference from B, we are *not apprehending A as having an existence beyond A₁*, that is, *not as a universal in particulars*; and similarly, though we apprehend A₁ as a particular, in its distinction from B₁, we are *not apprehending A₁ as a particularisation of A*. What is before us is, indeed, Cook Wilson maintains, "a particularised universal of 'characteristic being' A" but what we thus far actually apprehend in it is only this 'characteristic being'; and this 'characteristic being' in being thus apprehended is apprehended neither as universal nor as particular. Accordingly those who hold that perception is always of a universal and those who hold that it is always of the mere particular are, Cook Wilson argues, alike in error. For though everything which we apprehend in perception is a particular of a universal and never a mere particular, it need not be apprehended either *as* particular or *as* a universal.²

Cook Wilson, it will be noted, owing to his fundamental conviction, which he shares with the orthodox view, that the distinction between the particular and the universal is an ultimate fact and that neither is intelligible in the absence of the other, holds that every finite existence—and he counts characters as belonging to this class—is a particular of a universal, or to use his terminology, is a particularisation of the 'characteristic being' of a universal. Consequently the 'characteristic being' having been identified in one particular can be identified in another particular. Such identification would be impossible if A, in the first instance,

¹ For brevity's sake, I have omitted one factor in Cook Wilson's account, namely his insistence—it is another of the main tenets in the idealist theories of knowledge, and as such is no less insisted upon by Stout than by Bradley and Bosanquet—that particulars can be distinguished only within the sphere of some kind of being which is common to them all and so universal, i.e., that all advance in knowledge is specification of previously existing less specific knowledge. Cf. *op. cit.*, pp. 337, 340-341.

² *Op. cit.*, p. 344.

had been apprehended as confined to A_1 , that is, if we had apprehended A_1 merely as a particular. (One particular, needless to say, can never be identified with another.) But having apprehended it, from the start, neither as particular nor as universal, and it (*i.e.*, 'the characteristic being' A) being in itself identical in the various different particulars, there is no obstacle to our recognising it as being thus identical. When we have done so, then for the first time we have recognised the universal *as* universal.

The only part of the above account which I find reason for questioning is Cook Wilson's distinction between A and A -ness, that is, between the 'characteristic being' of a universal and the universal itself. The sole reason which he here gives for drawing this distinction is the fact, which I see no ground for questioning, that on first apprehending the universal we need not explicitly apprehend it as being a universal, just as we also need not explicitly apprehend the particular as being particular. But this surely is no sufficient ground for denying that it *is* the universal which is being apprehended when we apprehend A . The universal (A -ness) cannot, of course, be identified with A , if A -ness has to be defined in concrete, extensional fashion, as being the totality of its instances. But this reason apart, I can find in Cook Wilson no justification for the drawing of the distinction between A and A -ness. He admits that the distinction between A_1 and A in such a case as red is a philosophical distinction, with which ordinary language is not concerned. Redness is, however, a term which we do employ in ordinary speech; and it seems a very forced interpretation to take it as a name not for 'the characteristic being' of the universal 'red,' but as a name for the totality of all the actual and possible instances of red. Cook Wilson's and Stout's interpretation of the universal, as a name for the totality of the actual and possible instances, seems still more unnatural when applied to relations. Surely in conceiving the universal 'to the right of,' we do not require to be thinking of a class constituted of all those cases, actual and possible, in which the relation may exist.

My contention therefore is that in the case of absolutely specific types, which being simple do not allow of variation, the whole nature of the particular is determined by the type: each instance is apprehensible only as a 'such,' and the 'such' is the type. The distinction can be quite adequately symbolised as being between A_1 , A_2 , A_3 , etc., and A . The type or universal, A , as such, is a predicate, not a character; but A_1 , A_2 , A_3 , etc., being what they are, it is truly predicable

of them. Hence when we say, 'This flower is red,' what we are asserting is, 'This flower has a character which is of the type "being red"'. .

A chief respect in which 'being a character' differs from 'being a type' is that the latter involves, as already noted, consideration of more than the character, or even than the thing or event which has the character. I may express this difference by saying that even when the character in question is a quite simple character, our apprehension of the corresponding type involves reference to a complex situation in which there is more than one instance of the character, and in which the instances are severally identified as of the same 'so and so'. Only one instance may be supplied to us in actual experience; the other may be obtained through ideal construction. But whatever the means, the complex situation must be mentally entertained, if the type, *i.e.*, a universal as a universal, is to be apprehended. The difference between 'being a character' and 'being a type' may therefore be taken as the difference between a mode of existence and that mode of existence as reflected upon. *Universalia* belong to the reflective sphere, but are *bene fundata* in the nature of things.

These considerations suggest a method of answering our next question: namely as to the nature of the complex types, such as 'being a colour,' 'being a shape,' 'being a number,' types of living organism, and the types, normative and other, dealt with by the humanistic disciplines. All the strictly logical issues come up in connexion with any one of these types, and further discussion of the type 'being a colour,' with occasional references to other types, will, I think, indicate sufficiently clearly the nature of the proposed standpoint.

This is the most difficult part of my enquiry. For in connexion with it I have to meet the objection that there are certain non-specific, or as we usually say, *general* characters, which appear to be in no respect particular, such, for instance, as 'colour,' 'shape,' 'number'. Can type be understood in a connotative manner, save by adoption of the orthodox view that such characters as these are of necessity universal, and can never exist as particulars? I have already touched upon this point in other connections. The interpretation which I have given to the proposition, 'Red is a colour,' is that it asserts, 'Red has a character of the general type "being a colour"'. The question itself, however, has not yet been answered. What is meant by 'being of the type colour,' or in other words, having a character of which this predicate can be truly asserted? Though 'red' is that to which this

predicate is being applied, what is asserted is not simply that it is red, but that it has a character distinguishable from simply being red. For since the predicate 'being a colour' can also be asserted of what is *not* red, for instance, of green, quite clearly it is not being simply equated, in its existential being, with red. The answer is, I think, fairly obvious, when the complex spatial situation in which colours exhibit their properties is taken into account. We then find, in addition to the qualitative types constituted by the different colours, a certain other type of a *highly relational nature*, which is uniform for all the colours, namely that of defining outline through contrast of colouring. This is a type of property found in connexion with every colour, and found only in colours; and is, I have maintained, our reason for assigning to each and all of them the title 'colour'.

Now the situation which is experienced when we observe two different colours defining the limit between them is a particular situation—particular in the same sense in which a simple character is particular, namely, as being a particular instance of such and such a type. In one important respect it does, indeed, differ from a simple quality. Being complex, many of its simpler terms and relations can vary without destroying the uniformity of the type. This would seem to be what is meant by saying that a certain type is a *general* type. We may merely mean that it is a type which has many duplicate instances; and this is one meaning of the term 'general'. But we recognise different degrees of generality in types and universals; and what is then meant would seem to be that the more general types are not merely general in contrast to the particularity of their instances, but are general in contrast to their distinguishable sub-species. But does this mean more than that one and the same result can be obtained by different methods? Uniformities are of different orders; those which depend upon a variety of contributory conditions can, in certain cases, be achieved in more than one way. The variety of the sub-types, distinguishable according to the variety of means employed, is, however, so far as type is concerned, really irrelevant. Either the type is achieved or it is not; and if it is, the relation between it and its instances is interpretable in the same manner as the relation between a precise type of red and the particulars in which it is found.

What tends to conceal this from view is that the subtypes are always more than simply embodiments of the more general type, and therefore involve for their apprehension the recognition of further types. The sub-grouping does not,

however, in the least diminish the uniformity of the more general type. Visual definition of outline can be achieved through the contrast of red and green or through the contrast of yellow and blue; and adequately to apprehend the two situations involves identification through each of the four qualitative types. But in the case of the predicate 'being a colour,' which is equally applicable to any one of the four colours, there is identification only through one type, a type which is constant in both situations. In distinguishing, therefore, within the type 'being a colour' the subordinate species, 'red,' 'green,' etc., we are not required to hold that the property which leads us to identify both red and green as colours is a general property in any sense in which the sub-type 'red' is not itself a general property. What has been said in regard to simple types, that the whole nature of the particular character in question is determined by the type, will also apply to this complex type.

To take an instance from another field: if triangularity be defined as the type 'three-sided rectilineal figure,' then through all variations of type the number, straightness and closedness of the sides remain unvaried. In these respects the type is absolutely uniform and identical in all triangles, however otherwise they may vary. Every existing triangle must, of course, be more than simply an embodiment of the type triangle; but to whichever of the sub-types, equilateral, isosceles or scalene, it may belong, the unvarying identity of the main type is not affected by the diverse ways in which it is thus achieved. Here as in all other such cases, identity is not in any degree diluted by the intervention of differences. In simple types the 'instances' are *characters*, and the only differences discoverable in them reduce to existential differences, and as such ultimately to differences of position within some system; in the more complex types, the 'instances,' strictly interpreted, are again the *characters* of which the types are types. We can, of course, in the manner of the customary view of universals, regard the 'instances,' as being the 'things' which, while having these characters, also have other characters; and only in such a way of speaking can the differences be said to enter into the constitution of the 'particulars,' *i.e.*, not of the characters but of the things.

Similarly, though 'being a living organism' is a highly general type, judged by the number of its distinguishable sub-types, this type must none the less be definable in absolutely precise terms. Its generality is in no sense equivalent to vagueness or indefiniteness of character; and this is as true of 'being a living organism' as of 'being a specific

shade of red'; the type must remain throughout *the same identical type*, and in respect of the *type*, the instances must be indistinguishable from one another. And just as a certain amount of abstractive analysis is required to get at the type 'red'—every red that we experience being apprehended as a red patch or surface, with a multiplicity of features which are not relevant—so likewise in the case of the type 'being a living organism'. Indeed it is a task requiring the scientifically trained observer. In ordinary consciousness such terms are used vaguely and loosely; and as Socrates discovered in reference to moral concepts, the capacity to define them is often more than can be expected even of the professional thinker. But preciseness of nature, however difficult to discern or to formulate, is none the less always presupposed, and, so far as I can see, is in no way incompatible with particularity of existence. I am proceeding, of course, on the very large assumption that the corresponding argument has been made good in regard to simple characters. If, however, this can be granted, it would seem to follow that whatever meaning is to be ascribed to the phrase 'degrees of generality,' this meaning cannot be such as will affect the issue. I do not mean to suggest that complex types are analysable without remainder into simple types. But complex types of whatever order of unity are, I should maintain, to be viewed as being, like simple types, identical in their instances, and therefore as being compatible with thoroughgoing particularity in all the characters and relations which we can observe in the instances, or which in view of the requirements of the type, we are constrained to ascribe to them.

I may here intercalate a reference to that part of Bosanquet's teaching which bears upon the question before us. If the above position be tenable, then even when the type is 'a scheme of modifiable relations,'¹ the scheme is not *itself* modifiable: it stands for what is uniform in all the instances in which it is found. In apprehending triangularity or animality, we are, of course, alive to various alternative possibilities; but this only means that we are interested in other characters besides triangularity and animality; there are different sorts of triangles and animals, but not different sorts of triangularity and animality. If it be not so, what can be meant by saying that all the types of triangularity or of animality are *triangular* or *animal* types? Bosanquet asserts that in man animality is of a modified type: what he ought to have asserted is that man is a type of *animal* of a highly

¹ Cf. above, p. 151 (in first article).

specific kind. Similarly animals, not animality, are either vertebrate or invertebrate.

To allege that no conception of triangularity or animality is adequate unless it contains reference to the different species in which it can be embodied is virtually to allege that no conception is adequate unless it extends to the detail of all the varying particulars to which it applies. Short of this, there is no consistent stopping place. If, for instance, the conception of triangularity must in itself, in order to be adequate, involve explicit reference to its having three main species, must it not also take account of the fact that in every triangle the three angles are equal to two right-angles, and that when a triangle is right-angled the square on its hypotenuse equals the squares on its other two sides, etc.? If humanity has to include 'Frenchmanity,' must it not make reference to the differences of racial origin, of outlook and temperament, in the various Provinces of France, as also to all the innumerable differences in individual Frenchmen whether of the past, of the present, or of the possible future?

Bosanquet's contention¹ that though certain characters have always to be included in the universal concept, one or more of them may be at zero value, cannot, I should say, be granted. He would appear to be claiming the right to say 'yes' in a predicate and 'no' in the subject to which the predicate is applied. Take, for instance, the example to which, in this connexion, Mr. Hoernlé has recently² drawn attention, *viz.*, 'nationality.' Is it legitimate to maintain that an adequate concept of 'nationality' *must always* involve the characters of political subjection and political domination, and that the concept is yet applicable even when, as in the case of the Swiss, both these characters are non-existent? Is not this to confuse the question as to the range of historical contingencies contributory to the emergence of national unities with the very different question as to the characters which are required to justify the assertion, in any given case, that this type of unity has or has not been attained? Nationality has certainly been achieved under very varying conditions. Does it, therefore, follow that the understanding of what is meant by nationality is impossible if we be ignorant of these diverse historical influences, and that it cannot be conceived save by reference to them? Is it not the very negation of any effective precision in reasoned discourse, when we thus obscure (in the favoured Hegelian fashion) the distinction

¹ Cf. above, p. 151 ff. (in first article).

² In the issue of *MIND* above referred to, p. 190 ff.

between the accepted or postulated meaning of terms and the never-ending task of obtaining detailed understanding of the diverse historical or natural entities to which each can be applied? I do not press the further point that since, on Bosanquet's view, 'Frenchmanity' (and not merely the negro)¹ falls short of much that is implied in humanity, the term 'human,' so regarded, is not fully applicable to individual Frenchmen; and that we are therefore left with none but the vaguest of pronouncements as to the conditions under which, in this and other cases, a universal is or is not applicable, or as to what precisely it signifies when actually applied.

Some such 'elastic'² use of concepts, whatever be its disadvantages, is doubtless obligatory upon an absolutist philosophy. In giving up the doctrine of a distinguishable essence (or as I should prefer to describe it, of definitely distinguishable factors or contents), and so in disavowing, in fact, if not intention, any distinction between properties and accidents, Bradley and Bosanquet, while yet endeavouring to retain much of the older teaching, have set their feet upon the very different road that leads—in the expectation of transcending relations by exhausting them—to their relationless Absolute.

To return to my main argument: from the standpoint which I have adopted, universals are either simple or complex, that is, represent types of lower and of higher order. The main difference between these two classes of universals is that whereas simple types allow of possible (*i.e.*, conceivably possible), as well as actual instances, they do not allow of possible sub-types. Complex types, on the other hand, owing to variability in their accompaniments, may allow of possible sub-types as well as of possible instances. If, however, we are classing, not universals but relations and characters, and thereby the entities (things and events) which are so related and characterised,³ then the above types, through their recurrence, give rise in turn to a fourfold division—classes of relations, classes of characters, classes of things (*i.e.*, continuants), and classes of events.

When universality is thus regarded, as consisting in recurrence of type, there is no longer any serious difficulty in explaining the chief characteristics through which universals are distinguished from particulars. We are in position, for instance, to explain why universals do not allow of quantitative predicates. Multiplication of instances does not increase

¹ Cf. *loc. cit.*, p. 152.

² Cf. Hoernlé, *loc. cit.*, p. 192.

³ Cf. above, p. 398.

the amount of a type *qua* type. There is as much of the type 'green colour' in a single blade of grass as in two blades, in a half-blade as in a whole blade.

Hence also the 'inoperativeness' of universals. This is only what we should expect if characters are not identical save simply in type. A type, as a type, is not directly operative. What can alone operate are the causal and other factors in the system within which it appears, the factors which have conditioned its emergence as a type, which favour or do not favour its continuance, and which consequently determine how many instances embody it in actual existence, and in what precise modes. In an indirect, and none the less effective, fashion, type does, of course, determine consequences. The causal factors which operate are themselves of certain sorts, and act differently according to the sorts of things they are.

And lastly, to the question how universals can appear in different times and places, and in connexion with numerically distinct things, the answer is simple and obvious. Universality consists not in identity of existence or of occurrence, but solely in the identity of a type that is recurrent in separate particulars.

There are certain further questions, bearing on the existential status of universals, which are much too complicated to be dealt with in a few pages, but which are so directly relevant that before concluding I must attempt to indicate my attitude towards them. In maintaining that no existent can be apprehended save as a 'so-and-so,' as a 'such,' I have intended to suggest, though on wider grounds than can here be discussed, that the mode in which particulars are thus known is also the form in which they exist. Accordingly I have agreed in one quite fundamental respect with the orthodox view, namely that universals are integral to reality, and are predicable of it in a direct and not in a merely extensional manner. In this sense, while distinguishing, as the orthodox view does not, between characters and predicates, I have maintained that every actual universal is truly predicable of one or more actual particulars, namely, as being their type, *i.e.*, as being a pattern of which there are other instances, possible, if not actual. I have further suggested that every non-actual, but conceivable, universal is a differentiation of some other, complex, universal which is thus actual.¹

¹ I have discussed the matter somewhat more fully in an article on "Whitehead's Philosophy of Nature," in *Issues and Tendencies in Contemporary Philosophy* (University of California Publications 1923), pp. 218 ff.

In this last statement I indicate my answer to the question—so important in connexion with the controversy as to the possibility of distinguishing between existence and subsistence—whether types are conceivable beyond any that have been actualised in the Universe as we find it to exist. If we can hold that every actual universal has possible (*i.e.*, abstractly conceivable) as well as actual instances, and also that certain complex universals have possible as well as actual sub-species—their possibility being determined solely by reference to the universals, without consideration of the factors which would have to be reckoned with, if we were considering whether they could also be actual—we shall escape what I should describe as the two evil alternatives, either of having to agree with Bradley and Bosanquet that nothing is possible which is not also real, or of having to hold that supplementary to the real there is a second realm, that of the subsistent. The possible, in so far as it is relative to some *actual* universal will be genuinely, though only abstractly, possible.

When we further ask whether the abstractly possible—as a possible additional instance of an existing type or as a possible new sub-type of an existing type—can be or become itself actual, we are asking a legitimate and quite intelligible question, namely as to whether the supplementary conditions required for making it actual (in addition to those which have determined the actuality of the presupposed type) are themselves possible, *e.g.*, as to whether, and if so by what means, air can be made to exist in solidified form, or as to whether, and if so by what means, poverty can be abolished by advances in chemistry, or war by changes in international organisation and in human nature. Special, detailed knowledge is required to answer either the 'whether' or the 'what' of any such questions; and we cannot, ahead of experience or at least of adequate theory, dogmatise in regard to them. And for the same reasons, when similar questions of a more metaphysical character are propounded, we cannot hope to answer them simply in terms of any doctrine of universals, or indeed from any purely logical standpoint, but only in this or that differing manner, according as our general philosophy, based on wider grounds, is of this or that kind. No universals—at least, as it would seem, none of those humanly accessible to us—are ever self-justifying, not even when they are of the normative character dealt with in the humanistic disciplines. For even in those fields in which rights and values come up for consideration, type does not seem to be any more independent of the rest of reality than happens in the case of what we presume to call the merely *de facto*.

In other words, one main consequence of the view here taken of universals is that they will have to be regarded as being in all cases *conditioned* modes of existence—a conclusion which, if true, will result in a very different type of rationalism than is usually favoured by the idealist philosophies. This, indeed, is of the nature of a corollary to the conclusion arrived at in the previous article, that relatedness within a system, not identity in difference, is the more ultimate category. System conditions both characters and relations, and therewith the types in which they recur.

II.—HOW HEGEL CAME TO ENGLAND.

By J. H. MUIRHEAD.

I.

HEGEL was born in 1770 and his name had been before the public in Germany since 1801 when he published his essay on *The Difference between Fichte and Schelling*. Yet it was long after this before we find him even mentioned in English philosophical literature, and longer still before any of his works appeared in English dress. When he did come to be mentioned by historians, it was only to be held up as an example of the extravagances to which "the intellect left to itself" and particularly the German rationalising intellect might lead its votaries. It was not until 1855, when an English translation of part of the *Logic*¹ was published, that any word of his was available to students ignorant of German. Thus it happened that before his work began to attract attention in England the whole movement of which it was an organic part had been disowned by its greatest living representative, Schelling, as having started from a negation and ended with an abstraction,² the school founded by him had been shattered into fragments,³ and a violent reaction had set in against the whole attitude of mind which it represented. Two questions are thus suggested to the student of British Idealism: 1. Whence this belated arrival in England of the greatest thinker of his time? 2. Why under the circumstances just mentioned did he arrive at all?

II.

(1) In attempting an answer to the former of these questions we have to recall in the first place the singular insularity that, precisely at this time, as contrasted both with

¹ *The Subjective Logic of Hegel*, translated by H. Sloman and J. Wallon.

² See Schelling's *Werke*, vol. iii, Bk i. See esp. on Hegel, pp. 87 foll.

³ "Since 1840," wrote Vaihinger in his essay on *The Jubilee of Kant's Critique of the Pure Reason*, "there has been hopeless philosophical anarchy in Germany". See the whole passage quoted by Max Müller in Preface to *Translation of the Critique*, i, p. xxiii.

an earlier and a later period, was a conspicuous mark of such British philosophers as there were. While in political matters, in physical Science and even in a sense in general literature, England was in close touch with continental life, in the matter of philosophical speculation there was a singular want of interest in what was being thought and written on the other side of the Channel or the German Ocean. Writing in the 1829¹ edition of the *Abridgment of his History of Philosophy*, Tennemann could say with more than partial truth, "Speculative Philosophy has been altogether neglected by the English, and Practical treated principally with reference to general Politics. Their national pride has at all times inclined them to concern themselves little about the philosophical pursuits of other nations, and, with few exceptions, they have attempted nothing by the path of abstruse and painful research. In consequence they continue to know little of the labours of the philosophers of Germany and are very imperfectly acquainted even with the system of Kant."² In the same spirit the French Philosopher Cousin announced to his audience in 1828, "England, Gentlemen, is a very considerable island; in England everything is insular, everything stops at certain limits, nothing is developed on a grand scale. England is not destitute of inventions; but history declares that she does not possess that power of generalisation and deduction which alone is able to push an idea or a principle to its entire development, and to draw from it all the consequences it encloses." "England," says the same author, speaking in the twenties, "has, strictly speaking, for some time past, and I might almost say for the last half century, not contributed her share to the philosophical researches of civilised Europe; no celebrated work on metaphysics has been published in England."³ No better illustration of this insularity could be given than the philosopher whose recent death Cousin goes on to deplore. In these years if any one had asked who was the leading British philosopher he would probably have been told Dugald Stewart, whose *Dissertations on Metaphysical and Ethical Science* were written for the Supplement to the then edition of the *Encyclopædia*

¹ The first edition dates from 1812.

² *Op. cit.* Eng. Tr. by the Rev. Arthur Thomson, M.A., Late Fellow of Wadham College (Oxford, 1832). In the *Morning Chronicle* in the course of a correspondence in 1814, Henry Richter (himself a pioneer in Kantian study) refers with surprise to "the appearance in your columns of so obsolete a character as an ENGLISH METAPHYSICIAN," which he attributes to the interest aroused by the publication of Madame de Staël's *Germany*.

³ Introduction to the *History of Philosophy* by Victor Cousin. Tr. by H. L. Linberg (Boston, 1832).

Britannica. Yet, as Stewart himself tells us in a note, he was totally ignorant of German. This, he adds, "would have prevented me from saying anything of the philosophy of Kant if the extraordinary pretensions with which it was first brought forward in this island, contrasted with the total oblivion into which it soon after very suddenly fell, had not seemed to demand some attention to so wonderful a phenomenon in the literary history of the eighteenth century". He proceeds to piece together such information as he can obtain from Kant's Latin *Dissertation* and from French and English translators and commentators, in a long condemnatory article on "Kant and other Metaphysicians of the New German School".¹

We can see, however, from these passages in Stewart that links were already being established between Germany and England:² the cordon by the twenties had been broken through, and more special causes than mere parochialness and self-complacency are required to account for the slowness with which the new thought made its way. These are to be found in the barriers which both what might be called the official philosophies within the Universities and the unofficial outside of them had themselves erected against the new thought.

(2) (a) In the older English Universities pledged to theological orthodoxy and "revealed religion" short shrift might be expected for any philosophy that relied solely on the powers of reason and was committed to following its lead. Endless vagaries and vain disputations were the natural result of its impious claims. "Of these everlasting disputes," writes the translator of Tennemann's *History*, "what has been the result? How little has been gained by endless controversy. The inadequacy of Human Reason to satisfy its own requirements ought to incline the learned and the wise a little to mistrust the guide to which they are apt to commit themselves without hesitation. The most fantastical dreams

¹ *Dissertations* (Edinburgh, 1835), pp. 187 foll. The chief interest for the historian in the caricature of Kant here given is the claim which Stewart puts forward on behalf of Cudworth to have anticipated his central doctrine of the place of the mind in the constitution of the objective world and "to be far superior to the German metaphysician, both in point of perspicacity and of precision". Needless to say he does justice neither to the one nor the other in the version he gives of their respective teaching. The note he adds on Cudworth's *Eternal and Immutable Morality* is important as illustrating the interest which that work had aroused on the continent after the publication in 1732 of Mosheim's Latin version.

² See below, pp. 429 foll.

of the wildest religious enthusiasts were never more repugnant to common sense than the Neo-platonism of Proclus, the Absolute Identity of Schelling or the Ego and Non-Ego of Fichte."¹

Substituting "Theism" and "belief in immortality" for "Revealed Religion" the same note of theological prejudice runs through the academic histories of the next two decades that bear the names of J. D. Morell² and Robert Blakey.³

We shall have to return to the measure that these writers provide of the state of British criticism at this time. Here we are concerned with the veil that theological prejudice drew over their eyes with regard to the significance of German Philosophy. Morell's criticism, otherwise contrasting with that of his contemporaries in containing a real attempt to find some meaning in the Hegelian paradoxes, ends with the total condemnation of the system on the ground that in it "Theism with all its mighty influence on the human mind is compromised . . . This being the case the hope of immortality likewise perishes . . . Religion, if not destroyed by the Hegelian philosophy, is absorbed in it and *as religion* forever disappears."⁴ Blakey who, writing later, might have profited from the work of his predecessor is merely "filled with melancholy" at the thought of writers "whose lives are spent in playing one paradox against another, and in striving who shall promulgate the most startling and outrageous conceits". He "stands aghast in amazement at the audacity and folly which gives utterance to doctrines so denuded of every particle of scriptural authority and common sense".⁵

(b) Equally hostile to the whole spirit of German Philosophy was the Positivism that was the prevailing spirit of non-academic philosophy in England in the thirties and forties of the century. There was a singular irony in the fact that the leading historian of philosophy at the time was a writer whose aim was to show "how and why the interest in Philosophy has become purely historical" and to whom it seemed the highest recommendation of his own work that it was

¹ Translator's Preface to Tennemann, *op. cit.*, p. xi. After mentioning some trifling alterations which he has permitted himself the translator goes on: "I am compelled to add that I have judged it better to omit altogether a few passages which appeared to militate against Revealed Religion rather than to alter or soften them". The reader is left wondering how so timid a defender of the faith could have summoned up courage to translate the history of so dangerous and useless a study.

² *Modern Philosophy* (London, 1846).

³ *History of the Philosophy of Mind* (London, 1850).

⁴ *Op. cit.*, ii, p. 159.

⁵ *Op. cit.*, vol. iv, p. 158.

"written by one disbelieving in the possibility of metaphysical certitude" and from the point of view of a science that "teaches us to regard the unhesitating temerities of Plato and Plotinus as we regard the efforts of a child to grasp the moon".¹ Lewes, like his more orthodox contemporary, is only restrained from laughter by the pain with which he contemplates the pretensions of German idealism in general and the "absurdities of the Hegelian system" in particular.²

(c) Finally, there was Scotland with its tradition of comparative detachment from theological dogma and a metaphysical genius which has always made it proof against the compromise of Positivism. After the dead hand of Reid's common-sense philosophy had been removed by the death of Dugald Stewart something better might be expected from the great chairs of philosophy in Edinburgh and Glasgow. There was at least vitality and movement in the work of Sir William Hamilton, but here also the fates were against the admission of post-Kantian German thought. Hamilton had identified himself with an interpretation of Kant's work on precisely opposite lines to those which the post-Kantian movement in Germany had pursued. Kant was taken to have raised a barrier between the human mind and knowledge of the Absolute and Hamilton's efforts were directed to the task of entrenching himself and his contemporaries in the resultant agnosticism. Again, also, there was an irony in the occupation of the successor to Stewart's seat with an interpretation of the syllogism that revived the worst traditions of the old formal Logic and made him entirely incapable not only of understanding the significance of Hegel's work in this department but of coming within sight of the meaning of its fundamental principle and method. His well known essay "On the Philosophy of the Unconditioned; in reference to Cousin's Infinito-Absolute" dates from 1829. In the new matter introduced on its republication in 1852 there occurs a long note on Schelling and Hegel in which the battle is joined:—

"If Hegel's Dialectic were (was?) logical, it was a logic outraging that science and the conditions of thought itself. Hegel's whole philosophy is indeed founded on two errors: on a mistake in logic and on a violation of logic. In his dream of disproving the law of excluded middle (between two Contradictories), he inconceivably mistakes Contraries for Contradictories; and in positing pure or absolute existence

¹ Lewes's *Biographical History of Philosophy* (Library Ed. 1857), p. xxxi.

² *Op. cit.*, 725 foll.

as a mental datum, immediate, intuitive, and above proof (though, in truth, this be palpably a mere relative gained by a process of abstraction) he not only mistakes the fact, but violates the logical law which prohibits us to assume the principle which it behoves us to prove. On these two fundamental errors rests Hegel's Dialectic; and Hegel's Dialectic is the ladder by which he attempts to scale the absolute".¹

Whatever may be said of Hegel's use of the Dialectic as a whole (and Croce has in our own day found much to say of his extension of it to what he calls "distincts" or "forms of the spirit" such as sensation and thought) there is a peculiar perversity in attributing to a doctrine that depends from first to last on the validity of the law of non-contradiction the design of undermining that law. Criticism has come full circle when the same modern author finds in Hegel's discovery of the union of opposites his chief permanent achievement in philosophy.²

(3) These historical influences would not, however, of themselves have been sufficient to explain the slow arrival in England of the Hegelian philosophy had it not been handicapped by its own inherent difficulty. In one respect Lewes was right, namely, that Hegel differs from Kant and Fichte in that, while these latter carry on a certain tradition of philosophical language and form of presentation, in Hegel the very language has to be learned. It is true that Hegel claimed for himself the intention of attempting "to teach philosophy to speak in German". But when used to denote philosophical ideas ordinary German words and phrases were apt to break down under the weight of the meaning and leave one with nothing. As Wallace has put it "in the atmosphere of Hegelian thought we feel very much as if we had been lifted into a vacuum where we cannot breathe and which is a fit habitation for unrecognisable ghosts only".³ Hence it came about that the ablest men of these years might be prepared to open their minds to the new philosophy if it would but open its mind to them, and yet might fall back defeated after the most strenuous effort. The experience of Ferrier⁴ writing in 1854 was probably typical of that of many. After

¹ Hamilton's *Discussions* (Edinburgh and London, 1866), p. 24 n.

² Croce in *What is Living and what is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel*, tr. by Douglas Ainslie, 1915.

³ *The Logic of Hegel*, p. xv.

⁴ The brilliant St. Andrew's Professor of Moral Philosophy and Political Economy between 1845 and 1864, the year of his death, author of *Institutes of Metaphysics* (1854), described by the writer of the article upon him in the Ninth Edition of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* as "perhaps the best propædæutic to the study of Metaphysics in the English language".

an interesting reference to the hopes that men were then placing in the octogenarian Schelling "to show that speculation was not all one 'barren heath,'" Ferrier goes on: "Hegel! But who has ever yet uttered one intelligible word about Hegel? Not any one of his country-men—not any foreigner—seldom even himself. With peaks here and there more lucent than the sun, his intervals are filled with a sea of darkness, unnavigable by the aid of any compass, and an atmosphere or rather vacuum in which no human intellect can breathe. Hegel had better not be meddled with just at present. Whatever truth there may be in Hegel, it is certain that his meaning cannot be wrung from him by any amount of mere reading, any more than the whisky which is in bread—so at least we have been informed—can be extracted by squeezing the loaf into a tumbler. He requires to be *distilled*, as all philosophers do, more or less—but Hegel to an extent which is unparalleled."¹ Schelling died the next year. It was perhaps the failure of all hope in that direction that led Ferrier to renew his attack on Hegel with somewhat better results. But that belongs to the next section of our story. Up to the middle of the fifties it may be said that no intelligible word had been spoken by British writers as to the place and significance of Hegel's work. What were the chief influences which brought about a change for the better and were to end in bringing Hegel to England?

III.

(1) The first place in these influences must be assigned to the steady flow into England, in face of indifference and prejudice, of translations and interpretations of Kant's works. For the more Kant was studied the more evident it became that his was not the final word and that the powerful movement, which he set agoing, swept inevitably on to his successors, of whom Hegel in point of his conclusions was the last.

I know of no complete account of the progress of Kantian study in England. Any attempt to give one here would carry us too far from our present text. But the mention of a few of the earlier translations and commentaries may serve at once to illustrate and to mitigate the accusations of the insularity directed against British thought which have been already quoted. While as compared with the 300 books and articles on Kant's philosophy which are said to have appeared

¹ J. F. Ferrier's *Institutes of Metaphysics*, 3rd Edition, pp. 95-96.

on the Continent within the first ten years after the publication of the *Critique of Pure Reason*¹ they make a sorry list, they yet show that from the middle of the nineties of the eighteenth century and still in Kant's life-time there was a steady stream of translation, comment, and exposition upon his work.

In 1795 Prof. F. A. Nitsch, who had attended Kant's lectures in Königsberg and was one of his favourite pupils, delivered public lectures in London on "The Analysis of the Mental Faculties as established in the Critique of Pure Reason," and in the following year published *A General and Introductory View of Professor Kant's Principles concerning Man, the World, and the Deity, submitted to the consideration of the learned*.

Two years afterwards appeared *The Principles of the Critical Philosophy selected from the works of Emmanuel Kant* by James Sig. Beck, translated from the German (London and Edinburgh, 1797); and, in the same year, an article by Henry Richter, another pupil of Kant, in a Supplementary Number of the *Monthly Magazine*, on "The Origin of the Idea of Cause," in which the writer earnestly urges the necessity of a candid examination of Kant's system.

In 1798 appeared *Elements of the Critical Philosophy* by A. F. M. Willich, M.D., who explains in the Preface that he "had the good fortune to attend Prof. Kant's lectures between the years 1778 and 1781 during his residence at the University of Königsberg and on the occasion of a visit to his native country again heard several of his lectures in 1792". This book contains a chronological account of thirty of Kant's principal works, including the *Critique of Pure Reason*, and fourteen of his minor works, as also a *Synopsis of the Critical Philosophy*, which was translated from the German of John Schultze, Chaplain to the King of Prussia, as a College exercise, by no less a hand than that of Dr. Reid of Glasgow. It was to this and Nitsch's book that Dugald Stewart seems to have owed a considerable part of his very imperfect knowledge of Kant.²

To the same period is to be referred the article on Kant in the fifth supplementary volume of the *Encyclopædia Britannica* by John Colquhoun, an Edinburgh advocate.

In 1814 occurred the correspondence in the *Morning Chronicle* already alluded to. In the course of this, on 12th March, appeared a long letter signed "A Friend to True Metaphysics" (in reality Henry Richter),³ to direct its readers

¹ See Max Müller, *op. cit.*, p. xv.

² See *Dissertation*, i, p. 191.

³ See Wirgman in work quoted below, p. 160a.

to a better source of information than the eloquence of Madame de Staël. Kant is described as "the *intellectual soul* that is beginning to dawn upon the long infancy of the world" and the central point of Kant's work is vigorously stated as the establishment of the constitutive function of the understanding "whose business is to give an intelligible nature to the objects of knowledge, that is, to constitute them as such before any consciousness or logical classification can take place". The same writer published in 1817 a philosophical satire, *Day Light, a recent Discovery in the Art of Painting; with hints on the Philosophy of the Fine Arts and on that of the Human Mind as first dissected by Emanuel Kant*, in which the attempt to discover what the object of sense is apart from the use of the intelligence is compared to "the whimsical practice of christening the child before it is born" in order to enforce the Kantian doctrine that "the word used to express a quality of sense must also express some property of the Intellect".

It was not till 1819 that we have, so far as I can find, any actual translation of Kant's works. In that year John Richardson published in English *Prolegomena to Every Future Metaphysic which can appear as a Science* and Kant's posthumous work on *Logic*, each with a reproduction of Wernet's portrait of Kant at the age of seventy-one (probably the first to appear in England); the *Logic* with a biographical appendix.

An impulse was given to Kantian study by the publication in the *Encyclopædia Londonensis* of long articles on Logic, Metaphysics, and Moral Philosophy¹ on Kantian lines by Thomas Wirgman as well as of *An Entirely New, Complete, and Permanent Science of Philosophy founded on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason*, which was issued from its press. The latter part of this work is occupied with an abridged translation of the *Critique*, undertaken, as the author tells us, with the object of introducing "to the notice of England that long dormant book which is the pride and the glory of Germany".²

¹These articles were printed separately with plates, 5s. coloured, 4s. plain.

²This book, with its long preface dated 6th October, 1823, was also obtainable with plates, 5s. coloured, 4s. plain. The author makes the interesting prophecy that if England does not adopt transcendental Philosophy. "Germany will on speculative points soon be many centuries in advance. But should this system once strike root in Britain I should not be surprised if, by her active powers, she were far to surpass, in application, all that has been effected at the birth-place of this divine system." Besides

By the thirties, through the influence of Coleridge, De Quincey¹ and Carlyle, Kant's name had become familiar in circles far beyond the "learned". Henceforth it occupies a conspicuous place in the histories of philosophy.

By this time also Hegel's name begins to appear. In the translation of Tennemann's *Manual of the History of Philosophy*, already mentioned, Hegel is referred to in the section on "Partisans and Adversaries of the System of Schelling" as having seceded with Krause from the tenets of his master; and later in the section on "Most recent Philosophical Systems" he is again named as "a professor at Berlin whose system is one of Absolute Idealism".

Within the next ten years on the continent Schelling's name has been superseded by Hegel's as that which really counts in the post-Kantian movement. In England Hegel appears in Lewes's *History* (1841) as closing the Ninth Epoch, which is described as "Demonstration of the Subjectivity once more leading to Idealism". In spite of his contempt for German Philosophy as the pursuit of a shadow and for Hegel's as mere verbalism Lewes is prepared to recognise the "high order of intelligences" to which its leading exponents belong. "Hegel especially impresses you with a sense of his wonderful power. His works we have always found very suggestive; his ideas, if repugnant to what we regard as the truth, are yet so coherent, systematically developed, so obviously coming from mature meditation, that we have always risen from the perusal with a sense of the author's greatness". His lectures on the *Philosophy of History* is even "one of the pleasantest books on the subject we ever read".²

In Morell's *Historical and Critical View of the Speculative Philosophy of Europe in the Nineteenth Century* (1846) the German School occupies a hundred and twenty pages in which Hegel's position is similarly recognised, and for the first time the attempt is made to find at least some sense in his paradoxes. The two principles of the Unity of Contradictions and the Identity of Being and Thought are singled out as the central ones and allowed to have "a germ of truth". The germ in the former is that "in every judgment two

a complete translation of the *Critique* he tells us he has himself in view an arrangement of the elements of Kant's philosophy for school use, "so susceptible is it of being conveyed into the tender mind of youth".

¹ De Quincey's translation of Kant's Essay on *The Idea of a Universal History on a Cosmopolitan Plan* appeared in *The London Magazine*, Oct. 1824.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 726 and 734.

different things form a unity: subject and predicate are the differences" and that "as knowledge advances differences become more and more merged into higher principles". The germ in the latter is contained in the fact that the infinite essence which we must suppose to be the absolute ground of things "only exists as it is thought: Universal Being is a purely rational conception, a necessary idea" which "does not come to its full reality except in the human consciousness: the real and the ideal meet in one; the very essence of the former consisting really in the process of the latter."¹ For the rest Morell interprets Hegelianism in a sense that makes it an easy mark for the kind of criticism which for half a century was in fashion among its enemies: Hegel resolved everything in process of thought. But whence the process? Hegel begins with Nothing and shows with logical precision how everything regularly proceeds from it by the law of the Dialectic. But is it not as easy to imagine an Infinite Being for the source of all things as an infinite law? Hegel makes the dialectic process everything: all nature, all mind, all history are but pulsations of this movement. But if this is so what becomes of man's freedom? "His personality is sunk in the infinite," "the law of progress being fixed man becomes irresponsible".²

We spoke in the last section of the bar of theological and antitheological prejudice that obstructed the advent of Hegel. But a weakness that is conscious of itself is on the way to correct itself. Frederick Denison Maurice at the beginning of the sixties marked a new era in philosophical criticism when he declared that, while "he had felt as a theologian, thought as a theologian, written as a theologian" while "all other subjects in his mind were connected with theology and subordinate to it," if he had allowed this to warp his judgment of philosophers with whom he disagreed "not my theology but the atheism which fights in me against my theology is answerable for that wrong". "So far as I confess God who is revealed in Christ I dare not mis-represent any one; I dare not pass judgment upon him."³ Similarly Maurice marked a new era in Kantian Criticism in England when he remarked upon the misfortune "for Kant's reputation in England that the epithet 'transcendental' had been much more associated with his philosophy than the epithet 'critical' and that the reasons which led him to adopt the former word had not been considered in the light of the latter". "The notion that Kant

¹ *Op. cit.*, vol. ii, p. 156.

² *Op. cit.*, vol. ii, pp. 157 foll.

³ *Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy* (1882 edition). Preface, p. ix.

was in some sense reversing the decrees of Locke by bringing in *a priori* truths has blinded us to the fact that the German had even a greater horror than the Englishman of that 'ocean' which he forbade us to approach."¹ Equally from the other side, that of the conception of Kant as the *Alles-zermalmende*, made current in England by De Quincey, he declared that "Kant's reputation as a destroyer even of the metaphysics and psychology of his predecessors has been greatly exaggerated".² In Maurice also we have an end to the soul-destroying method which preceding historians had adopted of epitomising (usually in a wholly unintelligent way) the philosophies of Kant's successors. These epitomes were merely tombstones to the philosophies they epitomised and were indeed intended to be nothing more. In the short twenty pages devoted to Kant himself in the chapter entitled "Glimpse into the Nineteenth Century," the philosopher may be said at last to have come to his own in England in this Cambridge successor of Cudworth and Coleridge. Finally, in the still shorter account of Hegel as the completer of the movement begun by Kant, our interest is excited and the mind thrown forward by hearing of him as the bearer of the "watchwords Being and Not Being, Being and Becoming" which, "as in the days of Plato, will be rung in our ears" and as the reviver of the thought of a dialectic which "had dawned upon Plato" and which constituted the pulse at once of logic and history. But in Maurice, as he himself confessed, the theological was still the dominant interest, and while his catholic sympathy and his real power of philosophical interpretation may be said to have marked the end of blind opposition to German influences, he was not the man to lead in making them the starting-point of a new era of speculation. This was to come from men trained in another school.

(2) The curse of British philosophy in the first half of the century was the survival, within the Universities of the theological bias, outside of them of the positivist Humean tradition inherited, notwithstanding all that had been done in the direction of naturalising Kant's work in England, from the pre-critical stage of thought. But as the result of the better understanding of that work, powerfully aided in these years by the teaching of Carlyle, Emerson, Matthew Arnold, Tennyson, and Browning, there was growing up in the

¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 620. Cp. 627. "The critical philosophy is born to be the scourge of dreamers especially when their dreams assume the shape and air of philosophy, especially when they try to turn their dreams outward and apply them to the business of the world."

² *Ibid.*, p. 635.

younger men of the fifties and sixties both within and without the Universities a wholly new attitude at once to the orthodoxies of the church and to the negations of the positivist creed. There was an increasing number of those who were prepared neither to sacrifice the reality of the experiences represented by morality, art, religion to what appeared to be the demand of positive science for a rigidly naturalistic world nor to allow that the vindication of that reality depended on the maintenance of doctrines resting on other foundations than the witness of the spirit of man itself. Kant was being studied as the enemy of dogmatism in all its forms. But was Kant rightly understood by his professed exponents?

Sir William Hamilton was a great power in the fifties, and Hamilton had succeeded in converting elements which were positive in Kant into mere negatives. Space, time, causality were not expressions of the constructive powers of thought but of its impotence to grasp the Absolute. Here was again the opportunity for the reassertion of mere dogma under the name of faith on the one hand, of a complete agnosticism on the other. Herbert Spencer joined hands with Dean Mansel in laying the foundations of a new form of reactionary metaphysics with the stones that Kantian Criticism seemed to have provided. But if this interpretation was right it might well be asked whether Kant had indeed gone beyond Hume. The malady of the age of which Hume's philosophy was the completest expression was the separation of subject from object, the ideal from the real, the individual from society, the finite from the infinite. What was needed was a rational philosophy that should reunite what reason had divided, reclothe what it had stripped bare, reconstruct what it had destroyed. Carlyle had felt all this—no one more vividly—and had stated the need with incomparable power. His literary method was adequate to that. He had even, such was his insight, become convinced that Kant had supplied the needed principle, but he knew little in detail of Kant's work and still less of the work of his successor, Hegel, who had developed it in an entirely different direction from Hamilton.¹

¹ Emerson's position in America was almost precisely parallel in this respect to Carlyle's in England. He saw what was needed. He prophesied of it but he had to leave to others the philosophical vindication of the transcendentalism he preached. "For Emerson," writes Mr. Lewis Mumford in *The Golden Day* (p. 104), "matter and spirit were not enemies in conflict: they were phases of man's experience: matter passed into spirit and became a symbol: spirit passed into matter and gave it a form; and symbols and forms were essences through which man lived and fulfilled his proper being." The writer adds "To withhold the name of philosopher from the man who saw and expressed this integral vision of life

It was to men who were deeply impressed with the need of a comprehensive vindication by philosophy of the great spiritual interests of mankind, who felt that the healing word remained with Kant, however much Kant had been misunderstood and misrepresented by the Hamiltonian philosophy, who believed that the clue to the real meaning of his work must be sought for in that of his German successors—and who were undismayed by the fate that had overtaken Hegelianism, under circumstances entirely different from their own, in the land of its birth—that we owe the first systematic attempt to understand and expound the bearing of Idealism on what they rightly regarded as the central problem of their time. In this attempt James Hutchison Stirling has the credit of being the leader. But there were skirmishers who went before and there were others who followed after him and completed his work. Of the former J. F. Ferrier deserves especial mention.

IV.

Ferrier's account in the fifties of his abortive efforts to penetrate the secret of Hegel has been already referred to. But it was characteristic of the man, as perhaps of his nation, that he did not know when he was beaten. We learn from the articles in the *Imperial Dictionary of Universal Biography* on Schelling and Hegel that he was employed to the last in seeking to understand the meaning and the significance for contemporary thought of the philosophy of the Absolute. The articles are very short and even so are mainly occupied with biography, but they contain what may be said to be the first sympathetic and therefore understanding word in English upon their subjects.

In the essay on Schelling he points to the fundamental distinction between Hamilton's Unconditioned and Schelling's Absolute. Carried to its logical conclusion, Hamilton's conception of the unconditioned as that which lies beyond all relation means that truth lies not only beyond the grasp of the human mind but beyond the grasp of Omniscience itself. To escape this absurdity we must abandon that conception and interpret the unconditioned or absolute truth not as that which is out of relation to all intelligence but as that which is in relation to intelligence simply (*ἀπλῶς*), or in itself, as contrasted with that which is merely in relation to *our* in-

so clearly is to deny the central office of philosophy". This is true; but something more than vision and expression is needed if philosophy is to be justified of her children. Emerson himself knew this well enough and sought it with tears in the technicalities of Hegel. See below, p. 445.

telligence. Is there any such truth open to us? Schelling's whole theory of the "intellectual intuition," obscurely as it is worked out by himself, means the assertion of the reality of an element common to all intelligence human or divine, actual or possible. It is the necessity of verifying this claim that leads Ferrier to the conclusion that "the philosophy of the unconditioned still calls for patient and impartial reconsideration".

In the article on Hegel he has himself advanced a step further in such a reconsideration. He recognises Hegel's whole philosophy as "nothing but an explanation of the Absolute". He repeats his own simplified interpretation of the meaning of "truth absolute" as truth for intellect considered simply as intellect, and goes on to illustrate it from the place of the categories of "being" and "unity" as contrasted with the sensational or relative element in all knowledge. He defends the Dialectic as the legitimate attempt to show how the categories from lowest to highest evolve themselves through a self-conversion into their opposites, as a work "replete at once with the profoundest truth and the most marvellous speculative sagacity," finally as affording the solution of the "antinomies" by which Kant succeeded in bewildering the reason of his contemporaries. He goes on to accuse Hegel's critics in this country of totally misunderstanding the nature of the absolute by taking it to refer to the *quantity* instead of the *quality* or nature of knowledge. "The absolute has nothing to do with the extent but only with the constitution of cognition. Wherever knowledge or thought is, even in its narrowest manifestation, there 'the absolute' is known; because there is something apprehended by intellect which is intelligible to reason universally." He admits the difficulties that have to be contended with in establishing "a philosophy of the absolute," more particularly the difficulties that attach to the conclusion that "rational self-consciousness is the only ultimate and all-comprehensive reality". But he insists that this conclusion cannot be disposed of (pro or con) by any inquiry into the limitations of the human faculties, but only by a thorough-going analysis which shall distinguish between the relative and absolute elements in our cognitions. It was precisely here, he thought, that Kant by making the absolute elements into something merely relative and thus denying that intelligence has any nature or essence had failed. "Hegel made the attempt in a far better and truer spirit," however labyrinthine the mazes in which he has involved himself and his readers. Finally he sets aside the heterodox opinions of some of Hegel's

followers as deductions for which "neither the system itself nor its author are in any way responsible".¹

Ferrier's account of what Hegel meant by the Absolute is far from adequate. His own contribution to the development of Idealism was his insistence on the mutual implication in all experience of subject and object—the place we might say of the idea of the self both in knowledge and practice. But he never got beyond a merely formal interpretation of the self as a polar opposite of sense and passion, realising itself by the negation of them. The self as a principle of organisation in the data of experience theoretic or practical was never clearly apprehended by him. It is for this reason that the Absolute is for him little more than a universal element side by side with the particulars (what Hegel would have called an "abstract" universal) instead of the identity of principle that manifests itself in them and constitutes their substance. Notwithstanding this failure we might say of Ferrier in contrast to his British contemporaries what Aristotle says of Anaxagoras in a similar connexion that he was "as a sober man speaking among drunkards".

V.

James Hutchison Stirling has the merit of being the first clearly to perceive that there was nothing really constructive to be looked for from British philosophy, until it had put itself to school in the German Idealist movement. In leading the way to this school he conceived himself as only giving expression to a widespread conviction of his own generation of students: "There appears," he wrote in explaining the source of his own inspiration, "to be no wish nearer to the hearts of all honest students now-a-days than that Hegel (and with him Kant is usually united) should be made permeable. Even the general public carries in its heart a strange secret conviction and seems even to its own self to wait on them with a dumb fixed expectation of infinite and essential result."² This faith he believed to be founded on the true intuition that first in Hegel emancipation had been won from the tyranny, the "thin negative," as he believed it to be, of the abstracting intelligence, that was responsible for the deplorable separation of man from what he called his "substance" in nature, society, and God.

Born in Glasgow in 1820 he was trained for the medical profession in the old university in High Street, taking the

¹ *Philosophical Remains*, pp. 567-568.

² *Secret of Hegel*, Preface to 1st Edition, pp. xxv-xxvi.

diploma of Surgeon in 1842.¹ But he had other interests besides medicine. Like so many of the younger generation he had been powerfully stirred by *Sartor Resartus* and had already opened a correspondence with Carlyle, in which he described his works as "the most important element in his being". Forty years later he wrote of Carlyle's extraordinary influence at this time: "He was every literary young man's idol, almost the God he prayed to. Even a morsel of white paper with the name of Carlyle upon it would have been picked up from the street as a veritable amulet."² But it was still literature rather than philosophy that he thought of as an alternative profession and when, on the death of his father, he came into a small competency, which enabled him to give up medicine, it was to France and not to Germany that he went to pursue his studies in the eventful year of Napoleon III.'s *coup d'état*. It was not till 1856 that with a view to learning German he settled in Heidelberg.

Before going to Germany he had seen the name of Hegel in a Review and had been attracted by it as a young Athenian might have been attracted by the name of Heraclitus, the "dark philosopher". Now, as he tells us, he had his interest reawakened and deepened by two fellow students who talked of Hegel as the deepest, if also the darkest, of all philosophers. "It was understood that he had not only completed philosophy; but above all reconciled to philosophy Christianity itself." "That," he adds characteristically, "struck".³ He turned to his works only to find them "utterly refractory". He has vividly described the sensations of the student who approached Hegel for himself in these days: "One approaches Hegel for the first time—such is the voice of rumour and such the subjects he involves—as one might approach some enchanted palace of Arabian story. New powers—imagination is assured (were but the entrance gained)—await one there—secrets—as it were the ring of Solomon and the passkeys of the universe.

¹The relation between modern medicine and Idealistic philosophy in Great Britain would make an interesting study. In Stirling's case his medical training gave him as it gave to Joseph Henry Green, the author of *Spiritual Philosophy* (posthumously published 1865), an eye for biological illustrations of the idealistic principle. "The very cell," he afterwards wrote, "which is Virchow's first, and beyond which there is in that sphere no other, is quite Hegelian. Seyn, Daseyn, Fürsichseyn repeat themselves in the cell of Virchow, the membrane, the distinguishable involution of the membrane, the apex or the functioning and individual one." *Secret of Hegel*, Preface, p. xxii.

²James Hutchison Stirling, *His Life and Work*, by Amelia Hutchison Stirling, p. 48.

³*Op. cit.*, p. 115.

But, very truly, if thus magical is the promise, no less magical is the difficulty; and one wanders round the book—as Aboulfaouaris round the palace—*irrito*, without success, but not without a sufficiency of vexation. Book—palace—is absolutely inaccessible, for the *known* can show no bridge to it; or if accessible, then it is absolutely impenetrable, for it begins *not*, it enters *not*, what seems the door-way received but to reject and every attempt at a window is baffled by a fall. This is the *universal* experience; and one is almost justified to add that—whether in England or in France or in Germany—this the experience of the beginning is also—all but equally universally—the experience of the end.”¹

Light, he tells us,² went up in his own case when he perceived that Hegel was only the end of a movement of which Kant was the beginning, and that if we would understand him we also must begin with Kant. Yet to English students Kant was still an enigma. Most of the translations of him “were to be regarded but as psychological curiosities”. Hegel was in far worse plight. Labels and summaries were almost³ all that was available and these were worse than useless. “Summaries only propagate ignorance, when used independently and not merely as useful synopses and reminders to those who have already mastered the whole subject.” If this was true of summaries by masters like Schwegler,⁴ it was ten-fold more true of the kind of summary to which we have already referred.

Stirling returned to England in 1857 convinced that a thorough first-hand study of Kant and Hegel and of the relation between them was the clue to the whole philosophical situation, and determined to place that clue in the hands of his fellow-countrymen so far as was in his power. After three years in London he settled in Portobello near Edinburgh, and for the next eight years devoted himself (as he afterwards explained to John Stuart Mill) “most laboriously—rather with positive agony and often for twelve hours a day” to his self-imposed task.

The fruit of this long wrestle was *The Secret of Hegel*

¹ *Secret of Hegel*, vol. i, p. 1.

² *Ibid.*, p. 118.

³ Besides the fragment of the *Logic* translated and published by H. Sloman and J. Wallon in 1855 there was only Sibree's translation of the *Lectures on the Philosophy of History* (London, 1857) available in English.

⁴ Whose *Handbook of Philosophy* was translated with Supplementary Notes in 1867 by Stirling himself from the fifth German edition. It was already in its third edition in 1871, and in the undergraduate days of the present writer was a very present help in time of trouble.

being the Hegelian-System in Origin, Principle, Form, and Matter, in two volumes (London, 1865).¹

If it is the merit of other writers even in philosophy to conceal the "labour of the file" the main interest, if not the merit, of Stirling's book is that no attempt is made to do so. It is the account of his mind's pilgrimage, and owes the place it has in the history of British and American Philosophy to this rather than to any literary form or finality of statement. Our concern here is neither with the personal element nor with the details of the treatment, but with the general terms in which Hegel for the first time receives recognition in England and in which his main teaching is expounded.

The sections to which the reader will turn for the succinctest statements as to the place claimed for German Philosophy in general and Hegel in particular are the Preface and the earlier written but more detailed statement in Chapter III of the First Part, "Notes of the Struggle Continued. The Secret of Hegel." The Preface is a vigorous defence of German Philosophy against the charges *first* that it is obsolete and *second* that it is bad, the former founded chiefly on the repudiation by its last representative, Schelling, of his own philosophy, and Hegel's which followed it, as "a mere poem"; the latter founded on the attacks upon historical Christianity by Strauss and his English followers who hailed from the Hegelian camp. To deny the former of these charges it would seem was "to prefer yourself to Schelling"; to deny the second was to "justify Scepticism". Stirling's answer to the first is that Schelling's sentence has not as a matter of fact been accepted but has been "set aside by the mere progress of time". His answer to the second is to show that so far from making for scepticism German Philosophy in general and Hegel's in particular is just what is required to supply the counteractive not only to the negative movement in theology as represented by Strauss and Colenso, but to the materialistic interpretation of history in such writers as Buckle, and to the contempt of first principles represented by Macaulay's jeering question "Who are wisest and best, and whose opinion is to decide?"—all of them in Stirling's

¹ It is a somewhat amorphous work consisting of a long Preface; Section I, Prolegomena. The Struggle to Hegel; Section II, A translation from the complete Logic of the whole first Section, *Quality*; Section III, A Comment on the previous translation; Section IV, Extracts from the account of Quality in the Encyclopædia; Section V, A Summary or translation commented and interpreted by the Second Section of the complete Logic *Quality*; followed by a long section on Hegel's Commentators and a Conclusion.

view retrogressive reflections of the eighteenth century "Illumination," and springing from the over-emphasis on the rights of private judgment of which the Idealist philosophy was the conclusive corrective.

As contrasted with this reaction which places the accent on *private* and leads to self-will, Idealism places the accent on *judgment* and therewith on the truth that is a common possession: the thought, will, purpose that belongs to man as man. It stands for "the rights of the object as something above the rights of the subject". Put in another way it stands for thought in a sense of which England knows little or nothing. We mistake vivid picturing for thinking—"intensely vivid picturing almost constitutes Mr. Carlyle"; or, if we get beyond pictures to conceptions, it is only to get caught in the abstractions of the understanding, which, like the god Horos, is the principle and agent of the definite everywhere. As contrasted with all this, what is wanted is synthetic principles in every department theoretic, practical, æsthetic. Just to supply these is the sole object of the three great works of Kant. If we would sum up his teaching in a word it would be in the word Freedom—"When this word was articulated by the lips of Kant the Illumination was at an end." But Kant was himself a child of the Illumination and was never able wholly to free himself from its spell. Freedom was still opposed to necessity, reality to appearance, the self to the world. What *Hegel* did was to perceive and make clear that "the conditions of a concrete, and of every concrete, are two opposites: in other words Hegel came to see that there exists no concrete which consists not of two antagonistic characters, where at the same time, strangely, somehow the one is not only through the other but actually is the other". This union Hegel called the Concrete Notion, and the "concrete notion is the secret of Hegel". It is in this way that Hegel completes the compromise of the understanding by the "complement of the reason".

"The secret of Hegel is the secret of Kant," and can be put in a nutshell. Kant in his doctrine of the *a priori* forms of the sensory and the categories of the understanding had shown that thought enters into the constitution of the world of objects that we know. "Here lies the germ of the thought of Hegel, that initiated his whole system. The universe is but a materialisation, but an externalisation, but a heterisation of certain thoughts." His difference from Kant is that, while Kant conceives of these materialising thoughts as subjective and as hiding a beyond or thing-in-itself which thus escapes our knowledge, Hegel conceives of them objectively

as the absolute universal principles on which the all or whole is fashioned—the diamond net which by its invisible meshes encloses, not the veil that conceals, the real world. “Why crave a Jenseits, a Beyond to what we have? Why should not that be the all? Why not conceive an absolute Now and Here? We see the universe—we find the eternal principles on which it rests, which constitute it; why then go further? Why feign more—a Jenseits, an unknown that is simply a Jenseits and an unknown, an unreachable, an nonexistent? No, let us but *think* the universe truly and we shall have truly entered into the possession of the universal life and of a world that needs no Indian tortoise for its pedestal and support.” The absolute so far from being the unthinkable is the object of all thought. “Thought when it asked why an apple fell sought the Absolute and found it—at least so far as outer matter is concerned. Thought, when, in Socrates, it interrogated many particular virtues for the one universal virtue, sought the Absolute. Thought in Hume when it asked the reason of our ascription of effects to causes sought the Absolute and, if he did not find it, he put others on the way to find it. What since the beginning of time, what in any corner of the earth has philosophy, has thinking ever considered but the Absolute?”¹ The claim to think the absolute is not to be countered by “school-boys’ puzzle-boxes of Time and Space,” with their “infantile dilemmas”. Thought can think the infinite because it is itself infinite, and the infinite is thought. “Where is the difficulty? Is it not thought to thought?”—that which is seeking inter-connexion, wholeness in things, to the Whole which actually is, however far *we* may be from seeing that Whole in its completeness?

It is in this development of the arrested Idealism of Kant that we are to find the essence of Hegel. He did not accomplish it unaided. Fichte and Schelling furnished the intermediate stages. Hegel merely took the last step and completed the movement. Both Fichte and Schelling had renounced Kant’s unknowable Absolute. Fichte had found the ultimate reality in the Ego in its clear-cut separation from the Non-Ego; Schelling in the obscurity of a substance which is neither subject nor object, neither thought nor thing; Hegel found it in the Thought or Reason which is the essence of the thing, that of which all things from those of sense upwards are but the “types, symbols, and metaphors”.

From this it followed that if all the forms of thought could be found and shown in their organic connexion with one

¹ *Secret*, I, pp. 139-140, condensed.

another we should have the scheme of that "self-supported, self-maintained, self-moved life which is the All of things, the ultimate principle the Absolute". It is this task, that Hegel has attempted as none had done before in the *Logic*, which has proved the main stumbling-block and rock of offence to his critics. It has been assumed that he is offering this bloodless scheme for the rich life of concrete nature, and he has been asked to show how the one can pass into the other. This is sheer misapprehension. Hegel starts from the world of nature and man on the one hand, thought or reason on the other, and asks what is the relation between them. His answer is that they are one in their otherness, but reason is the prior not in the sense of cause to effect ("mundane succession" has no place here), but in the sense that it is reason that gives its unity to nature and that in the end "will resume it into itself," thus manifesting itself as Spirit, the final expression in Hegel for the Absolute.

After quoting the passage from the Introduction to the *Philosophy of History* in which perhaps more clearly than anywhere else the Hegelian doctrine that it is "Reason that rules the world," that reason is "the substance as well as the infinite power of all natural and spiritual life", is stated, Stirling ends:

"Such we believe to be the secret origin and constitution of the system of Hegel. We do not say, Hegel does not say, that it is complete and that no joining gapes. On the contrary, in the execution of the details, there will be much that will give pause. Still in this execution—we may say as much as this on our own account—all the great interests of mankind have been kindled into new lights by the touch of this master-hand, and surely the general idea is one of the hugest that ever curdled in the thought of man. Hegel, indeed, so far as abstract thought is concerned and so far as one can see at this moment, seems to have closed an era, and has named the all of things in such terms of thought as will perhaps remain essentially the same for the next thousand years. To all present appearance at least what Aristotle was to ancient Greece Hegel is to modern Europe."

The *Secret of Hegel* was at once recognised both in the Universities and beyond them as marking a new departure in British philosophy. T. H. Green, who was among those who held that without a knowledge of German philosophy "a writer was outside the main stream of human thought," said of it, as an exposition of Hegelianism, that it "contrasted with everything else that had been published as sense with nonsense". A few years later Jowett wrote to the author:

"You have made the general idea of Hegelianism more plain than it has been made before in England". Carlyle wrote of him that he seemed to him "the one man in Britain capable of bringing metaphysical philosophy in the ultimate, German or European, and highest actual form of it distinctly home to the understanding of British men". In America Emerson hailed it as "the most competent and compulsive of modern British books on metaphysics," and paid it the tribute of carrying the two volumes with him on a prolonged journey. In Germany the historian Erdmann wrote to Stirling as to one whose knowledge of Hegel was deeper than his own. Rosenkranz, Hegel's disciple, later spoke of the *Secret* as "ein wahrhafter staunliches Phänomenon"; Arnold Ruge said that it marked "ein grosser Fortschritt in der Englischen Philosophischen Literatur," "a book which had truly assimilated Hegel's philosophy".¹

VI.

With this Hegel may be said to have arrived and Stirling's credit for so crucial an event in the history of contemporary Anglo-Saxon thought is unchallengeable and has been generously recognised by the only other man who would have the least claim to challenge it. "To English readers," wrote Edward Caird in 1883, "Hegel was first introduced in the powerful statement of his principles by Dr. Hutchison Stirling".² But there was still much to be done to make these principles in Stirling's own phrase "permeable". Stirling was a path-finder and his work bore the impress of the pioneer. It reminds one of the forts and shacks built by the early settlers in California to secure the rivers and mines they had won by their enterprise. The country itself had still to be won for civilisation. He was perhaps too near the subject of his long study and too deeply imbued with Hegel's terminology to be able to shake himself free from the letter and become the exponent of the spirit of the Hegelian system. The *Secret of Hegel* showed an entire absence of method with the result, as an otherwise sympathetic writer the late Prof. James Seth says, that it was "almost as difficult as the original which it is intended to illuminate,"³ or as it was wittily put at the time that "if Mr. Hutchinson Stirling knew the secret of Hegel he had managed to keep it to himself".

¹ For these and other references to recognitions by continental writers, see *Secret*, 2nd Edition (Edinburgh and London, 1898).

² *Hegel* (Blackwood), p. vi.

³ *English Philosophers and Schools of Philosophy* (1912), p. 342.

Even his style, vigorous and redolent of the Scottish soil from which it had sprung as it was, had little to commend it to English readers. Though therefore he had brought Hegel to England, he can hardly be said to have naturalised him there. At the date of the publication of the *Secret* he was indeed still a comparatively young man and he lived to be an old one. There was therefore ample time for him had he been less of a rebel against ordinary standards of composition, possessed less of the "manner" he attributes to his hero Hegel,¹ more particularly more generous in his estimate of the younger men, to correct these defects in subsequent works. As a matter of fact he had shot his bolt, and in the remaining work of his life he added little that was of significance for the understanding of Hegel.²

There could be no better illustration of how much he still left to be done not only in the exposition of Hegel but in laying a deeper foundation for a true understanding of him in a proper understanding of Kant than Stirling's own excursions in this field. In 1881 he published a *Text-Book to Kant*. In spite of the fact that Edward Caird's important book on the *Philosophy of Kant* (1878) had already appeared, so far from taking any advantage of it to revise his own work in the "Reproduction" which contains the gist of the book and stands as an Introduction to Translations and Commentaries, he merely prints what he had written in 1862 twenty years before, containing an interpretation of the relation of the Categories of the Understanding to sense-perception which it is not too much to say is now merely a curiosity of Kantian literature.³ It would have been well for his own reputation had he been content to ignore the work of the younger men. Unfortunately for himself he made a long article on "Schopenhauer in relation to Kant" in the XIIIth volume of *The Journal of Speculative Philosophy*, the occasion for an intemperate attack on philosophy as represented by the "younger strengths" both in the English and the Scottish Universities in general and on Edward Caird's work on Kant in particular. Caird's devastating reply in the same volume and

¹ Lectures on the *Philosophy of Law*, etc. (1873), p. 103.

² An exception to this statement should be made in favour of the brilliant chapter on Hegel in his book on *What is Thought?* (1900), in which he reiterated and drove home his view of the identity of Hegel's starting-point with respect to Theism and Christianity.

³ "Hutchison Stirling's criticisms of Kant in his *Text-Book to Kant* are vitiated by a failure to recognise the completely un-critical character of the occasional passages in which Kant admits a distinction between judgments of perception and 'judgments of experience'." N. Kemp Smith's *Commentary to Kant's Critique of the Pure Reason*, p. 366 n.

his restatement of his own position in the following volume are models at once of philosophical controversy at its best and of the spirit that was necessary to domesticate the dry Hegelianism of the *Secret* in the softer and more humid atmosphere of British thought.

Before Hegel could be thoroughly naturalised translations had to be made of the encyclopædic series of works in which his central conceptions were applied to every department of human thought and experience; commentaries had to be written; his ideas had to gain access to university class and common rooms. It was because there were in these years men in Scotland and Oxford who, equally convinced with Stirling of the importance of these ideas, were gifted with a quite unusual power of lucid exposition and even literary expression and who were prepared to devote themselves to these tasks with the additional advantage of the classical training, to which Hegel himself owed so much, that in the course of the next decades Hegel became a household word with the younger generation of students of philosophy. Among these teachers and writers the names that stand out are those of Edward and John Caird in Glasgow, William Wallace, T. H. Green, and (in his earliest book *Ethical Studies*) F. H. Bradley in Oxford, somewhat later Bernard Bosanquet in London. If, as Bradley afterwards maintained, some of these with their followers "insisted too incautiously on the great claims of Kant and Hegel" this was perhaps inevitable. Before there can be intelligent criticism there must be thorough appropriation, and if some were led to give their hearts as well as their heads in a kind of *amor intellectualis* to the new ideas no great harm perhaps was done. It merely added a touch of romance to the movement by which the stone that the builders had rejected in Germany was made in these years the head of the corner in England and Scotland.

Note.—The order of the chief translations of Hegel's works after the publication of the *Secret of Hegel* was as follows:—

The *Logic of Hegel* translated from the Encyclopædia of the Philosophical Sciences with Prolegomena by William Wallace (Oxford), 1874.

The *Philosophy of Art* by W. Hastie (1886).

The *Philosophy of Mind* by William Wallace (1894).

The *Philosophy of Religion* by E. B. Spiers (1895).

The *History of Philosophy* by R. B. Haldane (1896).

The *Philosophy of Right* by S. W. Dyde (1896).

The *Phænomenology* by J. B. Baillie (1910).

III.—WHAT DOES MR. W. E. JOHNSON MEAN BY A PROPOSITION? (I).

BY H. W. B. JOSEPH.

MR. JOHNSON begins the first chapter of his *Logic* with the following paragraph: 'A systematic treatment of logic must begin by regarding the proposition as the unit from which the whole body of logical principles may be developed. A proposition is that of which truth and falsehood can be significantly predicated. Some logicians have taken the *judgment* as their central topic, and it will be necessary to examine the distinction between what I have called a proposition and what appears to be meant by a judgment. It has been very generally held that the proposition is the *verbal expression* of the judgment; this, however, seems to be an error, because such characterisations as true or false cannot be predicated of a mere verbal expression, for which appropriate adjectives would be 'obscure,' 'ungrammatical,' 'ambiguous,' etc. There appear then to be three notions, which, though intimately connected, must be clearly distinguished: namely (1) what may be called the sentence; (2) the proposition; and (3) the judgment. The sentence may be summarily defined as the verbal expression of a judgment or of a proposition; it remains, therefore, to distinguish and interrelate the proposition and the judgment.'

Now if Mr. Johnson thinks that the central topic of logic is the proposition, and that the whole body of logical principles may be developed from it—which I suppose means from an understanding of its nature—then it is of the first importance that he should make the reader understand what he thinks a proposition is. I confess that I have altogether failed to discover what Mr. Johnson thinks it is, or rather, to discover any meaning for the word *proposition* which can reconcile the various statements which he makes about it, or in which the word occurs. This by itself would be of small importance. But I have to confess further that I do not believe Mr. Johnson has settled with himself what he means by the word. This is a serious criticism to make about a teacher of such

eminence, and a book that shows in many ways very hard and careful thought. I shall therefore endeavour to establish it by citation, and I cannot avoid being lengthy and perhaps tedious. But I do not think the issue merely to concern a particular book. It seems to me to touch the roots of a widespread error about the nature of logic and of thinking.

We have seen that Mr. Johnson holds a proposition to be neither a sentence nor a judgment. No one, of course, would identify a proposition with a sentence. 'Go to Bath,' 'Where are you going to?' are not propositions. The sentence meant must be an indicative sentence. 'Judgment' is said 'to denote an act or attitude or process which may constitute an incident in the mental history of an individual.' It is an attitude 'towards' a proposition, and there is a variety of such attitudes. The central attitude is assertion, and I think that the judgment from which we are to distinguish a proposition is an act of assertion. When a proposition is called false or true, it is meant that anyone's assertion of it would or would not be erroneous (L 4)—though why Mr. Johnson should not say 'false' instead of 'erroneous' I do not know. The true proposition is that which is to be accepted, the false that which is to be rejected.

I have no quarrel with the contention that it is really thinking which is true or false, and that propositions are to be so distinguished only as they express thought. But in so contending Mr. Johnson seems to me to be distinguishing thought from *statement*. A great deal that he says about propositions treats them as statements; but a great deal does not.

I will enumerate the various indications of what a proposition is which are given, or (as it seems to me) implied, in different passages of the *Logic*, and then offer my evidence. They are not, of course, all inconsistent; but where they are, though sometimes it might be pleaded that the only fault is careless writing, I do not think that the plea would cover the ground.

A proposition then (1) is an act of the mind: (2) is a factor in an act of the mind: (3) is the object of thought in assertion, and (4) one that different persons may equally apprehend, but distinguishable not only from the minds apprehending it but from the real: (5) is a real of some sort, characterising fact, or is a fact: (6) may be accordant to fact: (7) expresses a fact: (8) is expressed by a sentence: (9) is denoted by a sentence: (10) expresses a judgment: (11) is a judgment: (12) is neither a judgment nor a sentence: (13) is a product of thought-construction: (14) is a sentence, statement, or form of words, or

(15) a symbol: (16) is a statement about the truth or falsity of other statements: (17) may depend sometimes for its character upon the assertion of another proposition: (18) is an *assertum*, or content of assertion: (19) is an *assertibile*, and (20) a *possibile*.¹

(1) A proposition is an act of the mind. For (I. xxi-xxii), 'the modes in which words are combined—which constitute the subject-matter for Grammar—cannot be expounded or understood except as reflecting the modes in which thoughts are combined; and this combination is effected by means of such logical operations as negation, conjunction, disjunction, alternation, implication, and so on, represented by the words *not, and, not both, or, if, etc.*' Now the operations and the words recited are those elsewhere said to connect or be used in propositions; and the operations are here said to effect a combination of thoughts. Propositions therefore are thoughts, and these are acts of the mind. Again (I. xl), 'The quantity or degree called probability attaches exclusively to the proposition; not however to the proposition as such, but to the proposition regarded as based upon rationally certified knowledge acquired by any supposed thinker.' This is a dark saying, for the elucidation of which we must perhaps await vol. iv, which is to deal with probability; but as I do not see what could be based upon 'rationally certified knowledge' except other knowledge or belief, I cite it in support of (1). I. 58, 'Propositions which are admittedly based on experience, will also involve processes of thought or reasoning.' I. 67, 'Such a proposition [as *Wisdom is not blue*] would have purpose only in a logical context where we are pointing out that certain types of adjective cannot be predicated of certain types of substantive.' (The word *logical* is surely otiose.) Now only acts can have purpose; but here no doubt it would be easy to amend to 'The assertion of such a proposition'.

(2) For 'proposition' meaning a factor in an act of the mind, cf. I. 3: 'The fundamental adjectives true and false which are (perhaps universally) predicated of mere propositions as such, derive their significance from the fact that the proposition is not so to speak a self-subsistent entity, but only a factor in the concrete act of judgment.'

(3) I. xxiv seems to imply that propositions are objects of thought in assertion. 'Logic begins with a sharp contrast between matter, as that which is given as merely shapeless, and form, as that which thought imposes. But as we

¹ Most of what I have to offer by way of criticism (as opposed to exposition) of these views will be found on (4), (5), (8), (13) to (16), (18) to (20).

advance to mathematics, we impose a new element of form. . . . I should have thought it was rather Kantian epistemology than logic that so began; but if matter is given and form is imposed on matter, and logic studies these forms, and studies propositions, it seems to me to follow that propositions are the formed matter about which we can think and make assertions. Again, at the outset of I, ch. v, on *Negation*, we are told that pure negation may mean the simple attitude of rejection towards a proposition taken as a unit and without further analysis. 'According to this definition of pure negation, the judgment which may be called purely negative has as its object precisely what I have called a secondary proposition in my previous discussion as to whether the statement "*p* is false" is to be regarded as primary or secondary. . . . When some assertum is proposed which can be clearly conceived in thought, and yet repels any attempt to accept it, then the attitude towards such an assertum to which our thinking process has led us is strictly to be called that of pure negation. For example, the proposition "Matter exists" has seemed to some philosophers to have in it a sufficiently clear content to enable them to reject it, without their having in mind a correspondingly clear substitute which they can accept.' I venture to make two comments on this passage. (i) When it is said that an assertum repels any attempt to accept it, the so-called assertum (the word is said to be equivalent to proposition) is treated as existing and acting on the mind. If that is not meant, the language is figurative, and should not be used in explaining. It does not elucidate but needs elucidation. I could cite a number of places where I find myself, if I may so put it, put off with an unhelpful word or phrase by way of elucidation or otherwise, e.g., *characterise* is said to mean 'cognitively determine the character of' (I. 12); 'a proposition which is *uncertified* appears to be what Kant and others have meant by a problematic proposition' (I. 55); 'substance has not been sensationally impressed on us' (II. 81); 'by a postulate I understand a proposition that is assertorically and not merely hypothetically entertained' (III, xviii); 'in place of the somewhat obscure term change, I shall introduce the notion of alterable as opposed to unalterable states of a thing' (III. 66); 'an effort-sensation resembles other sensations in the further respect that at any moment it may be more or less determinately characterised in an attitude of cognition' (III. 108). This however by the way; but if 'repelling any attempt to accept it' is not meant figuratively, a proposition is some object of thought which can act. (ii) There seems to be some confusion in the passage

quoted. A secondary proposition 'predicates some characteristic of a primary proposition' (I. 50); ' p is false' is therefore the object of a purely negative judgment only if the object of a judgment is the proposition asserted; but a purely negative attitude is not in this judgment taken towards the proposition ' p is false,' but towards the proposition p . For the proposition towards which some philosophers are said to take such an attitude is 'Matter exists,' which is here symbolised by p , and not by ' p is false'. The purely negative judgment then is 'Matter does not exist,' and this has two objects, one, 'Matter exists,' which repels any attempt to assert it, and the other, 'Matter does not exist,' which it asserts.

(4) I think Mr. Johnson would not repudiate the last view, *viz.*, that a proposition is an object thought of in assertion, but rather claim it as his. But 'object' is a relative term, and what is so related is not always of the same nature. An object of perception we suppose to exist; an object of desire not; of an object of imagination what are we to say? A proposition is at any rate an object to which divers persons can be in the same relation. 'The proposition is identifiable when in various relations to different thinkers' (I. xxxiv); I. 7: 'It must be maintained that the content of the proposition preserves its identity unmodified, independently of all variations of assertive attitude [*i.e.*, asserting, supposing, doubting, etc.], and of personal or temporal reference.' Again, I. 67, 'A more common case which leads to a purely negative form of predication is where, for instance, a distant object of perception is considered as to whether it is blue or of some other colour, or as to whether it is a man or some other material body. [Is not 'material' otiose?] Towards this proposed assertum—that it is blue, or that it is a man—our attitude may be that of mere denial, in the sense that we are perfectly clear what it is *not*, but we are not correspondingly clear as to what it is.' An assertum is a proposition, and a proposed assertum is a proposition which we consider whether to assert. If, instead of saying that a distant object is considered as to whether it is a man, Mr. Johnson had said that we consider whether it is so, I am not sure that any assertum would seem proposed; but anyhow, when I wonder whether *that* is a man, I am merely considering *that*, and not a proposition; *that* is the distant object, but the proposition is an object in some other sense. I venture to call it, on the present view, a *Zwischending*—not an act of the mind, and not a real which, or the nature of which, we may come to know, but somehow between the two. I shall have something to say later of the theory of a *Zwischending*; I will

here add one further passage (II. 9) perhaps illustrating the view. 'Consider for instance (a) "B's asserting that there will be a thunderstorm would imply his having noticed the closeness of the atmosphere," and (b) "the closeness of the atmosphere would imply that there will be a thunderstorm". The first of these relates [*i.e.*, states a relation between?] two mental acts of the general nature of assertion, and is an instance of "the asserting of *q* would imply having asserted *p*"; the second is a relation between two propositions, and is an instance of "the proposition *p* would imply the proposition *q*".' I am not sure that noticing the closeness of the atmosphere is an act of the general nature of assertion; but let that be. The distinction drawn seems one between a relation of assertions, and a relation of objects of thought which are not reals, but yet may be objects to all of us: these would be *Zwischendinge*. It might be suggested that a relation of facts is meant, and that I ought to have quoted this passage under my 5th heading, of 'proposition' meaning real or fact; but according to Mr. Johnson implication is not a relation manifested among facts.¹

(5) I have said that it is not clear in what sense of the word 'object' a proposition is held to be an object, where that view of it is taken. A *Zwischending* is not a real, or an existent. But in places a proposition is a real of some sort, and characterises fact. It is analysed (I. xxxiv) into substantive and adjective (with Mr. Johnson these are not parts of speech), and 'the substantive proper seems to coincide with the category "existent"' (*ib.*). Elsewhere (I. 9) Mr. Johnson says that he reserves 'the terms substantive, adjective, preposition, etc., for the different kinds of entity to which the several parts of speech correspond,' and (I. 11) that 'The distinction and connexion between substantive and adjective correspond to—and, in my view, explain—the distinction and connexion between particular and universal'; and this, I suppose, is a distinction in the real. So (I. 9) 'To turn now to the analysis of the proposition. We find that in every proposition we are determining *in* thought the character of an object presented *to* thought to be thus determined.' This object presented to thought, the substantive, is called the determinandum; and 'presented to thought,' like 'given' suggests that it is something 'really there'. More difficult is the following passage, where 'primitive propositions' are under discussion (I. 18): 'The most formless of such primitive propositions is the exclamatory assertion

¹ Cf. I. xxxii, quoted under (14) *infra*.

illustrated by such an utterance as "Lightning!" This appears to contain only a characterising adjective [we have been told that an adjective is an entity, not a word], without any assigned subject which is so characterised. . . . In short what is asserted by the percipient is "*a* manifestation of lightning". This phrase for representing the assertum, etc.' Here in two pages, a proposition is an assertion, an utterance, and lastly a real; for the phrase 'a manifestation of lightning' is said to represent an assertum, and an assertum is a proposition; but a manifestation of lightning is something real. Again (I. 14), a proposition 'is related objectively to fact. Our conclusion, briefly expressed, is that any proposition *characterises* some fact'; lest we should think this to mean 'states the character of,' the passage proceeds 'so that the relation of proposition to fact is the same as that of adjective to substantive'. A proposition then is a character of some fact, and therefore real, as a fact is real. Again (II. 2), we are told that in some cases 'the mental process of inference consists in transforming what was *potentially* assertible into a proposition *actually* asserted'. 'Potentially assertible' seems to be an instance of $\delta\iota\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\ \alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\ \lambda\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\epsilon\iota\nu$. But can anything be transformed, or be potentially this or that, which does not exist? Perhaps the potentiality belongs really to the mind, and inattention to language has here led to error. But there are plenty of passages where a proposition is clearly treated as a fact. I. 37, *note*: 'Thus, complementary propositions might be defined as those which are frequently confused in thought and frequently conjoined in fact.' This may be only loose or elliptical writing; but the following passage, I. 55, is less easily emended. Mr. Johnson is discussing the modality of propositions, and writes: 'The first antithesis that immediately impresses us in this connexion is that between a *certified* and an *uncertified* proposition. A proposition which is *uncertified* appears to be what Kant and others have sometimes meant by a problematic proposition; hence we begin by replacing the term "problematic" by the term "uncertified". [I have already suggested that this does not elucidate.] The contradictory of uncertified is certified, so that all propositions may be divided into the two classes of certified and uncertified. It is of course obvious that these terms are what is called relative; that is to say, at one stage in the acquisition of knowledge, a given proposition may be uncertified, while at a later or higher stage, or with increased opportunities of observation, etc., it may become certified.' Now, in the advance of knowledge I may come to know what I did not know

before; and facts are that towards which my relation then alters although no doubt it may equally be said that a proposition at one time not known by me to be true is at another known by me to be true and may be called 'uncertified' and 'certified' accordingly. (I do not see why 'known by me to be true' and 'not known by me to be true' are relative terms; and I am sure the phrases do not mean what is traditionally meant by 'necessary' and 'contingent'.) Again, I. 61, the 'nominally possible' proposition is said to be 'what does not conflict with any law of nature, *i.e.*, with any proposition necessary in the third sense'. Does anything really conflict with a law of nature? with an alleged law of nature does anything conflict except a fact? Take again I. 98, where proposition, adjective, substantive, are given as examples of logical categories; adjectives and substantives are facts or real. In I. 126 we read: 'Whether this or that is a genuine entity can only be answered when we have provided a test of genuineness. The only general test which I can conceive of is as to whether the entity intended to be meant (in using such a word as *class*) can serve as subject of which some predicate can be truly asserted. [Is not the test *as to* the genuineness of an entity, and not as to whether etc.?] Thus, as an illustration of the general question, we may ask whether a proposition is a genuine entity, and taking the proposition *matter exists*, the reply would be in the affirmative, inasmuch as we can make the assertion 'that *matter exists* was rejected by Berkeley'. A genuine entity is perhaps better called real than fact; but the passage is reminiscent of arguments attributed by Plato in the *Sophistes* to those who denied the possibility of error: ἀδύνατον καὶ δοξάζειν τό γε μὴ ὄν.¹ And indeed I have no doubt that the very real difficulties which are there raised have very rightly troubled Mr. Johnson, and led to much that is puzzling in the *Logic*. At the same time I think he is here a prey to words. If I deny that a circle is square, it may be said that a square circle is rejected by me; but that is not a proof that a square circle is a genuine entity. Consider further II. 30: 'There are certain specifiable relations such that, when one or other of these subsists between two propositions, we may validly infer one from the other.' I do not for a moment suggest that when 'propositions' was written facts were meant here, or reals; nevertheless I believe that valid inference proceeds through the apprehension of relations between facts or reals. This question, however,

¹ Plato, *Rep.*, V, 478 B.

will arise under (16). Lastly, let me quote II. xii. 'For example, in the proposition, "He is afraid of ghosts," the relational component is expressed by the phrase "afraid of".' Now what is expressed by that phrase is a component in a fact.

(6) The statement that a true proposition is in accordance with a certain fact I have already quoted from I. 17.

(7) My seventh meaning for 'proposition' was what expresses a fact. In his fondness for new names, Mr. Johnson proposes (I. 61), that *nomic* should be substituted for *necessary* as contrasted with *contingent* propositions. 'Thus a nomic proposition is one that expresses a pure law of nature; and a contingent proposition is one that expresses a concrete event.' Both, I suppose, are facts of a kind, though I should have thought a law of nature was a contingent fact; certainly Mr. Johnson's view of inductive science, so far as I can gather it from these volumes, does not take statements of the laws of nature inductively reached to be necessary or apodeictic, in the traditional sense of those words. Again (I. 64), 'it needs only a little reflexion to show that familiarity with a matter of fact does not render the proposition which expresses such fact verbal or analytic' . . . 'as verbal' a proposition 'cannot strictly be said to be either true or false, because it does not declare a fact, but rather expresses an intention, a command, or a request,' though we are told that 'a proposition about the meaning of words is verbal' also, and in this sense of 'verbal proposition' it may be true or false. And at III. 36 we read of 'the kind of proposition which directly expresses the data of observation'; these, I suppose, are facts.

(8) That a proposition is expressed by a sentence seems the view held in II. 58. 'Ordinary language adopts abbreviated expressions for propositions that are connected, through identity of *subject*, by constructing a compound *predicate*, e.g., "*A is p or q*," "*A is p and q*"; as also for propositions that are connected, through identity of *predicate*, by constructing a compound *subject*, e.g., "*A or B is p*," "*A and B are p*".' Now it is clear that when David said 'Saul and Jonathan were lovely and pleasant in their lives,' Saul and Jonathan themselves were nothing compound; it is equally clear that when Robert Boyle was said to have been the father of chemistry and the nephew of the Earl of Cork, that was not a compound relation, but two relations; and that if Hamlet was either mad or irresolute, that is not a compound quality of character. Only therefore the words that are styled in grammar subject and predicate are here compounded in the

sentences, from which the propositions expressed are distinguished. But the word *express* is used in many senses in the *Logic*, and perhaps it is here meant that a proposition *is* a sentence: to 'express' a proposition is to construct it; as we read I. 89, 'Taking the two words "valour" and "courage," the brief formula "valour means courage" is seen on reflexion to be imperfectly expressed': for it is meant that *valour* and *courage* have the same meaning. Thus 'to be imperfectly expressed' means 'imperfectly to express the writer's meaning'; and in that sense, the sentence just quoted is itself imperfectly expressed. Hence, that a proposition is expressed by a sentence may mean that it is a sentence, and if so, this passage falls under (14).

(9) That a proposition is denoted by a sentence we are told in III. 117: 'Now an understanding of the meaning of language, and in particular of the sentence as denoting a proposition, is what is meant by thought or ideation'. *Denote* here might be loosely used for *symbolise*, and not as e.g. III. 2, where the subject-term of a proposition expressing a single fact is said to denote 'a pure substantive without adjectival characterisation,' and to be best symbolised by *S*. The proposition may be symbolised by '*S* is *p*,' or if we like by *p* (*p* of course having then another meaning), but neither symbol denotes or names a proposition as *Socrates* denotes the philosopher. But I cite the passage as perhaps intended to state a fresh truth about propositions, because of the symbolism so freely used by Mr. Russell and not altogether absent from the *Logic*, whereby it is suggested that propositions can be subjects in propositions stating them to imply other propositions, and the propositions in which they are such subjects can again be such in yet others; thus Mr. Russell tells us that "*p* implies *q*" implies *p* 'implies '*p* is true'. Such forms of words can be interpreted so as to make sense; but they are really statements about the meaning of symbolism, not about what words denote. To say that a sentence denotes a proposition may betray a tendency to overlook the artificiality of such expressions.

(10) But a proposition also in turn expresses a judgment. For a little before the passage just cited from III. 117 we read, 'in fact, passing from this simplest case [of "some such proposition as: 'The word red stands for the quality characterising this sensation'"] to the higher forms of thought which may be accompanied by language, the verbal expression of a proposition may be taken to represent the universal form of an act of thinking'. If the verbal expression of a proposition is a sentence, and the sentence expresses

a proposition, and represents the form of an act of thinking, I am puzzled how the three things, sentence, proposition and act of thinking, are being distinguished. Are we to find a subtle difference between expressing and representing? But in I. 16, there is no question that a proposition *expresses* a judgment; for we are told: 'the truth of a judgment (expressed in a proposition), may be said to mean that a proposition is in accordance with a certain fact, while any proposition whose falsity would necessarily follow from the truth of the former is in discordance with that fact. In this way the somewhat vague conception of the correspondence between thought and reality is replaced by the relation of accordance with a certain fact attributed to the true proposition, and of discordance with the same fact attributed to the associated false proposition.' (But how this is less vague than the other, or how more is done than to replace one phraseology by another without meaning anything different, I do not see.)

(11) Though we have just been told that a proposition expresses a judgment, elsewhere it is called a judgment. Mr. Johnson is anxious to avoid the ambiguity of what is ordinarily called a disjunctive proposition of the form ' x is y or z '; is that intended or not to exclude x being both y and z ? He therefore gives the name disjunctive to 'not both p and q ' (where p and q are propositions) and the name alternative to 'either p or q ': the alternative form not excluding the truth of both. In discussing the question he writes that 'where any form of verbal expression is admittedly ambiguous, it is better to adopt the alternative which gives the smaller rather than the greater force to a form of proposition, since otherwise there is danger of attaching to the judgment an item of significance beyond that intended by the assertor'. Here *form of verbal expression, proposition, judgment* seem to be synonyms; for it is words that have significance. A little later we read that certain usage 'so far from proving that the alternative proposition *affirms* this exclusiveness, rather suggests, etc'. To affirm is to assert, and according to Mr. Johnson elsewhere an assertion is a judgment, and an attitude towards a proposition. Again I. 60, the contention 'All that happens is necessitated,' 'is to be clearly distinguished from the view that "All judgments or propositions are necessary"'. For the necessity ascribed to judgments is to be conceived as a compulsion exercised by the objective or real upon the thinker.' Here also *judgment* and *proposition* seem to be synonymous.

(12) Yet in the very first paragraph of the *Logic*, I. i, already

quoted, 'there appear then to be three notions which, though intimately connected, must be clearly distinguished: namely (1) what may be called the sentence; (2) the proposition; and (3) the judgment.'

(13) That a proposition is an object of thought-construction is frequently stated, though I do not find any explanation or discussion of what this constructing is. Thus I. 3, 'As to the term constitutive—a term for which philosophers are indebted to Kant—it has the force of "objective," inasmuch as it points to the constitution of such an object of thought-construction as the proposition when treated independently of this or that thinker.' The entity therefore towards which I may adopt an attitude of doubt, or supposition, or assertion I have constructed in thought, and now treat as independent of myself or other thinkers. In chapter III of vol. i (p. 26), it is said that out of a single proposition I 'may construct its negative—expressed by the prefix *not*—*not-p* being taken as equivalent to *p*-false'. As 'not' is a prefix only in this symbolic formula, perhaps proposition and symbol are confused here and in the following pages, where conjunctive and composite propositions are constructed out of two single propositions: *cf.* (15). We are told in I. xxxii that 'the operations *not*, *and*, *not-both*, *if*, *or*, are supplied by thought; and that nothing in the merely objective world manifests the mere absence of a character, or the mere indeterminateness of the alternative operation [*i.e.*, *either . . . or*], or dependence as expressed by implication. These relations are not manifested *to* thought, but analytically or rather synthetically imposed *by* thought'. That dependence as expressed by implication is manifested by nothing in the merely objective world is a statement very much to be borne in mind, in considering a doctrine which makes the relation of implication of the first importance in inference; *cf.* (16). But we have to ask ourselves here what that is on which the operations of thought impose these relations. I know of course that in Kant's view phenomena are in part the work of the mind; but that work belongs to what is considered in his so-called transcendental logic, and not in general logic; whereas Mr. Johnson's treatise would, I suppose, be general logic. Nor does Mr. Johnson, so far as I understand, adopt Kant's position, or hold that the propositions with which his treatise deals concern only 'phenomena'; at any rate his account of the physical and the psychical and of their relation does not smack of 'transcendental idealism'. Yet (I. 21, n. 2) 'such mental processes as sense differentiation, etc., in which the experient is merely passive or recipient, must have been

developed prior to the exercise of judgment, to furnish the material upon which the activity of thought can operate.' In I. 221, 'it is to be observed that the *relation* that may be said to be predicated, *viz.*, that of characterisation, does not subsist between the idea of *S* and the idea of *P* [but between the objects of thought *S* and *P*], since each of these ideas is specifically completed in the single complex idea of "*S*-as-characterised-by-*P*" or of "*P*-as-characterising-*S*" or again of "the-characterisation-of-*S*-by-*P*"; and I hold that these three phrases express different modes of *constructing* one and the same *construct* or complex object of thought',—is coming to think of an object constructing it? In II. xv we read 'For a surface to be characterised as red or square, it must first have been constructed in thought as being the kind of thing that has colour or shape'; in III. xix, 'A plurality of occurrents is constructed by thought into a unity by virtue of the nature of causality, and a plurality of determinates by virtue of the relation of opponency or incompatibility'. Mr. Russell holds bodies and minds to be 'logical constructions', carried out presumably by some of these constructions themselves; but that is not Mr. Johnson's doctrine; I cannot however gather from the above what his doctrine is. Once more, consider II. xiii: 'while acknowledging that an adjective may be called a universal, I regard it not as a mere abstraction, but as a factor in the real; and hence, in holding that the objectively real is properly construed into an adjective characterising a substantive, the antithesis between the particular and the universal (*i.e.*, in my terminology between the substantive and the adjective) does not involve separation within the real, but solely a separation *for thought*, in the sense that the conception of the substantive apart from the adjective, as well as the conception of the adjective apart from the substantive, equally entail abstraction.' I have no objection; but in the next sentence 'the whole proposition' is said to be 'constituted by the connecting of substantive with adjective'. Is constructing then distinguishing and recognising the relation of factors in a real which we do not construct, or is there a *Zwischending* which we really do construct?

(14) I come now to passages where a proposition seems to be an indicative sentence or some form of words. These are so numerous that I shall have to be content in some cases merely to give the reference. As early as I. xxx we read: 'The prominent use [by conceptualists like Hamilton and Sigwart] of the word concept and its associate judgment points not necessarily to any difference of logical theory between those who use these words, and those who prefer the words

"term" or "name" and "proposition," but merely to the common recognition that thought has form as well as verbal expression.' I cannot understand this unless it mean that the proposition is the verbal expression of the judgment. Again I. xxii, 'grammatical criticism is confined to securing that the sentence precisely represents the thought, any further criticism of the proposition coming exclusively within the province of Logic'; grammatical criticism then is already criticism of the proposition; but it is criticism of the sentence. In I. 27, 'A proposition in whose construction the only formal elements involved are negation and the logical conjunctions [*and, if, etc.*] is called a *Conjunctive Function* of its component propositions'; now the sentence 'He went to bed and did not sleep soundly' might be called a conjunctive function of the two sentences 'He went to bed' and 'He slept soundly' with the help of 'not'; but let a proposition be that which I may suppose or assert or doubt of, and I fail to see how 'his going to bed and not sleeping soundly' can be any function of 'his going to bed' and 'his sleeping soundly'. The momentum of a body may be called a function of its velocity (and not merely the symbol mv a function of v) because the velocity of a body changes, and the momentum with it; but how does not sleeping soundly change with the change of sleeping soundly? Again, the Law of Double Negation, $\text{not-not-}p \equiv p$, the Commutative Law, p and $q \equiv q$ and p , the Associative Law, $(p$ and $q)$ and $r \equiv p$ and $(q$ and $r)$, the Reiterative Law, p and $p \equiv p$, which are treated as laws of thought (I. 29, 226) surely merely declare that certain differing forms of statement have the same meaning; but they are said to 'indicate, in general, equivalence as regards the propositions asserted'. In I. 26 the 'form of proposition' in which the words 'a certain' precede the substantive (as they do in 'A certain man was both an historian and a philosopher,' a proposition of the form S is P) is said to 'raise the problem of the significance of the proposition " S is"': here 'proposition' must mean sentence or form of words. So I. 130, 'We may define a general proposition as one in which the subject is constructed by prefixing an applicative to a general name'; I. 166, 'A narrative proposition may be more precisely defined as one whose subject-term is prefixed by (*sic*) introductory or referential applicatives.' There is an elaborate diagram of opposition on page 136, offered in lieu of the ordinary square of opposition, which is said to be required 'because of the distinction introduced between two possible interpretations of the propositions A, E, I, O '; this does not mean, of the symbolic letters, but of the propositions

symbolised by them; *e.g.*, 'No trespasser has been prosecuted' may mean either merely that no one has both trespassed and been prosecuted, or this and that there have been trespassers: in Mr. Johnson's formulation, either 'nothing is pq ' or 'nothing is pq and something is p '. He distinguishes E propositions according to the two interpretations by suffixes, as E_n and E_f ; and so with the other three forms; and the propositions he is talking of are plainly forms of sentence; indeed what else could be capable of divers *interpretations*? Another passage worth citing is I. 176: 'The relations asserted in the two propositions "Red is a colour" and "Plato is a man," though formally equivalent, must yet be contrasted on the ground that the latter but not the former is based on an adjectival predication'; 'is based on' means, I suppose, 'is'; colour, on Mr. Johnson's view, is not an adjective of red, as human is of Plato. In holding that being a man is an adjective of Plato, Mr. Johnson implies that a 'substantive proper' or substance is a mere 'this'; that doctrine appears elsewhere, but I question its truth; however, it is at any rate true that the relation of species to genus (or, as he prefers to say, of determinate to determinable) is not that of individual to kind (or, as he prefers to say, of determinandum to determinans). Only the sentences therefore are 'formally equivalent,' and the 'two propositions' are two sentences. Other places in vol. i where *proposition* must mean a sentence will be found on page 41, l. 3; on page 108, l. 18, and in Chapters IX and X *passim*. But they may be found equally in the later volumes. Thus at II. 70 Mr. Johnson dissents from Mr. Russell's use of the phrase 'propositional function'. According to Mr. Johnson 'the propositional function may be rendered: 'the proposition x constructed by means of is out of the constituents s and p '; and the quantitative function may be rendered 'the quantity x constructed by means of $plus$ out of the constituents s and p '; the first rendering is a lengthened expression for 'the proposition s is p ,' the second for 'the quantity $s + p$ '. Now surely we can only compare here (though I am not sure that Mr. Johnson would admit this) the way in which the sentence is built up out of substantive- and adjective-words by the help of 'is' and the way in which the expression for a sum is built up out of the symbols for its parts by the help of $+$. For ' $7 + 5$ ' stands for the number of an aggregate wherein are really found two lesser aggregates for whose numbers stand the symbols 7 and 5; but what so stands for the nature of that wherein are present what 'pitcher' and 'broken' stand for, is not the proposition 'the pitcher is broken' but the term 'the broken pitcher'. Therefore ' $7 + 5$ ' and 'the pitcher is broken' (or ' $s + p$ '

and ' s is p ') are not comparable in respect of the comparability of what they signify, but only in respect of the way in which as sentence and symbolic expression they are built up. Lastly, consider this passage from III. 36: 'Agreement and difference—the two principles upon which every method of direct induction ultimately depends—are notions which may be further expounded and more precisely defined by a logical analysis of the kind of proposition which directly expresses the data of observation. Such a proposition assumes the form: certain observed manifestations are characterised by the descriptive adjectives *mnpqr*, say. Now this form of proposition is—in two main respects—different from that with which we have been chiefly familiarised in logical teaching. In the first place, the familiar terms of quantity, such as "all" or "some," are omitted'; and so on. This passage suggests several questions: are agreement and difference principles? are they not relations? is a principle a notion? manifestations of what? But our immediate question concerns the meaning of *proposition*, and I have quoted enough to show that in this passage the word means an indicative sentence.

(15) I have included symbol in my list of what the *Logic* holds a proposition to be, not because I think Mr. Johnson ever means to give the name *proposition* to the symbolic representation of one, but because some statements made about propositions seem to me only true of symbolic representations.

There is a difficult passage at I. 197, in a discussion of the 'relation of identity'. 'Although in the sense explained identity always implies the legitimacy of substitution, we cannot say conversely that the legitimacy of substitution always implies identity. For whenever any two predications are *co-implicative* [i.e., if either is true, so is the other], the one may always be substituted for the other in the same way as for substantives which are *identical*. Thus, for substantives x and y we have the formula:

If x is identical with y , then " x is p " is co-implicative with " y is p ," where p is any predication applicable to x and y .

Corresponding to this, for predications q and r , we have:

If q is co-implicative with r , then " q is n " is co-implicative with " r is n ," where n is any predication applicable to q and r .

Thus, given the co-implication of two predications (q) human being and (r) featherless biped, we can infer that the proposition "the number of human beings is n " is co-implicative with the proposition "the number of featherless bipeds is n ". And again, given the co-implication of the two propositions (q) "There is a righteous God" and (r) "The wicked will be

punished," we can infer that the proposition "That there is a righteous God is problematic" is co-implicative with the proposition, "That the wicked will be punished is problematic".

Here in the first place we may enquire what would be an example of the first formula 'for substantives x and y '. Substantives in Mr. Johnson's usage are singular reals, and he rightly says that two such cannot be identical; the proposition ' x is p ' can be co-implicative therefore with the proposition ' y is p ,' only if x and y are not two substantives, but two symbols for one substantive. If however x and y are symbols not for substantives but for commensurate characters, like 'human being' and 'featherless biped' then the substitution is permissible in some propositions and not in others. For example, if organisms are equal in number to the stars, so are mortals, since every organism and nothing else is mortal; but though to be an organism is to be a substance, to be mortal is not. Symbolic logicians, aware of such differences, have devised formulæ and rules of substitution in the use of their symbols which shall work correctly in spite thereof; they concern themselves (as Mr. Russell allows) chiefly with the extension of terms, and their operation with their symbols is therefore in certain respects comparable to that of the mathematician with his. But I think that in so safeguarding themselves, they are led to forget the importance of, and misconceive the conditions which make possible, that thinking which proceeds by considering not the mere consistency of statements nor relations of quantity, but the connexions of character or qualities in the real.

Mr. Johnson however appears to be thinking here of such connexions; and this raises a second difficulty in the passage. For he talks of two *predications* being co-implicative; and as examples of such predications he gives 'human being' and 'featherless biped'; 'in number n ' would seem also to be a predication. But equally he gives as examples of co-implicative predications 'There is a righteous God' and 'The wicked will be punished'; at least these are equally examples of his q and r , which are called predications. According to Mr. Russell, implication is a relation that only obtains between propositions; and though I do not remember any explicit statement to this effect in the *Logic*, it is clear that in the sense of the word *imply* in which a false proposition implies and a true is implied by all propositions (as Mr. Johnson holds along with Mr. Russell), implications can only obtain between propositions. Is a predication then a proposition and a proposition a predication, or not? if yes, q , r and n are not predications in the first example given, nor

n in the second; if no, 'human being' and 'There is a righteous God,' 'featherless biped,' and 'The wicked will be punished' should not equally be given as examples of predications. What induces Mr. Johnson to give both as if they were of the same kind would seem to be the use of the same symbolic notation for what are different. If q and r are commensurate characters, 'The q 's are n in number' implies 'the r 's are n in number', and *vice versa*; but q and r are not symbols here for propositions; if q and r are symbols for co-implicative propositions, ' q is problematic' implies ' r is problematic,' and *vice versa*, but it is not true that whatever 'predication' n stands for in the 'propositions' ' q is n ' and ' r is n ,' the co-implication of q and r carries the co-implication of ' q is n ' and ' r is n '. Let n be 'believed by all who deny the justice of punishment.' That all who deny the justice of punishment believe that there is a righteous God does not imply that they believe that the wicked will be punished. The above criticisms concern the truth of statements in the passage quoted; but the passage betrays, I think, a tendency to confuse the consideration of propositions with that of the manipulation of symbols.

In this connexion I may refer again to the passage quoted under (14) from II. 70, about propositional functions. I think the comparison between the construction of the proposition ' s is p ' and that of the sum ' $s + p$ ' would have seemed less plausible if Mr. Johnson had not been thinking of constructing a symbolic notation for a statement when he should have been thinking of constructing a statement itself. There are other passages where attention to symbols instead of what they stand for seems to mislead. In I, ch. XIV four 'Principles of Propositional Determination' are formulated among the Laws of Thought; one of these is ' P and not- P cannot both be true'. These principles, applied to any singular proposition, of the form ' s is p ' (where ' s stands for a uniquely determined or singular subject') yield four 'Principles of Adjectival Determination,' among which the corresponding one is ' s cannot be both p and not- p '. These formulæ may be expressed 'without any modification of meaning' in generalised form as follows: 'No proposition can be both true and false,' 'Nothing can be both p and not- p '; but the first is properly expressed rather in the form 'No proposition can be both true and not-true'. The Principles of Adjectival Determination are then further considered 'with a view to giving added significance to the predication factor by bringing out the relation of an adjective to its determinable'. (An illustration will explain this;

red, green, etc., are relatively determinate adjectives of the determinable *colour*.) Let the alternative forms of a determinable P be p, p', p'' , etc.; then for ' s cannot be both p and not- p ' we get ' s cannot be both p and p' '. The principle 'as thus reformulated gains in significance, as compared with the mere disjunction of p with the indeterminate not- p , since now it precludes the possibility of conjoining an indefinite number of pairs of predicates, which are here exhibited as determinate and positive. In fact, in the principle of disjunction in its original form (according to which p cannot be conjoined with not- p) not- p should signify—not merely some or any adjective other than p —but some adjective that is *necessarily incompatible* with p , and the only such adjectives are those other than p which belong to the same determinable'. (pp. 238-239). Now the proposition that the same surface cannot be red and green is not an application of the principle that no proposition can be both true and false; nor, so far as I see, are determinates of the same determinable the only necessarily incompatible adjectives. Are not *square* and *virtuous* such? Mr. Johnson, I think, with his views on the relation of mind and body, would allow that they are incompatible; but he would deny that they are necessarily so, because the only necessity is logical necessity, or necessity found in the subject-matter of logic; and the consideration of determinates and determinables, with the incompatibility of any two determinates of one determinable, belongs to logic, while that of minds and bodies with their mutual relation does not. To me it seems, that whether or not one and not the other belongs to logic, both concern the nature of things; and the same intelligence which apprehends the one incompatibility apprehends the other. But let that be; my point is that from 'Nothing can be both p and not- p ' as an application of 'No proposition can be both true and false,' you cannot get to 'Nothing that is P can be both p and p' '; and I think Mr. Johnson himself would admit that some fresh act of insight intervenes. But further, I doubt if the last would seem even a development of the first, but for an error in the symbolic notation. 'Nothing can both be and not be p ' is the true 'application' of the 'Principle of Propositional Determination'; but Mr. Johnson writes 'Nothing can be both p and not- p '. I do not forget that at I. 15-16, Mr. Johnson has maintained the Principle of Contradiction to be derived from that of incompatibility between adjectives; but I should contend that this position is both mistaken, and inconsistent with his admission that there can be pure negation.

(To be continued.)

IV.—"THE IDEA OF NECESSARY CONNEXION" (I).

BY R. B. BRAITHWAITE.

THE object of this paper is to propound and to defend the thesis that the "necessity" of a causal proposition consists in the fact that such a proposition states two *de facto* universal propositions, one being the statement that as a matter of fact the properties concerned in the causal proposition are always associated, the other being the statement that as a matter of fact the former universal proposition is universally believed for reasons which are not logically demonstrative. This analysis of "the idea of necessary connexion" is in essentials that put forward by David Hume; and it is usually considered a *reductio ad absurdum* of the atomistic sensationalism from which he derived it. But it is, in my opinion, independent of Hume's premisses about the relations of "ideas" to "impressions" and of his doctrine about the nature of belief; so I shall discuss my analysis for the most part without reference to Hume and without venturing into the dangerous topics of Humian exegesis. Moreover reasons of space compel me to treat the theory with only incidental reference to other theories of causality, although it is the difficulties in the alternative theories that are my main grounds for preferring Hume's. So all I can hope to show is that a theory on the lines suggested by Hume is at least possible, and that some of the objections that have been urged against it are not as strong as they appear at first sight. But reasons of competence compel me to treat very disrespectfully the most serious of these objections. Hume's theory is usually held to involve the proposition that induction is invalid as a method of logical inference, either certain or probable; and the main reason for the rejection of the theory is that it makes knowledge of most sorts of universal propositions impossible and belief in them "irrational". I discuss this objection briefly at the end of my paper, and give the reasons why it does not convince me. But I do not profess to be able to deal at all adequately with induction, and I do not hope to convince those to whom "transcendental" arguments

based on "necessary presuppositions of knowledge" appeal strongly.

It is, perhaps, on account of these "transcendental" arguments that Hume's analysis of causality has had the strange fate for a theory repugnant to common sense of being accepted more by amateur than by professional philosophers. In particular, the theory has been absorbed, by those philosophers of science who derive from Mach, into the "descriptive theory of science," which makes science consist in mere abbreviated descriptions of phenomena about whose status science does not care a pin. Critics of these theories naturally enough have attended more to the nature of the entities involved in scientific laws than to the connexions asserted in such laws. M. Meyerson, for instance, while treating most brilliantly "causality" as distinct from "legality"—submission to law—, neglects altogether to consider the problems involved in "legality". Mr. Bertrand Russell's various treatments discuss "cause" and its temporal antinomies more than the causal relation, which he describes in terms of probable inference and an inductive principle. Moreover he follows Mach in advocating functional relations instead of causation, a distinction which seems to me simply to obscure the issue. For the "necessary connexion" is the most important feature of the causal relation, and we are still left with its problems if we exchange "A causes B" for "B is a function of A," and thus obtain the "complete extrusion" of the word "cause" "from the philosophical vocabulary".¹ So a fresh discussion of Hume's type of theory by an advocate who is very much aware of its shortcomings may not be entirely unprofitable.

Hume's analysis of causal propositions may be taken as a denial of the existence of causation, so that there are no causal propositions and nothing left to analyse. And in one way this is true. If causal propositions are taken as asserting a genuine² necessary connexion between events, then the view that I am defending states that there are no true causal propositions and that we are mistaken in thinking that there are. Similarly, if propositions about material objects are taken as stating facts about things which are certainly not mental, then a follower of Berkeley would maintain that all such propositions are false and that we are in error in thinking any such propositions true. But this seems

¹ *Mysticism and Logic*, p. 180. In his recent *Analysis of Matter*, Mr. Russell quite justifiably declines to discuss induction, and uses "causality" without any suggestion of "necessary connexion" as "embracing all laws which connect events at different times" (p. 313).

² I use "genuine" in this and similar contexts to mean "not to be analysed in a Pickwickian sense".

to me to be a wrong way of looking at the subject. I agree with Dr. Moore in thinking that the task of philosophy is to analyse propositions which are universally accepted, not to reject the propositions of common sense because they cannot be analysed in a particular way. Thus the task of an idealist should be, not to reduce matter to "the same position as the Gorgons or the Harpies" so that "its existence is a bare possibility to which it would be foolish to attach the least importance,"¹ but to show that matter can be analysed in terms of something mental so that all the accepted propositions about material objects remain as true as before. Similarly, my task should not have to be to maintain that all causal propositions are false, but should be to explain that the analysis of them is different from that which it is generally supposed to be. Consequently I shall be able to avoid the absurdity of saying that the propositions "Arsenic causes death" and "Milk causes death" are equally false.

But there is a preliminary objection that can be made to the attempt of a Humian to analyse causal propositions that does not confront a Berkeleyan analysing propositions about material objects. For Hume's theory apparently cuts away the basis for induction, so that I seem to have no justification for asserting even the *de facto* universal propositions into which Hume analyses causal propositions. In this case it may be asked why I ever assert any causal proposition at all; for, though it may be true, I have no reason for thinking it true. Again its truth would be "a bare possibility to which it would be foolish to attach the least importance". But it is perfectly possible to assert sensible propositions which may be true in cases where everyone would admit that there is no justification for asserting them. If I declare that my pencil weighs exactly one ounce, I am making a perfectly sensible remark which might be true, though it is certain that I have absolutely no satisfactory logical grounds for making the remark. And were I to attempt the philosophical analysis of the property of "weighing exactly one ounce," it would be no valid criticism of my analysis to point out that, according to it, I should never have any justification for asserting the property of anything.

Thus my analysis of causal propositions is an analysis of propositions such as "Heat causes milk to go sour" or "The non-vanishing of the Riemann-Christoffel tensor causes a gravitational field," propositions which we all believe and the truth of which my analysis will leave unaffected. The fact that,

¹ McTaggart, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 95.

if my analysis is correct, my reasons for believing such propositions are quite different from those I have for believing that the conclusion follows from the premisses of a valid syllogism, is an argument against my analysis, but not against the possibility of making such an analysis. Alternatively, if you insist that causation can only mean a genuinely necessary relation, I deny that there are any true propositions which are causal in this sense; and, having said this, proceed to apply my analysis to the propositions which I believe to be true and which appear to be causal.

Causal propositions are of two kinds—particular causal propositions such as “Mrs. Palmer’s death was caused by Mr. Palmer’s giving her arsenic,” and causal laws such as “Arsenic causes death”. A particular causal proposition may be written in the form “A’s having P causally necessitates A’s having Q”: in our example, A is the event “the consumption of a substance by Mrs. Palmer given her by Mr. Palmer,” P is “the property of being a consumption of arsenic” and Q is “the property of being followed after not too long an interval of time by an event having the property of being the death of the consumer of the arsenic”. A causal law may be written in the form, “If a thing has P, it causally must have Q”: in our example, P and Q are the properties defined above. So all causal propositions, whether or not they *prima facie* assert relations of causal concomitance of properties, can be written in the form of causal concomitances. Similarly, causal propositions with more than one cause-factor or more than one effect-factor can be written as the causal concomitance of two properties in the forms given above.¹

The theory which I wish to propound consists of three parts: (1) A particular causal proposition “A’s having P causally necessitates A’s having Q” states the causal law that if a thing has P, it causally must have Q, together with the particular proposition that A has P.

(2) and (3) A causal law “If a thing has P, it causally must have Q” states two propositions: (a) The “universal of fact” stating the *de facto* association of the property Q with the property P, *i.e.*, the proposition that, as a matter of fact, all P’s are Q’s, and (b) A psychological proposition, about beliefs, that, under certain circumstances, everyone does as a matter of fact believe (a).

¹ Causal propositions can be expressed in these forms in more than one way, but this fact (like the closely connected questions of the spatio-temporal relations in causation and as to whether persistent substances or only events are involved) is irrelevant to the “necessity” of causal propositions.

The first two of these propositions are included in the former of the two definitions of cause given by Hume towards the end of the Section entitled "Of the Idea of Necessary Connexion" in both the *Treatise of Human Nature* and the *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*. I quote from the *Treatise*: "We may define a cause to be 'An object precedent and contiguous to another, and where all the objects resembling the former are plac'd in like relations of precedence and contiguity to those objects, that resemble the latter'".

The first part of my theory, that the "necessity" of particular causal propositions is to be found in that of causal laws, is common ground to most theories of causality and I shall not discuss it at this point.

The second part of my theory, that one of the things stated by a causal law is a *de facto* uniformity, is that part of the doctrine which is usually thought to be all that Hume's theory boils causation down to. In this case, the "universal of law" that, if a thing is P, it causally must be Q, is simply the "universal of fact" that, if a thing is P, it is Q. For I am interpreting the universal proposition "All P's are Q's" as not asserting the existence of a P, and hence as equivalent to the hypothetical proposition "If a thing is P, it is Q," and to the denial of the particular proposition "Some P's are not Q's". It is universally admitted that causal laws entail these *de facto* uniformities, though it would not generally be admitted that such uniformities form any part of the meaning of causal laws. And Hume's theory is usually taken to be that these uniformities are the whole of the meaning of causal laws. It seems to me that the admission that there are psychological propositions also involved in causal laws escapes the paradoxes with which a pure uniformity theory is confronted: nevertheless, if a theory of Hume's type is correct, the uniformity is certainly the most important element of a causal law in that it is the only non-psychological element to which it can be thought that the "necessity" is due.

There are two restrictions that must be placed on the *de facto* universal proposition which is part of the meaning of a causal law:—

(1) The proposition must not be logically necessary: it must not be a proposition of logic (*e.g.*, $2 + 2 = 4$)¹ nor an

¹ I follow Mr. Chadwick (*MIND*, N.S., vol. xxxvi, p. 11) in taking a proposition "belonging to Logic" to be one which is both logically necessary and expressible solely in terms of logical constants.

instance of a proposition of logic (*e.g.*, If Socrates is a man and all men are mortal, then Socrates is mortal), nor any other logically necessary proposition (if there are any such). Moreover the proposition must not be expressible purely in terms of logical constants: it must not be a mathematical proposition which is believed to be true but has never been proved (like Riemann's hypothesis about the zeros of the Riemann-Zeta function). In Mr. Johnson's language, the proposition must be neither formally certified nor formally certifiable.

(2) Consequently the properties P and Q involved in the universal of fact must not be purely formal properties. But they must, I think, satisfy other conditions which I will merely indicate. Most people think that a cause must precede its effect, some people think that a cause must either precede or be simultaneous with its effect, but no one would allow a cause to follow its effect. So the properties P and Q must be restricted to being properties of things in time, and Q must not contain a reference to anything earlier than the thing (or the latest of the things) contained in P or to which P and Q are asserted to apply. Moreover it is frequently thought that cause and effect must have some sort of spatio-temporal continuity, which would impose further restrictions on P and Q. I think it is only plausible to maintain that this is the case for the ultimate causal laws: certainly in the ordinary causal laws of common sense there is no spatial or temporal continuity. But I shall neglect any detailed discussion of these limitations, because it is generally agreed that the "necessity" of causation does not arise from the "relations of precedency and contiguity".

I now come to the third part of my theory—the psychological proposition involved in a causal law. The most important thing about this proposition is that it is extremely ambiguous and is different for different people: to this fact is due the divergence of opinion about what are causal propositions and the substitution of definite uniformities for indefinite causal laws by many philosophers of science. But I am fairly satisfied that in all cases the psychological proposition is about beliefs, and about beliefs in the non-psychological *de facto* universal proposition. So that the psychological proposition is simply that all the persons of a certain class happen to believe this universal of fact. By "believe" in this context, I do not mean "entertain a belief all the time," but "have a disposition to believe," *i.e.*, believe when considering the proposition. The ambiguity of the psychological proposition is in the class of persons whom it asserts to have the disposition

to believe: I will postpone consideration of this question until I have made three qualifications to the psychological proposition.

In the first place, I wish to exclude from causal laws universals of fact which are believed on logically demonstrative grounds. We have already excluded formally certified and formally certifiable propositions: this qualification excludes propositions which are experientially certified on logically demonstrative grounds according to the principles of deductive logic. This excludes universals of fact obtained only by simple enumeration, *e.g.*, the proposition that all the Conservative Prime Ministers of England during the quarter-century from 1903 have names beginning with B. And it would exclude any scientific universal of fact if all the members of our class of believers knew that it followed logically from some first principle which each knew to be experientially certified. But it would not exclude universals of fact which do in fact follow from known facts, if it is not generally known that they follow. So the laws of physics are not to be excluded from causal laws, on the ground that it is possible that they all logically follow from some principle which we know.

The second qualification is simply to exclude silly cases. All my universal propositions are to be interpreted as not asserting the existence of their subject terms; so my psychological proposition is true if nobody ever in fact considers the non-psychological proposition. Since I do not wish every unthought-of generalisation to be counted as a causal law, I add to the universal psychological proposition the particular proposition that some person of the class in question at some moment considers the proposition.

The third qualification is with regard to causal laws stated in an exact mathematical form. Here I suggest that, while the non-psychological proposition asserted is that the *de facto* universal proposition is true, the psychological proposition is that this non-psychological proposition is believed to be true within certain vague limits of error. The progress of science consists almost entirely in subsuming limited generalisations under more general ones, but occasionally the limited generalisation is found to be slightly wrong, as was the case with Newton's Law of Gravitation. So scientists only believe that the laws which they discover are true to a certain degree of approximation; and I would not wish my criterion to exclude such a series of generalisations as Einstein's Relativity Theory from being causal laws because everyone agrees that they may need slight modifications.

This seems to me the right point to consider the relation of my psychological proposition to Hume's second definition of cause. In his analysis of "the idea of necessary connexion" Hume set himself two tasks—the philosophical task of showing that there is no genuine causal necessity, and the psychological task of explaining the causal origin of the idea. Hume is sometimes accused of circularity in deriving "the idea of necessary connexion" from an association of ideas in which "the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other," which association has been caused by experience of uniformity in the past. But the "determination of the mind" is merely uniform conjunction, and the psychological theory as to the origin of an association of ideas is quite inessential to "the idea of necessary connexion". Its only function is to introduce the definition of cause by showing how it is that we come to make "inferences" for which no logical reason can be found.

Mr. Bertrand Russell distinguishes four stages in the history of an "inference" based on sensible experience.¹ (1) The physiological "inference" when I act as if I believed a universal proposition. I will call this "physiological pseudo-belief" in the proposition. (2) "Transition from the belief expressing the premiss of the physiological inference to that expressing its conclusion, without any consciousness of how the transition is effected": I will call this "psychological pseudo-belief" in the proposition. (3) Belief in the proposition. (4) Logically justified belief in the proposition.

In the case of causal "inferences" we never reach the fourth stage. The psychological proposition which I have given as an essential part of a causal proposition is in terms of the third stage in this history, the actual beliefs in the universal of fact. Hume's second definition of cause (which is supplementary and not, as he thinks, equivalent to his first definition) is in terms of the second stage, the psychological pseudo-beliefs. I quote again from the *Treatise*: "A cause is an object precedent and contiguous to another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one determines the mind to form the idea of the other, and the impression of the one to form a more lively idea of the other". This, translated out of Hume's language and neglecting the "precedency" and "contiguity," is to define cause in terms of a *de facto* association of beliefs. It was reasonable for an eighteenth-century philosopher to whom causal laws were primarily those of common sense to make this the criterion:

¹ *The Analysis of Matter*, p. 190.

I do frequently pass by a "transition of the imagination" from a knowledge that I have boiled an egg to a belief that it is fit for eating. But in the case of such a causal law as that the non-vanishing of the Riemann-Christoffel tensor causes the existence of a gravitational field, most, if not all, people have no "transition of the imagination" at all, since they never consider in any individual case whether or not the tensor vanishes. So, according to Hume's criterion, every generalisation that was so complicated that nobody ever believed that a particular thing had the cause-property P would be a causal law, unless the particular proposition that someone did this were added to the criterion, in which case no complicated proposition would be a causal law.

Moreover the reason which I have for believing most causal laws is not that I have actually experienced a bit of the constant conjunction asserted in the law, but either that other people whom I trust have experienced a constant conjunction or that I or other people whom I trust have obtained the law by applying "scientific method" to relevant data. Consequently I frequently skip the physiological and the psychological pseudo-belief stages, and believe a universal proposition without ever having had an "association of ideas". In many cases I only produce the "association of ideas" by applying a causal law which I believe to a particular case. I can perfectly well believe the causal law connecting a rise in the Bank Rate with an influx of gold without always having a belief that gold will come into the country when I read in *The Times* that the Bank Rate has been raised. Indeed, it seems to me that I only believe in a particular case that gold will come into the country because I deliberately apply to the case the law which I already believe.

The limitations imposed by Hume's atomistic psychology would prevent him from realising that there is a difference between the psychological criterion as given by him and that given by me. On Hume's principles a belief in an association can only be an association of beliefs. But recognition of the fact that these are not the same would have enabled him to solve more satisfactorily the problem set him by his first principles of finding the "impression" from which the "idea of necessary connexion" is derived. Hume speaks as though this "impression of reflexion" were the "determination of the mind to pass from one object to its usual attendant," but I find it difficult to see how an experienced constant conjunction of ideas can be itself the "new impression". Had Hume's first principles allowed him beliefs in general propositions, I think he might have found these beliefs to be the

impressions required. It is my awareness of these beliefs in myself and my knowledge that other people share them that is the foundation for my "idea of necessary connexion".

I must return to my psychological proposition after this excursus into the higher criticism of Hume. The psychological proposition which I am suggesting as an essential part of a causal law is that all the persons of a certain class believe (in the sense of "have a disposition to believe") the non-psychological universal of fact to be true or (in the case of mathematically expressed laws) approximately true, it being understood that one such person has such a belief (in the sense of "actual belief") for reasons which are not logically demonstrative. But what is the class of persons? I do not think it can be definitely determined, because I think that all causal propositions are extremely ambiguous. A causal proposition means different things to different people, and that is why disputes as to whether a certain causal proposition is or is not true are so futile. For the class of persons about whose beliefs one person is making an assertion is probably not identical with the class about whose beliefs the other person is making an assertion. A philosopher who says that causal relations only hold between states of substances is referring to a different class of persons from that referred to by a dissenter from his opinion, who holds perhaps that all causal relations must be expressible as differential equations. In each case the class of persons referred to are those who agree with the assertor of the proposition on the point at issue, and discussion is fruitless, unless it is confined to the truth of the non-psychological proposition which the unambiguous part of a causal proposition. So adherents of the uniformity theory of causality who treat these universals of fact as all that Hume has left of causal propositions are right in thinking that they are the only definite propositions asserted by all people in causal propositions. It certainly is a definite objective fact that all men who eat one pound of arsenic in a day die; and this, according to my analysis, is included in every causal proposition stating that eating one pound of arsenic in a day causes death. But the something extra asserted may be different for each assertor, so that what one person means by saying that one pound of arsenic in a day causes death may be quite different from what another person means by the same expression. There is an ineradicable vagueness about the idea of cause: if you try to make a causal proposition definite, you realise that psychological propositions are involved, and you hastily change the subject and consider instead the non-psychological universal of fact.

Nevertheless, recognition that every causal proposition asserts a psychological proposition besides a uniformity in the external world, even though the psychological proposition is a different one for each assertor, explains "our extreme unwillingness to admit that causation is nothing but regular sequence,"¹ and enables us to avoid many of the "extreme paradoxes" of the pure uniformity theory. For example, the succession of night and day will not be a causal law according to my theory, since most of us do not as a matter of fact believe in the uniformity, because we think that the earth might stop rotating in accordance with more fundamental causal laws. And my analysis disposes satisfactorily of the paradox of Mr. Russell's hooters in different places, which all sound at twelve o'clock, any one of which, according to Mr. Russell,² has as good a right as any other to be regarded as the cause of a man's leaving one factory for dinner. For, as a matter of fact, for good or bad reasons we only believe one universal of fact, that connecting the sound of a hooter with the man's leaving the factory where the hooter is, and disbelieve all the others.

¹ C. D. Broad, *The Mind and its Place in Nature*, p. 454.

² *The Analysis of Mind*, p. 97. See C. D. Broad, *op. cit.*, p. 456.

(*To be continued.*)

V.—CRITICAL NOTICES.

Essays in Philosophy. By JAMES WARD. With a Memoir of the Author, by OLWEN WARD CAMPBELL. University Press, Cambridge, 1927. Pp. vii, 372. 16s.

THIS volume, edited by Profs. Sorley and Stout, contains a memoir of Ward by his younger daughter, Mrs. Campbell, and a collection of twelve papers written by him, which are for the most part, not 'essays' in the ordinary sense, but addresses and public lectures, and which range in date of composition from 1879 to 1924. Four of the papers have not been previously published, some of the others though published are not perhaps readily accessible, and one is out of print. The collection, therefore, will be valuable to all who are interested in Ward's philosophical teaching, especially as a number of the papers expound his views upon a topic with which, in his larger works, he had no occasion to deal—the nature, method, and present trend of philosophy generally. But the book will also be valuable in a wider way, for it makes an excellent informal introduction to philosophy, and might well be commended as such to the beginner and the general reader. I ought perhaps to add that, with few exceptions, the papers were not meant for either class of reader, but for audiences of a more or less academic character. To describe the papers, as the editors do in the Preface, as 'popular' is therefore, even with the qualification 'as the author would have used that word,' rather misleading: they are popular only in the sense in which all spoken addresses or lectures must endeavour to be so. I need hardly say, they are full of instruction and suggestion for all students of philosophy.

I will first say a little about the Memoir. Ward's life falls into two sharply contrasted parts. During the last fifty years of it, his life was that of a philosophical teacher at Cambridge, in Trinity College and as a University Professor. But he came late to the University, having already taken a lengthy course of study for the ministry in a Nonconformist college, and also held a pastorate for a year in Cambridge. During the latter part of this time he had passed through a painful intellectual struggle in which his religious views had been much broadened and changed. A year spent after his college course in study in Germany, first at Berlin and then at Göttingen to hear Lotze—"the year," he says in a letter of later date, "in which I grew most"—had at least hastened the process of change, and in the end he felt his position to be untenable and,

in spite of urgent appeals, resigned his charge. Having once made the break and turned away to seek a new career, "he buried his past"—so completely indeed, that "to the larger number of those who became his friends in later life" his earlier experiences "remained utterly unknown". But Mrs. Campbell takes the significance of her father's life to lie very largely in its having been a spiritual adventure, "a voyage of discovery, where the traveller sets out with no other guide than the pointing compass of his own soul, for an unknown land, and after many conflicts, obstacles, and inevitable losses, arrives at his goal". She is therefore led to dwell upon the first part of his life and "the formative experiences of his life and character," and this involves a certain amount of detail as to family history and the personal experiences and hardships of Ward's early life. This somewhat difficult part of the memoir is very well done. We get a vivid sketch of the environment in which Ward's early life was spent, and of the difficulties, aggravated by frequent ill-health, with which he had to struggle. The account of the mental conflict through which he passed in his transition period throws, of course, much light on the direction and aims of his subsequent philosophical thinking. To take a single instance, we can see from his later writings that he had a strong interest in, and wide knowledge of, natural science, but we learn from the memoir that he had even considered seriously whether he should not make science his life-work. It seems too, that he would have been fully justified in doing so, for Michael Foster was so impressed by his promise in scientific work as to say of the philosopher that he was "a physiologist spoiled". Ward's whole endeavour in later life to show that natural science is not incompatible with a spiritual philosophy may be regarded as having its source and impulse in the earlier conflict between his scientific leanings and his religious convictions. Throughout the memoir, and more particularly in the difficult first part of it, one feels that Mrs. Campbell has sought to present a true and faithful picture of the incidents of her father's life and the traits of his character and temperament; and the reader will often be impressed, I think, by her sympathetic understanding of her father's attitude to the problems of his life. In a letter in which Ward is reflecting on the experiences of his critical transition period he says "I simply feel that here as elsewhere there is good in evil, though not so much as to make me cease to wish that the evil had not been. Perhaps though when the end of all comes it may prove true that evil has been the parent of a larger good . . . only so far I am not conscious that such evil as I have known and done has proved this for me." "It was in this spirit," Mrs. Campbell says, "with its typical mixture of pessimism, resolution, and hope, that Ward turned to his new life . . . being sustained only, as he said, by 'faith in light to come'." This brief comment seems to characterise very aptly the habitual attitude of mind in which Ward confronted life's problems, not only in their personal, but also in their philosophical aspect.

In the account of the latter half of Ward's life one would have expected his writings and his academic work to be dealt with pretty fully. That this expectation is somewhat disappointed is not, of course, Mrs. Campbell's fault: she explains that she "can only speak with the greatest diffidence of any matter connected with his work," and acknowledges assistance from Prof. Sorley in the passages that describe her father's works and philosophical ideas. But it is not merely the writings that are in question; they can speak for themselves. We are told that from 1882 onwards Ward "took an active part in College and University politics," but we hear practically nothing about this side of his activity. Again the references to his work as a teacher are very meagre, nor is there any description, such as the recollection of his intimate friends in Cambridge might have supplied, of his informal philosophical talk or of his views on subjects outside philosophy. It seems a pity that the editors have not seen their way to supplement the more personal memoir in these directions.

The memoir is accompanied by two portraits, reproduced from photographs, one showing the full face, the other the side face. The former is given as the frontispiece of the volume. It is a very striking portrait, but the photograph would appear to have been taken at a time when Ward was feeling ill and depressed, and I cannot think the selection of it as the chief portrait in the volume a happy one. We are told that Ward's "thoughts and not his conflicts were expressed in old age upon his face, the harmony and beauty of which increased with years," but the portrait would suggest the very reverse of all this, for it has a look of oppression, melancholy and even suffering. The other portrait, though not so striking in itself, is more likely to produce the right general impression.

Of the twelve papers in the volume nine at least may be grouped about three main topics: (1) the nature, method, and present tendencies of philosophy; (2) the contrast and relation between 'the realm of nature' and 'the realm of ends'; (3) faith, or the religious factor in action and thought. Five papers and part of a sixth are concerned with the first of these topics; the Adamson lecture on "Mechanism and Morals" and part of another paper with the second; and the first and the last paper with the third. The remaining three papers are the Sidgwick lecture on "Heredity and Memory," the Academy lecture on "Kant" and an unpublished paper on "Einstein and Epistemology".

Practically half the volume, then, consists of papers that deal with philosophy and philosophical method either generally or with special reference to present-day conditions; and two of these papers have not been previously published. A paper on "The Progress of Philosophy" (published in *MIND*, 1890) seeks to show that "philosophy, as regards its history and development, does not differ in *genere* from the body of the sciences" and that "allowing for differences of subject-matter, it has advanced about as much". An

unpublished paper on "The Difficulties of Philosophy" begins with a suggestive comparison between the difficulty of determining physical magnitudes, when great exactness is required, and the difficulty of analysing and defining philosophical concepts. In the former case all sorts of precautions have to be taken, and any one factor is found to be implicated indefinitely with others. Similarly when we start to analyse a concept like change, we find ourselves entangled at once in discussions about time and substance and cause, and are led on indefinitely from one difficulty to another. Hence the futility in philosophy of such Cartesian rules of method as those which tell us to divide our difficulties and proceed step by step. With this insistence on the mutual implication of philosophical problems we may connect another contention of Ward's both in this paper and in his Presidential Address to the Aristotelian Society (1919, reprinted here), *viz.*, that in philosophy the maxim 'to begin at the beginning' is useless and worse than useless. "For the plain fact is here we are in the middle; and, however we may deceive ourselves, we can begin only where we are, and can at best but try to get to the beginning." Hence in philosophy a synthetic or deductive method is not possible. "The problem that the universe sets us is an inverse problem." Hence again Ward's objection to philosophies of the Absolute that claim to speak from an insight into the nature of that transcendent unity, and on the strength of such supposed insight call in question the very realities of our finite experience from which we must after all start. "There is for us no absolute standpoint." The necessity of being clear about our standpoint and its implications and consequent limitations is another guiding principle of philosophical method for Ward. The problem of 'orientation,' as he liked to call it, is referred to both in connection with the difficulties of philosophy and in a paper called "Philosophical Orientation and Scientific Standpoints". Our philosophy, however far it attempts to reach in speculation, must still be worked out from the point of view of our own human experience and human life. Our ultimate interpretations of the world must still be anthropomorphic. But before philosophy can attempt its ultimate task of interpretation, it has the prior task of trying to bring the standpoints of the different sciences into relation with each other. For philosophy is no mere 'fusion' of the sciences; and when differences of standpoint are ignored or slurred over, only confusion and error can result. Statements valid enough under the limitations of one standpoint are taken to be true without qualification. The physical sciences, *e.g.*, may seem to involve a virtual denial of the reality of life and mind. Here, of course, we are brought to the second main topic of the volume. We approach it again from another side in the unpublished paper on "The Present Trend of Philosophical Speculation" (written in 1903). Here the main tendencies of present-day philosophy are said to be the following: a tendency on the whole towards an idealistic or spiritual philosophy, with an emphasis on the volitional or practical aspect

of experience ; a recognition of the importance of history with its categories of worth or value ; a reaction against Absolutism and towards pluralism ; a faith in progress that avoids the extremes both of optimism and pessimism. Obviously Ward must have regarded his own philosophy as being in harmony with the main tendencies of present-day philosophical thought.

The main aim of his philosophy was to show how ' the realm of nature ' can be interpreted from the point of view of ' the realm of ends '. This philosophy is outlined for us in the present volume in the Adamson Lecture and in the paper on " Philosophical Orientation ". As it is the theme of the two sets of Gifford Lectures and familiar to all students of philosophy, there is no need to say anything about it here. I will merely remark that the Adamson Lecture is probably the best short and comprehensive statement we have of Ward's philosophical doctrine about nature and its relation to mind.

As regards Ward's view of faith the two main points are these. First, faith itself is conceived as a more or less blind venture. And taken in this sense it is not even peculiar to man. Of the world of living beings in general we can say that at every stage " action is in advance of experience ". With a sort of " instinctive trustfulness " the living being experiments with the possibilities open to it. At the human level, man's faith may set before him ideal conceptions, but they are conceptions not known to be true yet cherished and acted upon. Second, by thus venturing in advance of experience, an ascent to higher levels may be achieved, and the faith will then be justified. And at the human level, Ward seems to have thought that, by trusting their religious impulses, men may some day develop a higher kind of insight, some sort of mystical God-consciousness which will transcend the ordinary forms of our present experience. This is not a mere casual or fanciful suggestion, it is referred to even in the *Psychological Principles*, but I must simply pass it over. Ward likes to illustrate the venture of faith by the text which says that Abraham " went out, not knowing whither he went ". On one occasion this part of the text is quoted by itself. But obviously this part of the text taken by itself leaves out the very thing in which Abraham's faith consisted. A mere adventurer might go out " not knowing whither he went ". But Abraham went out in obedience to a call, and the object of his faith was the divine call. Religious faith as conceived by the theologian is in truth a totally different thing from the faith of which Ward speaks : it is not any mere " spirit of hopeful adventure " but an intense conviction of the reality of its object. But the fact is, that of faith in the theologian's sense Ward had not any left. In a letter from Germany in his critical year he speaks of himself as " admitting the ethical worth of Christianity but uncertain as to anything else in it " ; and in a letter of 1873 he says, " The doubting phase is pretty well passed for me now. I reject the whole system of Christian dogma from beginning to end and rationalise the history. " Such

attenuated religious ideas as he retained seem to have become for him speculative hypotheses of greater or less probability rather than assured convictions. In Ward's philosophy we might indeed see a sort of philosophical analogue of religious faith in the intense conviction with which he asserted the reality and spontaneous activity of the self or human spirit. The human self and its activity were facts to be accepted as such, for Ward did not profess to have any metaphysical insight into their nature. But their reality and centrality in experience were also truths to be maintained against all attempts, whether from the naturalistic or the absolutist side, to deny or minimise them. And they were the foundation of Ward's whole philosophy. They furnish the clues for the interpretation of all our objective experiences, they make pluralism a necessary starting-point of philosophy and an inevitable aspect of experience, they suggest the pampsychism which would do away with the dualism of matter and mind, and finally they point towards the theism which is the speculative completion of philosophy.

H. BARKER.

Science and Philosophy and other Essays. By the late BERNARD BOSANQUET, Fellow of the British Academy. London: George Allen & Unwin, 1927. Pp. 446. 16s. net.

THESE Essays were judiciously selected by Mrs. Bosanquet, with the assistance of Prof. Muirhead, by whom they have been carefully edited. They have all been previously published—many of them in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* or in *MIND*; but it will be a great convenience to many readers to have them reproduced in a single volume. They cover a considerable variety of subjects; and it is only possible here to take note of some of the most fundamental problems that are dealt with in them.

The first Essay, which gives its title to the volume, was read before the Aristotelian Society. It is of great interest from the light that it throws on Bosanquet's general conception of philosophy. His view is summed up in the sentence that has been fittingly placed on the title-page and cover—'Philosophy rests on the whole spectacle of the ordered universe, and on the judgments of value which are essentially and rationally implied in that vision.' He contrasts this view with that which has been explained by Mr. Russell in his book on *Our Knowledge of the External World*, according to which philosophy is concerned with those general logical conceptions that are applicable to the whole of reality. He thinks that such a view really makes philosophy one of the sciences, though it is the most fundamental of them; and he connects it with the aspiration of Kant, that philosophy should attain to the 'sure march of science'. Possibly the contrast is too sharply drawn. Kant seems to have been thinking chiefly of sciences of

the mathematical type. Even in these there appear to have been changes that might almost be described as revolutionary; and in the more concrete sciences it might be difficult to point to any march that could be said to be quite sure. On the other hand, Hegel had some success in showing that in the development of philosophical ideas there is a much more definite line of advance than had been previously supposed; and in Hegel's own philosophical system there is a very definite march. Bosanquet, however, though very largely influenced by the Hegelian philosophy, did not accept it as a final system. His own views underwent considerable modification in the course of his long philosophical career. In the Essay under consideration, he makes the very interesting confession that, at the time when he wrote his great work on *Logic*, he believed that *Logic* was the whole of philosophy. Of course, he did not mean formal or mathematical *Logic* or even the dialectical *Logic* of Hegel, but what he characterised, using a biological conception, as the 'morphology of knowledge'. At a later stage he was led to recognise that the fundamental problem of philosophy is not simply that of knowledge, but rather that of value—having the three main aspects of knowledge, æsthetic appreciation, and goodness.

It may be thought that a view of this kind deprives philosophy of any claim to universal validity; and Bosanquet certainly suggests that philosophy, like art, may rightly have a distinctively national character. This would apply chiefly, I suppose, to the order of its development and the form of its expression. But at least he urges that value is not to be regarded as purely subjective. It is not concerned with individual appreciations, but is grounded in the nature of things. Probably, in view of the work of Meinong, Dr. G. E. Moore, and others, it may now be regarded as well established that value has a definitely objective foundation. Even æsthetic appreciations do not depend on simple liking. *Macbeth* (in which there is little that can be liked) is generally recognised as being on a higher artistic level than *As You Like It*. Still, it is true that there tend to be characteristic differences in the art of different countries and even in their moral valuations; and it may be admitted that the methods of approach to philosophical problems may also be somewhat different in different times and places. But Bosanquet himself at least was one who was pre-eminently fitted to bring together such differences and to show the essential identities in meaning that underlie them. His emphasis on value, however, leads to a very comprehensive view of the province of philosophy; and it is hardly an exaggeration to say that, with this conception in mind, he covered a larger field than anyone else has done in recent years. In accordance with his view of the three aspects of philosophical study, the Essays in the present volume are conveniently arranged under the three headings—A. *Logic and Metaphysics*; B. *Ethical, Social, and Political*; C. *Æsthetics*. The order of the Essays within these three groups is excellent.

The second Essay—on “A true theory of Identity”—was read before the Aristotelian Society, printed in *MIND*, and republished in a volume of *Essays and Addresses*. Hence it seems superfluous to do more than remind readers that it emphasises the doctrine that identity never means absolute sameness, but always unity in difference; and calls attention to various ways in which this has been made apparent in recent developments of thought in several European countries. The third Essay—on the philosophical distinction between “Knowledge” and “Opinion”—was also published in *Essays and Addresses*. The general contention is that knowledge remains mere opinion so long as it is not fully co-ordinated. This is illustrated, among other things, by some of the changes that have taken place in economic theory, which has been gradually tending to become less abstract. But he adds that ‘in fine art’ also, ‘in the province of social rights and duties, in morality, in politics, and especially in the inter-connexion of all these spheres, it is no less true than we have found it to be in science, that the mind must grow and advance either all together, or not at all’. It was for this reason, as I understand, that he held that a straightforward ‘march’ is not to be expected.

The fourth Essay—‘on a defect in the customary logical formulation in inductive reasoning’—is closely connected with the one on Identity. It also was read before the Aristotelian Society. It is directed against a statement of Bergson that the essential function of the intelligence is that of connecting the same with the same. It is urged against this ‘that it is the essential character of intelligence to bind different to different in binding same to same; and that it is for the former character that the latter is valuable’. ‘The universality or generality, which is the goal of such a process . . . is not measured by millions of repeated instances, but by depth and complexity of insight into a sub-system of the world.’

The fifth—on Contradiction and Reality—is reprinted from *MIND*. It is largely concerned with criticisms on McTaggart’s attempt to exclude negativity—in particular, pain—from the conception of ultimate reality. In connection with this, Bosanquet emphasises the fact that Tragedy is generally recognised as the highest form of dramatic art. What is urged here should be considered in relation to the further criticisms of McTaggart’s views that are given in the eleventh Essay.

The sixth—on Life and Finite Individuality—was read before the Aristotelian Society, and is largely concerned with the criticism of some of the views expressed by Prof. Pringle-Pattison in his Gifford Lectures on *The Idea of God*. It has considerable bearings also on some of the doctrines of McTaggart and others with reference to immortality and pre-existence. The main problem—whether a person is to be regarded as substantial or adjectival—has been criticised as involving the fallacy of ‘Many Questions’; since it may be doubted whether either way of regarding a person can be

held to be satisfactory. But the issue that is raised is a very fundamental one for Bosanquet's whole philosophy of life. His primary object appears to have been to enter a protest against the too facile assumption that a person may be regarded as an independent and persistent unity to which changing attributes are to be ascribed. From the point of view of Value, which he had constantly in mind, it may be urged that what is important is rather the degree in which a person may be held to have achieved beauty, truth, and love; and that what is essential in his life may be regarded as persisting wherever the same achievement is found in other forms. In Horace's phrase, he does not 'all die' so long as the values that he created persist. Samuel Butler's view of immortality may be referred to in this connexion. So far as I understand Bosanquet's contention, however, he did not mean to deny that the particular values that are created in an individual life may constitute a unique unity which could not be duplicated; but he would urge that this unity should not be regarded as a substantive to which the values could be referred as attributes, but rather as a whole within which they are contained, and a whole which is itself contained within a more comprehensive unity. It is possible that he underrated the continuity of the individual life. He asks, for instance, 'if by a miracle a man of sixty could have himself, as a boy of ten, introduced to him and open to his insight, is there anything, apart from external history, or bodily marks, by which he could identify the boy with himself?' I believe that many people could answer in the affirmative. Surely the child is 'father of the man' to a greater extent than is here implied; and, if the person referred to had died in childhood, there would have been a loss to the world of values that might conceivably have been developed. But still it would remain true that these qualities would have to be developed, not in him as an independent unit, but as a member of a more comprehensive system. His general view is quite clearly summed up near the end of this Essay, where he says that it is natural 'to suppose that our brief existence is the temporal appearance of some character of the whole, such as, in any case, constitutes a very great part of the finite individual's reality as experienced in the world. For what appears as a passage in time, the Absolute has need to express itself through us as very subordinate units. And there are indications which point in this direction, and suggest in what kind of worlds, or higher complexes, we might find our completion. While we serve as units, to speak the language of experience, the Absolute lives in us a little, and for a little time; when its life demands our existence no longer, we yet blend with it as the pervasive features or characters, which we were needed for a passing moment to emphasise, and in which our reality enriches the universe.'

The nature of human individuality was, of course, further discussed in Bosanquet's Gifford Lectures; and some light is also thrown on his way of regarding the individual life in his book on

the State. One of the Essays in the present volume (the fifteenth) is on the reality of the General Will; and this may be regarded as supplementary to the more comprehensive discussion of individuality. His main contention throughout is that an individual must not be assumed to be an independent entity; and that his life has to be considered in connection with his place in the social unity of which he is a member and in the still more comprehensive unity of the Cosmos.

His general view of that comprehensive unity is perhaps best seen in the seventh Essay, which is on "Time and the Absolute," and which has been published in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. The main contention here is that it is right to say that 'Time is in the Absolute,' but wrong to say that 'The Absolute is in Time'. It was very difficult to maintain such a distinction so long as Time—or, as it may be better to say, the series of temporal events—was supposed to be, in Kant's phrase, 'all-embracing' and indefinitely extended; but the more recent views with regard to the limited nature of that series have made the distinction much more tenable. Perhaps it may even be held that it has now become necessary—even from the point of view of the mathematical and physical sciences—to postulate some reality more comprehensive than the temporal series; but, of course, it is not easy to determine the nature of that more comprehensive reality. It may also be an open question whether it is right to say that the temporal series is *in* the Absolute, or whether it would be truer to say that it is an expression or appearance or creation of the Absolute. Bosanquet appears to have adopted, in general, the first mode of statement. He seems to have identified the Absolute with the Cosmos, though not with the spatio-temporal Universe. But probably he did not mean to dogmatise about this. It will be noticed that, in the passage previously quoted, the ideas of expression and appearance are contained, as well as that of totality. Perhaps it would be true to say that he thought of the Absolute as that aspect of the Cosmos in which its essential spirit is contained—a spirit that requires for its complete realisation a great variety of distinguishable and more or less persistent expressions. Some may regret, in this connection, that the present volume does not contain a more definite indication of his attitude towards the newer type of Realism; but at least he made it clear, here and elsewhere,¹ that he did not regard the universe in which we live as a subjective illusion. He used the term 'appearance' in the sense that was given to it by Bradley. He was neither a subjective idealist nor a dogmatic absolutist, but rather a speculative cosmist—i.e., a believer in a totality that has an intelligible order and intrinsic value. Of course, on all these fundamental problems, his relations to Bradley are very close; and it is sometimes almost necessary to refer to Bradley's work for a more definite interpretation of his meaning. But he was

¹ Reference may be made, in particular, to his book on *The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy*.

more anxious than Bradley was to bring his views into relation with those of his fellow-workers, and to make them generally intelligible and interesting to those who are not specialists in any limited field. He seems to have aimed, in dealing with ultimate conceptions, at suggestiveness rather than at finality. I believe he would have been among the first to admit that speculations about the larger issues in philosophical theory cannot be taken as final. This, indeed, might be held to be implied in his repudiation of a 'sure march'.

The only other Essays to which it seems possible to direct attention in such a notice as this are the eleventh on 'Hedonism among idealists,' the twelfth on 'the Prediction of Human Conduct,' and the twenty-third on 'the Nature of Æsthetic Emotion'. The eleventh was published in *MIND*, and is chiefly concerned with the discussion of McTaggart's view of the Supreme Good and the Moral Criterion. The discussion is long and detailed and could not be briefly summarised without losing most of its value. But the concluding passage may be quoted with advantage as throwing further light on Bosanquet's view of the relation of finite personalities to the Absolute. 'Though our morality,' he says, 'is tinged with falsehood throughout, yet we know that it is truth, relevant and relative to our life, in as far as it pursues the line of effort which the nature of reason involves. And we know that somewhere in the central tendencies of this effort, the tendencies whose negation would be to us the most fundamental contradiction, there lie characters continuous with and implying those of ultimate perfection. After all, the Absolute needs us and our conduct just as we need it. We are in it, now if ever, and we can hold to it, if at all, with the full breadth of reason and need not allow our grasp to be attenuated to a thread of hope. Our experience . . . demands and begins the harmonisation of a total world, and not merely the anticipation of its general nature.' What it is well to note here is the apparent distinction between the Absolute which 'needs us' and the 'harmonisation of a total world'. If these distinctions are to be taken as having a definite meaning, it would seem that the Absolute cannot be simply identified with the total world or Cosmos, however much it may be recognised that they imply one another. The Absolute, thought of as needing us just as we need it, would seem to be one aspect of the Cosmos, just as we are another. I think it is at least clear that Bosanquet did not intend any of the conceptions of totality, creation or expression to be taken as complete and final in themselves, but rather as indications of different aspects of reality that would have to be taken into account in any final solution. So regarded, they appear to me to be extremely enlightening and very useful as a basis for discussion.

The twelfth Essay, 'on the Prediction of Human Conduct,' was published in the *International Journal of Ethics*. It is directed against Bergson's denial of the possibility of such prediction; and the argument turns on the distinction previously drawn between

bare identity and identity in difference. It was urged that it is impossible to predict another person's actions, because we cannot know a mind that is different from our own. Bosanquet replies that it is possible in so far as another's mind is not really different from ours. If we can identify ourselves sufficiently with another person's outlook on the world, we may predict with some confidence the way in which he would act in any given situation. In so far, on the other hand, as we have not such insight, we cannot even predict what our own action would be. This certainly appears to be in harmony, not only with what was previously urged about identity and finite individuality, but also with common sense.

The twenty-third Essay, on the nature of æsthetic emotion, was originally published in *MIND*. It contains a somewhat elaborate account of different theories. His own view is summarised in the statement that 'æsthetic emotion is emotion which in creating, or adapting itself to, its pure expression—"pure" as expression for expression's sake—has undergone a definite change of character. It has become "objective" in the sense of being attached to presentations which are as a rule highly individualised and are related to entire psychoses much as abstract language is related to abstract thought. Its impersonal or superpersonal character is deducible from these conditions; while the typical character of the pleasure which attends it must be looked for within the general field of that enjoyment which accompanies the discharge of any and every emotion.' The value of this somewhat technical and complicated statement lies in its combination of the elements of feeling, expression, individuality, and impersonality which are apt to be emphasised in a one-sided fashion in many theories of æsthetics. I think he is right; but my knowledge of Æsthetic is not sufficient to justify a more decided opinion or a detailed discussion.

The other Essays that are concerned with Æsthetics are the twenty-second on 'the part played by Æsthetic in the development of modern philosophy' (published in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*) and the twenty-fourth on 'Croce's Æsthetic' (published in the *Proceedings of the British Academy*).

The remaining Essays that deal with other subjects are the following: 'The Practical Value of Moral Philosophy' (Inaugural Address at St. Andrews, printed separately), 'Recent Criticisms of Green's Ethics' (*Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*), 'The Relation of Sociology to Philosophy' (*MIND*), 'Social Automatism and Imitation Theory' (*MIND*), 'The Duties of Citizenship' (*Aspects of The Social Problem*), 'Ladies and Gentlemen' (*International Journal of Ethics*), 'Some Reflections on the Idea of Decadence' (printed for University College, Bangor), 'The Kingdom of God on Earth' (*Essays and Addresses*), and 'The Place of Leisure in Life' (*International Journal of Ethics*).

Most of these Essays are either too general or too detailed to be discussed in such a review as this. But there was nothing, I think, in which Bosanquet's special gifts appeared to greater advantage

than in these occasional papers on special topics, in which both the precision of his thought and the extraordinarily wide range of his knowledge and interests were very conspicuous—interests that were at once sternly scientific and warmly human, though sometimes expressed with a certain aloofness that is not without a charm of its own. The present collection of some of the best of these occasional papers forms a worthy crown to the magnificent achievement of his life.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

Indian Philosophy. By S. RADHAKRISHNAN. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd. New York: The Macmillan Co. Vol. i, 1923; vol. ii, 1927. 21s., 25s.

PROF. RADHAKRISHNAN recommends Indian philosophy to the Western student, but it is difficult to make out what exactly he expects the Western student to get from it. At one moment he declares that the Indian systems are quite as interesting and instructive from the cultural point of view as the systems of Plato and Aristotle or Kant and Hegel, and then he seems to doubt this, for he adds, "even if Indian thought be not valuable from the cultural point of view, it is yet entitled to consideration, if on no other ground, at least by reason of its contrast to other thought systems and its great influence over the mental life of Asia". This is a very modest claim, and one that may appeal to the anthropologist, who is equally interested in the mental life of a Red Indian or a Bushman. But this is far from being the author's sole standpoint. On the same page he claims that "there is hardly any height of spiritual insight or rational philosophy attained in the world that has not its parallel in the vast stretch that lies between the early Vedic seers and the modern Naiyāyikas".

What the Western student chiefly wants to know is whether among the various Indian systems there are any that add something of significance to his own interpretation of experience, or which at least present some parallel interpretation equally valid. Evidently the first requirement is to be able to find out what the systems actually say, but this, the author tells us, has not been his chief task. "My aim has been not so much to narrate Indian views as to explain them, so as to bring them within the focus of Western traditions of thought." The views of an Indian concerning the meaning of Indian thought undoubtedly have a value, and it is as such that the present work must be accepted, but it is astonishing to find the author making the assertion that so far there has been no attempt to deal with the history of Indian thought as an undivided whole, seeing that he himself alludes in the same preface to Prof. Dasgupta's *History of Indian Philosophy*, and when Deussen's *Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie* has been before the world for over twenty years.

His account or explanation (he refuses to call it a history) does however narrate much, and it makes clear the fact that wide stretches of what is called Indian thought consist of naïve polytheism, theological speculations, and dogmas of personal religion. All these are included by the author, and rightly, for it is necessary to know what the background of popular thought was, especially as Indian scepticism was never strong enough to free systematic thinking from the incubus of an inspired revelation. Even the two chief religions that revolted against the authority of the Veda, Jainism and Buddhism, put in its place the utterances of their own teachers, both of whom (Mahavira and Buddha) were declared by their disciples to be omniscient.

The sections on the Vedas are perhaps the most peculiar in the work. In England the study of Vedic culture has always suffered from the difficulty of getting hold of any intelligible translation of the Hymns. Even now the only complete translation of the Rigveda published in England is Wilson's begun in 1848, and this is not really a translation of the hymns. It gives the sense of the hymns according to the commentary, that is, as they were understood at least 3000 years after their composition. Even a translation of the words of the hymns is of little use without some knowledge of their social environment, and here too Vedic studies in England have been perverted through being permeated by the fanciful guesses of Max Müller and his successors. No one outside England now accepts Max Müller's anthropological views. His philology is obsolete and his ethnology scorned, and yet it is these that still impose on the Hindu student. On the other hand Germany possesses three translations of the hymns, and both in that country and in Holland there has been a succession of scholars who have produced a mass of minute and illuminating investigations. In France also there has been an important school.

It is no matter for congratulation that there should be divergences of methods and results, and it shows the need of caution in trying to arrive at assured conclusions. But both French and German sources are sealed to Prof. Radhakrishnan, and he appears to be ignorant of the names of the most important scholars, so that he cannot use or criticise their results, and he is not able even to report what the present state of the Vedic question is. His own results are the most fanciful in the book. He even goes out of his way to state that there has been no Indian commentary on the Atharva Veda, though Sayana's commentary was edited by a well-known Hindu nearly thirty years ago. It is a pity that his Western sponsors did not tell him that obsolete etymologies and Max Müller's mythology do not belong either to philosophy or to the ideas of the Vedic period.

The Upanishad chapters are much better. Gough's book on the Upanishad philosophy suffers from being written without any spiritual sympathy with the beliefs expressed, and with the assumption that they are to be understood according to the rigid

system of a much later age. But Prof. Radhakrishnan is just as dogmatic in telling us that "the upanishads had no set theory of philosophy or dogmatic scheme of theology to propound. They hint at the truth in life, but not yet in science or philosophy. So numerous are their suggestions of truth, so various are their guesses at God, that almost anybody may seek in them what he wants and find what he seeks." If the reader after being told this is willing to accept what the author has found in them, there is no more to be said, but the way in which he contradicts the views of other scholars will at least be a warning that a final history of these various guesses at God has not yet been written.

By the Upanishad period is meant a period (usually supposed to be pre-buddhistic), during which new theological and philosophical ideas arose, and which is represented by about ten of the oldest upanishads. It is these upanishads that all the later orthodox systems of philosophy profess to recognise as authoritative. But there is a gap of several centuries between the Upanishad period and the appearance of the orthodox systems in their present form as collections of sutras. That the systems, or some of them, existed before the Sutra-period is shown by incidental references in the Epics and in the religious discourses inserted therein. Prof. Radhakrishnan calls this the Epic period, but it is a delicate and not finally settled problem to decide whether what we find in the Epics are traces of a stage earlier than the classical systems, or whether the Epics merely give popular and more or less corrupted versions of these systems. The question has been debated much more than the author seems to realise, but it is not philosophically important, for the religious devotee is more concerned with enjoying the love of God than with thinking clearly, and in the so-called Epic period we do not get clear-cut systems. In this period the author also includes Jainism and Buddhism. This is justifiable for their earlier stages. They were primarily religions, and had no influence on the contemporary philosophy. As Dr. Dasgupta observes, none of the Pali schools of Buddhism are referred to in any of the systems of Indian thought.

The Buddhism discussed by the Hindu systems is of a very different nature. For one thing it belongs to a much later period. "It must be allowed," says Prof. Stcherbatsky, "that the Mahāyāna is a truly new religion, so radically different from Early Buddhism that it exhibits as many points of contact with later Brahmanical religions as with its own predecessors. Prof. O. Rosenberg calls it a separate 'church,' and compares its position with Roman Catholicism versus Protestantism. The difference is even more radical, since the new religion was obliged to produce a new Kanon of Scriptures." On the metaphysical side also the differences are fundamental. "In Hīnayāna, in a word, we have a radical Pluralism, converted in Mahāyāna into as radical a monism."¹

¹ T. Stcherbatsky, *The Conception of Buddhist Nirvana*, pp. 36, 41. Leningrad, 1926.

These latest forms of Buddhism, which in their extreme scepticism deny the real existence of all except consciousness, or even argue that consciousness itself is unreal, still exist among the Buddhists of Japan, just because these principles are there held with tenacity as religious doctrines. In the same way we can conceive how the systems of Spinoza or Fichte might have still survived if some modern sect had incorporated them in a confession of faith. The importance of these nihilistic doctrines is that they have permeated one of the philosophies based on the Upanishads, and have resulted in the most thorough-going of the systems of pantheism found in orthodox Hinduism, that of Sankara. There is little doubt that the Vedantist Gaudapada, who first infected orthodoxy with Buddhist principles, is addressing Buddha when he declares that he "worships the Sambuddha, the best of bipeds," though Sankara, himself accused of crypto-Buddhism, refuses to admit this interpretation. There is however no doubt of Gaudapada's Buddhism when he declares:

No cessation is there, no arising,
None is there who is bound, none who accomplishes,
None who desires release, and none released—
Thus is the absolute truth.

These are words on which Sankara himself commented, and to which he applied all his resources of argument and illustration to make them plausible. For Sankara brahman is not a subject correlative to an object, but in the absolute sense brahman is all, one without a second. Prof. Radhakrishnan expresses his sense of Sankara's greatness thus:

It is impossible to read Sankara's writings, packed as they are with serious and subtle thinking, without being conscious that one is in contact with a mind of a very fine penetration and profound spirituality. With his acute feeling of the immeasurable world, his stirring gaze into the abysmal mysteries of spirit, his unswerving resolve to say neither more nor less than what could be proved, Sankara stands out as a heroic figure of the first rank in the somewhat motley crowd of the religious thinkers of mediæval India. His philosophy stands forth complete, needing neither a before nor an after. It has a self-justifying wholeness characteristic of works of art. It expounds its own presuppositions, is ruled by its own end, and holds all its elements in a stable, reasoned equipoise.

This is an example of the author's eloquence, often striking and dignified, but vague and impalpable, which swells much of his volumes. One would think that this self-justifying wholeness was the last word in Indian philosophy. Yet the author admits Sankara's indebtedness to Buddhism, and goes on to tell us of three other schools, also called Vedanta and expounding the same sutras, to whom Sankara and his system are anything but heroic. "There are, of course, those to whom it seems to be an abyss of contradiction and darkness." And in spite of its profound spirituality we are told that "the Absolute remains indifferent to

the fear and love of its worshippers, and for all those who regard the goal of religion as the goal of philosophy—to know God is to know the real—Sankara's view seems to be a finished example of learned error”.

Such is the attitude of other schools of Vedanta to the great Vedantist. The system most fundamentally opposed to the Vedanta schools is Sankhya. This system, with its conception of the universe evolving from unmanifested matter of three constituent strands (*gunas*), at first in equilibrium and arriving at last at self-consciousness, is the kind of thing that Herbert Spencer would no doubt have welcomed. But he would have shuddered at the idea that behind all the manifestations of phenomenal consciousness there is an infinite number of immortal spiritual units, which can only be called souls. This conception of soul originated in the same upanishadic theory of the One which produced the Vedanta. But in this system soul became many, and the world remained real. There is no God, as he is inferred to be unnecessary, and besides other reasons, “if God were moved by good will, he would have created only happy creatures”.

An offshoot of Sankhya is the Yoga system, but it has no philosophical independence. It fostered Yoga practices, not to attain union with God, but as a means of getting free from matter. The author solemnly quotes a commentator who says that yoga (union) means *viyoga* (separation). It introduced a sort of a God, but did not make him the creator or the goal of the devotee, and the author rather severely declares, “we cannot help saying that the Yoga philosophy introduced the conception of God just to be in the fashion and catch the mind of the public”. But if the author thinks that the conception of God is the expression of a reality, would it not be fairer to say that where Yoga failed was in giving adequate expression to this reality, rather than to attribute to it such a shallow motive?

Two systems that essentially agree in their metaphysical position are Nyaya and Vaiseshika. They hold a form of common-sense realism with a belief in souls and a world of physical objects, and Nyaya at least argued for a God behind everything. The arguments of Nyaya against nihilistic Buddhism are rather like Dugald Stewart refuting Berkeley and Hume. But the chief interest of these systems is not metaphysical. Nyaya elaborated a system of formal logic, which has been continued and cultivated down to modern times, and Vaiseshika developed an atomic theory more complete than anything known to the Greeks. Both the atomic theory and the logic raise questions of borrowing from Greek thinkers or *vice versa*, but Prof. Radhakrishnan shows how very tenuous all such theories at present are.

It is this portion of the work—the second volume, with its account of the so-called six Brahmanical systems—which shows the author at his best. There is no attempt, as is sometimes seen both in Indian and European works, to press the claims of a single school.

When the author goes on to relate them, as he claims, to the living issues of philosophy and religion, there is almost inevitably a tendency for exposition to pass into personal theorising. But the statements are usually well documented, though there are references that need verification, and statements that need revising. This is especially the case with some which, as they stand, do injustice to the views of living writers. We are told (vol. i, p. 351) that M. Senart maintains that we have in the story of Buddha a sun myth. Whether M. Senart still maintains the hypothesis which he published over fifty years ago is doubtful, but this hypothesis was not a sun myth. The charge against Dr. Dasgupta is worse, for it is not easy for the ordinary reader to see its injustice. The author declares (vol. ii, p. 190) that "it is difficult to accept Dr. Dasgupta's suggestion that the Vaiseshika held that the 'self was one, though, for the sake of many limitations, and also because of the need of the performance of acts enjoined by the Scriptures, they are regarded as many'". But it is not a question of accepting a suggestion of Dr. Dasgupta. Dr. Dasgupta cites three Vaiseshika sutras, and in the passage quoted above he is giving, not a mere surmise or suggestion, but a translation of what he thinks they originally meant. Prof. Radhakrishnan may, if he likes, dispute the translation, but it is hardly fair to make it appear as if the words were merely Dr. Dasgupta's suggestion, and ignore the fact that the evidence is there, and that it is a question of the accurate translation of authoritative texts. The author further tells us (vol. i, p. 452) that according to Mrs. Rhys Davids, "the nirvana of Buddhism is simply extinction". This is astonishing to anyone who knows anything of the views of Mrs. Rhys Davids. Fortunately he gives the reference, which is to the article Buddhism in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*, but when we turn to it we find no article by Mrs. Rhys Davids nor any such statement about nirvana. The explanation is that the quotation is from the article in the edition of 1876, and this was by the late Dr. Rhys Davids, but, as the later editions show, he himself abandoned that view of nirvana years ago.

So far as Indian thought contains conceptions that may fairly be related to the "living issues of philosophy," they will be mainly found in the second volume, but this volume possesses an interest beyond the interpretation of the systems as such. This lies in the many particular theories which run through the various systems, and which have a philosophical interest apart from the coherence of the particular school in which they are found. Some of these are questions of epistemology, theories of causation, the nature of time and space, and ethical theories.

Prof. Radhakrishnan ends, as he began, with religion. Not that he describes the actual state of religion in India. We hear nothing of the obscenities of Sivaism or the licentiousness of Tantra and Krishnaism, but it is in these religions that the Vedantic doctrines have found a home without essentially overthrowing the pantheistic basis. Krishna, a manifestation of the eternal God Vishnu, who becomes incarnate to console and save his devotees, is probably

prechristian, but the chief philosophic exponents of theistic Vedanta, Ramanuja, Nimbarka, and Madhva, are late enough to have been influenced by Christian doctrines. Prof. Radhakrishnan quite candidly admits this possibility. "The doctrines of exclusive mediatorship through Vayu, the son of Vishnu, eternal hell as well as the missionary fervour of Madhva's faith, suggest the influence of Christianity, though there is little evidence in support of it." There is no reason why the question should not be dispassionately discussed, for Krishnaism is in its essence Indian, and an examination of the question is necessary for completing the history of Indian religions.

EDWARD J. THOMAS.

Cosmic Evolution. By J. E. BOODIN. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1925. Pp. 484. 15s.

IN this book Prof. Boodin expounds a constructive metaphysics, ostensibly based on the findings of modern science, which claims not only to have a scientific interest, but also to supply a satisfactory moral, æsthetic and religious outlook. The book has five main divisions. The first is a prelude which puts the main thesis "in general terms with a somewhat imaginative appeal to human interest so as to beguile the reader to go on"; the main body of the work restates and illustrates it in terms of a theory of evolution, of psychology (also with an evolutionary bias) and of the theory of relativity; and a chapter on "Cosmic Religion" "sums up in a somewhat lyric way the meaning of the whole". These phrases, quoted from the Preface, suggest that at the beginning and end of the book at least we may expect to find clarity and precision give way before the devices of rhetoric. The truth is that purple passages make rather too frequent intrusions into the argument all through, so that where we urgently need cold analysis and definition we may be fobbed off with metaphor and a rather theatrical diction, which fail to be impressive if only because we badly want something else in their place. His style is the antithesis of, say, Prof. Broad's. In particular, he does not take sufficient pains to define his terms. He uses on almost every page such phrases as 'energy pattern,' 'energy complex,' 'energy field,' 'energy structure,' 'energy exchange,' 'energy levels' and many others similarly compounded, without attempting adequately to define his use of either term or the meaning of the two when so conjoined. These defects may deter some readers from mastering a book which undoubtedly contains some original and suggestive thinking.

The general character of Prof. Boodin's philosophical scheme is broadly indicated in two dicta—(1) "Determination by adjustment is the master-key of the universe" (p. 429) (2) "We may think of the universe as a sort of organism or superorganism" (p. 35). These statements imply that the universe or, as Prof. Boodin prefers

to call it, the cosmos, is not a disjointed plurality but a systematic self-contained whole, with a definite unity of plan. Further, the cosmic unity is conceived by him as one of interaction. Each part of the whole, though it has a distinct existence of its own, is what it is and behaves as it does only through interaction, direct and indirect, with other parts and in the long run with the entire universe of being. Its individuality is shown only in the distinctive way in which it adjusts itself to 'the total cosmic field'. This is true equally of an atom or electron, of the solar system, of the world of stars, and of a human being or a human society. The cosmic unity is, moreover, essentially analogous to that which we find most obviously, though imperfectly, exemplified in a living organism. This means, in the first place, that the cosmic order is teleological: it cannot be accounted for merely as causal interaction in accordance with general laws, but only through specific laws, regulating the interaction of specific factors distributed and co-ordinated in specific 'patterns' or 'energy systems' which are themselves parts of one all-inclusive pattern or energy system. The order is, in a word, 'cosmic,' and cosmos can never emerge from chaos; there must always be specific adaptation and preadaptation. In illustration Prof. Boodin refers to Prof. Lawrence J. Henderson's *The Fitness of the Environment*, p. 276. "There is not one chance in countless millions that the many unique properties of carbon, hydrogen and oxygen, and especially of their stable compounds, water and carbonic acid, . . . should simultaneously occur in the three elements otherwise than through the operation of a natural law which somehow connects them together. There is no greater probability that these unique properties should be without due (*i.e.*, relevant) cause uniquely favourable to the organic mechanism" (p. 20). In the second place, the type of interaction involved is of a very special kind, such that one 'energy system,' having a definite pattern, tends to communicate this pattern to others, with variations due to variable conditions. Such interaction is exemplified in organic life by assimilation and heredity, by the co-ordinating control of higher over lower neural arrangements, and by the control of the muscular system, etc., by the nervous system. It is exemplified again, in the relation of organism to environment, by the development of sense-organs adapted to reproduce in their own way stimulus patterns (*e.g.*, through the organising presence of 'light patterns' the organism was led to contrive eyes). Analogous interactions are found in inorganic nature. Prof. Boodin has his own way of summing this up. "In the deathless rhythm of the universe the life-giving forms of each level of existence fly like winged messengers from system to system, the higher to the lower, to take effect on those that are prepared, as the moon's silver rays stir the heart of youth to love and tender meditation" (p. 41).

The cases which are most important for Prof. Boodin's view of the cosmos are those in which a more complex and highly organised energy pattern interacts with a lower level of existence in such a way that the higher level tends to communicate its own pattern to

the lower, and the lower is stimulated by a 'trial and error' process to assimilate itself to the higher. On such interaction depends all 'evolution,' considered as meaning the origin of new and higher forms of existence from lower. This is his substitute for Mr. Alexander's 'emergence'. If life arises it can only be through the agency of pre-existing life; if mind occurs when vital organisation has reached a certain stage, it can only be through the operation of pre-existing mind. At first sight it would seem that we are condemned to a mere repetition of old patterns, and can vouch only for an evolution shorn of all novelty in what is evolved. But this is a mistake, for the nature of the recipient and the special conditions of interaction vary continuously, and with them varies the nature of the result. The essential point is that the higher level can never of itself emerge from the lower. Hence all levels must always co-exist.

So far Prof. Boodin has accounted only for evolution *within* the universe. But this would not be what he means by 'cosmic evolution'—*i.e.*, a single process having the unity of the single cosmic whole. To complete his system he introduces the conception of God, or what he calls the 'cosmic genius,' which is the mainspring of the upward cosmic nîsus from lower to higher levels. We are not, however, to think of it as in any sense the creative source of the whole world of finite existence; it is rather to be regarded as itself a part of nature. Nature is an energy system of energy systems, and the cosmic genius is one energy pattern among others, distinguished from the rest by being single and everlasting and itself exempt from change and transition—from what Mr. Whitehead calls 'the passing of nature'. Its function is to "contribute the appropriate pattern in the evolutionary advance of nature" (p. 244). "Broadly speaking, and with due allowance for the limitations of our insight, we may conceive of the genius of God as bearing the same relation to the hierarchy of levels in the cosmos as our mind bears to the levels of human nature" (p. 268). The mind of a man, we must remember, is, according to Prof. Boodin, "an energy pattern manifesting itself in a unique control of the reflexes and habits of the biological organism" (p. 221). The cosmic genius, then, enters into the scheme as an energy pattern manifesting itself in a unique control of the cosmic organism or super-organism.

Prof. Boodin, in spite of dashes of unimpressive rhetoric, makes his scheme live in a way to which the above outline does not do justice. Suggestive and stimulating as his book is, however, it seems to me that the reasons with which he supports his rather sweeping statements are anything but convincing. His philosophy is ostensibly reached by interpretation of the results of physical science, but the teaching of science does not demand this interpretation; Prof. Boodin appears simply to take it for granted that there is no alternative. Regarded from a merely scientific point of view, then, his position is weak. His primary doctrine of cosmic unity by no means follows from the scientific evidence as the only

reasonable view. He fails, for instance, satisfactorily to dispose of the difficulty presented by the immensity of interstellar distances. He is more successful in showing the pervading presence of teleological pre-adaptation; but so far as the scientific evidence goes, his dogma that higher levels always co-exist with lower as a necessary pre-condition of the rise of the lower to the higher is a leap in the dark. Why should not teleological pre-adaptation in the lower levels be enough? His prevailing tendency to think in terms of physical science also makes him vague and ambiguous in his philosophical conception of evolution. A higher level differs from a lower, according to him, only as being a more complex and highly organised energy system. So qualitative difference and novelty ought to be only difference and novelty of energy pattern. But how about such qualities as colour and sound, and their genesis in the evolutionary process? Quality, he says, must be an *aspect* of energy. But if the term energy is used in the scientific sense, as standing for a quantity definable only by the way in which it is measured, this statement has no meaning. Prof. Boodin must have up his sleeve some positive view of the intrinsic nature of energy as an actual existence; but he gives us no clue to it.

The difficulty is most obvious in the account of mind. Mind is formally defined as a peculiar sort of energy pattern of a higher type than the brain and controlling the brain as this controls other parts of the nervous system. He utterly fails to show in any coherent way how such an energy pattern is connected with experience and experiencing individuals. He expressly deals with 'consciousness' on pp. 386 ff. "When we try to discover, in the mass of verbiage concerning consciousness, some defining characteristic, there is only one aspect that stands out, and that is the aspect of selection" (p. 389). Taking this as the defining characteristic, consciousness is universally present in nature. "Physical things 'take note' of one another's presence. Chemical elements, entering into compounds, take account of one another's quantitative and qualitative characters and the temperature, electrolysis, and other conditions of their synthesis" (p. 391). It is important to note that Prof. Boodin expressly rejects animism, and warns his reader against attaching animistic explanations to the kind of language he uses here. But if all animistic implications are banned, there seems nothing left but pointless metaphor which in such a context fully deserves to be called verbiage. Yet he thinks that in this way he has got rid of "the paradox of deriving consciousness from non-consciousness which confronts us otherwise in every genetic series" (p. 392). He might as well say that because "rhymes the rudders are of verses," the development of a boat and its rudder into rhyming verse ought to present no difficulty. Nothing will really make him consistent except absolutely uncompromising behaviourism, or else a very strong dose of Mr. Alexander's 'natural piety'. But a main aim of the book is to combat Mr. Alexander's 'emergence,' which he regards as miraculous. If this is miraculous, then there are miracles for Prof. Boodin also.

A. K. STOUT.

VI.—NEW BOOKS.

Handbuch der Logik. Von DR. N. O. LOSSKIJ, translated by DR. W. SEISEMANN. Leipzig, B. G. Teubner, 1927. Pp. viii + 447.

This logical treatise, written by a former professor in St. Petersburg and translated into German, is a long and, in parts, a difficult work to read. The claim made by the author is an important one. He thinks that he has once and for all bridged the gulf between Rationalism and Empiricism. "The chief aim of my system of Logic is . . . to overcome the opposition between Irrationalism and Rationalism, between the *a posteriori* and the *a priori*, experiencing and pure thinking." Many important consequences follow from this claim, the chief of which are to show that all propositions are synthetic, although necessary, and that in Induction we get, not only hypothetical propositions, but a system of knowledge, imperfect perhaps, but approaching to absolute truth. This latter is, of course, what we all like to believe and what, still more, we should all like to be able to prove, but, in any case, it shows that Dr. Losskij is fully alive to the problems in Logic, whether he has satisfactorily solved them or not. The reader's appetite is certainly sharpened at the outset, however much it may languish on the way.

The book divides naturally into three parts. The first part, to p. 71, deals with Theory of Knowledge, the second part, to p. 206, with the judgment, and the third part with Inference. In the first part of the work, the aim of the author is to show that all knowledge is direct and immediate. Unfortunately, much of what is written is obscure and too much time is taken up with criticisms of Locke and Kant. Indeed, one finds oneself in the position of asking why so much time is spent in a criticism of Representative Perception when the author has the key to direct perception in his pocket.

His theory, so far as I can understand it, is as follows.

Reality is "set through" with ideal moments. When an act of knowing takes place, there are two moments to differentiate, the subjective and the objective moment, which together build up a mind as a Unity. Between these two aspects there is a relation, which is often neither temporal nor spatial, but just a knowing relation. It is called a "co-ordination" between Subject and Object. This co-ordination gives the basis to the whole theory and, apparently, according to the author of the work, differentiates it from any other theory of knowledge. And because the object is known as it really is, the name Intuition is given to the act. This co-ordination is not due to any working of Causal Laws and no physiological explanation can account for it. The reason given is that Dr. Losskij insists that if a physiological explanation could be given to account for knowing, then we could never know the real object, because part of the Causal factors in a physiological explanation are subjective, that is, depend on the nervous structure of the body, and this means that we must conclude that we never know the actual object itself, but only the object under certain causal conditions. Hence the word co-ordination is used in order to describe the *direct* knowledge of the real object, which is "transcendental," as opposed to the immanency of the known object in other theories.

If we now turn to the two factors involved in knowing, we find that the Subject consists of a series of acts. Thus, if I make a series of judgments, "This is a maple-leaf," "This maple-leaf is yellow" . . . etc., the Subject, the Ich, simply makes a series of acts. The object, however, is the real object, and the ground of the predicates in the judgment is their actual existence in the object. They follow logically of necessity because they exist in fact. The object is one object, as is shown by the schema "S is P; SP is M; SPM is X"; and so on. Apparently, in judging, S is meant to be the real object which comes into consciousness, i.e., is known, through one of the Ideal moments which is necessary for knowing, or (as is the case with a familiar object) through all the Ideal moments which have been necessary in order to know all that is known of this object.

What is not made clear is this. The mind, or consciousness, consists of the two sides, namely the Subjective and the Objective side, the former being the act, the latter, what is known. The objective side is the real object, which is also the subject of the judgment. Now what is the precise nature of the mind? It contains something physical, but it is also mental. But this latter quality is an "über-individuelle Funktion des Individuums," which is due to Reality being "set-through" with ideal moments. What sort of thing is it in itself? I can find no real answer and there seems to be some sort of confusion between the Ich, the object, and the total unity, which is not unravelled.

But further, and this is still more pressing, what is the nature of the known object? In reply to the question as to whether we can cook water on the fire that is known, Dr. Losskij writes "My consciousness is not a box which is found in my head and contains real flame . . . but . . . despite the distance in Space, I and the object build an Unity . . ." "Naturally, this unity is nothing bodily or material, but it is necessary (or sufficient) for bringing together the different acts of knowing, not, however, for the physical operations of burning and cooking."

Now if the actual fire is known and is in my consciousness, it *must* be sufficient for cooking; if not, then it is not the real fire which is known. These questions are somewhat beyond the domain of Logic, but we may ask the same of the S in the Judgment. If S is not sufficient for boiling water, then the Subject of the judgment is not the actual fire, but something else. Apparently it is this dilemma which induces Dr. Losskij to call his theory an "ideal-real" theory, but it needs more than a set of words to surmount the difficulty.

The curious thing about all this part of the work is that Dr. Losskij is apparently entirely unaware of the tremendous efforts made, both in this country and in America, towards establishing a Realistic theory of knowledge, and there is no quotation from, nor, indeed, any mention of, any work which is at all realistic in character. This omission is all the more marked because, to judge from the many other quotations and shrewd criticisms that are made throughout the work, he is a philosophic scholar of more than average ability. A more positive criticism to be made, however, is that if Dr. Losskij had used his critical faculties in detecting the difficulties in a realistic position, to the same extent as he has used them in refuting a Lockian or a Kantian position, he would have been more anxious to meet the questionings and doubts which naturally arise in the reader's mind as to whether he really understands these difficulties. It is only fair to add, however, that he has two other works, also published in German, in which no doubt these questions are more fully discussed.

In connexion with logical entities it is argued that logical elements are, at the same time, ontological entities (para. 27 and again, para. 174). Logical relations, for instance, belong to the sphere of Ontology, where, presumably, he means by ontology, that they are existents in the objects

in the real world. He writes (p. 82): "We are now going to enquire what is the character of these relations . . . so far as they are elements of the World itself and not as elements of the Judgment." Of course, they are elements in the judgment, too, but the point of the quotation is that they are also elements in the real world. Now he does not mean that propositions are separate elements with an existence of their own apart from any minds. They are clearly not, for they only occur when the so-called Ideal moment takes place. He means, simply, that they are the things, and the relations between propositions and between the various elements in a proposition are the relations as they exist in the outside world. But that is the very point to be proved. And it is not proved, but merely stated, with copious examples. And the difficulty, again, is surmounted by a phrase which really contains a contradiction. Logical elements are Forms, but they are "ideal-real," the forms giving permanence, that is, the "ideal" part, and the "real" giving direct truth.

But if the logical relations belong to the real world, as relations, if they portray what actually exists in the outer world, can Dr. Losskij tell us this? Suppose that we have two propositions, Mr. Baldwin is Prime Minister, and Mr. Baldwin is not Prime Minister. There is clearly a relation between these two propositions, as propositions. But, according to Dr. Losskij, this relation is the actual existing entity in the outside world and exists as such. I see no answer to the difficulty, but it ought to be answered if this theory be true.

The formal part of the work is slight and may be passed over. But the Inductive pages are disappointing. There is a good deal of Mill recapitulated and no real facing of the main contention that hypotheses in Induction give truth, even although partial. Dr. Losskij holds that hypotheses can be verified—which, by the way, is not true if we mean by "verification," proof, as Mr. Johnson has pointed out—by an inter-network of other hypotheses which bolster up the first one. But the trouble is that sometimes we find that hypotheses cannot be verified in any sense of the term. They do not "cohere," which is what Dr. Losskij really means.

Of course, we here enter the sphere of false propositions, on which the author is discreetly silent. It almost grieves me to drag the skeleton out of the cupboard. Perhaps we may just peep at it reverently and close the door in sorrow. Suppose that an actual existing object is in our consciousness, and suppose that we name it wrongly and give it the right predicates, or, even worse, give it the wrong predicates. S is something, say P, and the ground of P is S. The judgment is synthetic but necessary because the relation between S and P is in the real world. But it is not S, and, confusion confounded, it is not P! What, then, is it? Clearly a false proposition. But how? Judgments are ontological. They are the objects in the real world. It must be a "false object". So be it; but it is a skeleton nevertheless, both literally and metaphorically. Similarly with hypotheses. If we could be *certain* that hypotheses gave us even partial truth, then Dr. Losskij would be right in essence. But unfortunately we cannot, and they might give us false propositions.

There is a difference between propositions which is not accounted for on this theory, and to call them all necessary is not a way out of the problem. Locke is rightly criticised for failing to account for truth, but it must be pointed out that this theory does not account for falsity.

I have criticised the book somewhat severely perhaps, but it is a book which brings forth criticism, not because it is without merit, but because it has the merit of facing clearly vital issues and falling definitely on one side. Its main obscurity is the conception of the "ideal-moments" and the use of the term "ideal-real". The former, frankly, I do not under-

stand, if it means anything else than "being experienced," and the latter looks like a contradiction. But if anyone wishes to be introduced to logical difficulties and an attempt to solve vital issues I can warmly recommend him to this book.

J. N. WRIGHT.

Histoire de la Philosophie. By ÉMILE BRÉHIER. Tome I. *L'Antiquité et le moyen Âge.* Fascicules 1 and 2, *Introduction-Période Hellénique: Période Hellénistique et Romaine.* Paris, Alcan, 1927. Pp. 522.

This is the first instalment of a work which promises to present many excellent features. If Mr. Bréhier succeeds in executing his programme he will have given us a complete history of philosophical thought from its first recognisable beginnings in Miletus down to the opening of our own century, in reasonable compass. Written in a lucid and attractive style free from unnecessary technicalities, unencumbered with the mass of erudite footnotes which make so many "histories of philosophy" unreadable, and yet well documented at the end of each chapter with references to fuller specialist literature, such a book is exactly what one needs for one's studies as presenting a good *vue d'ensemble* of a vast field which none of us can take as a whole for his speciality and yet each ought to know as a historical whole if he is to do really first-rate work as a special student in any one of its departments. Mr. Bréhier deserves the warmest commendation for his courage in attempting so considerable an undertaking; serious students of the subject will wish him every success in its completion.

The part of the work already published carries us, in rather over 500 pages, from Thales down to the personated "Dionysius the Areopagite," a period of roughly some eleven centuries. There are two excellent features of the execution on which I should like to congratulate the writer heartily. He shows an admirable sense of the continuity of the history of thought in carefully including, as some professed historians of the subject would not have done, an account, though a brief one, of the philosophical side of the thought of the Christian fathers through whom the historical inheritance of Plato passed to the Church. If I am to express any criticism on this part of the work, I would only say that, in view of the impressive personality and immense historical significance of Augustine, I could wish that he, at least, had received rather fuller treatment. After all, even for the student who draws the line most narrowly between philosophy and theology, Augustine as a philosophical thinker has much more interest and real significance than all but the very greatest of those who have won a prescriptive right to their place in a history of this kind. It is much more important, for the understanding of the Western European mind, to be informed about Augustinianism than to know even the general outlines of the Stoic logic of the hypothetical syllogism. A second point in respect of which Mr. Bréhier has deserved excellently well, is his attention to chronology in his treatment of the so-called "minor Socratic" schools. I think he is doing the right thing in reserving what he has to say about Cynics, Megarians, and Cyrenaics to a place after his account of Aristotle, since the plain fact is that we have no reason to believe that there were any Cyrenaic Hedonists before the third century, and that the Cynics and Megarians of whom we have detailed knowledge mostly belong also to the life-time of Aristotle or later. For the same reason, it is all to the good that in the treatment of Cynicism a careful separation is made between a fourth-century figure like Diogenes and the inferior third-century eccentrics whose "philosophy" seems to have been largely "cynical" in the modern

sense that it was a mere excuse for the life of the "unemployable" dole-drawer.

I do not think I should say that the author has executed all the parts of his task equally adequately. This, indeed, could hardly be expected. In the main the treatment of Aristotle and the post-Aristotelian thinkers seems to me on a higher level than that of the Ionians, Socrates and Plato; it is in this part of the book that Mr. Bréhier seems to write most *con amore*. The account of Neo-Platonism, in particular, seems to me to be done with great acuteness, except that I seem to detect a certain imperfect sympathy with the more religious side of Neo-Platonic thought. Perhaps it is the same deficiency in sympathy which accounts for the rather exaggerated tendency to ignore the presence of anything specifically religious in the thought of Posidonius. (I suppose Mr. Bréhier must have convinced himself that, contrary to the common opinion, the *de Mundo* of the Aristotelian *corpus* does not draw its inspiration from Posidonius. If so, I think there should have been some attempt to justify the position.) In the account of Stoicism, I welcome the interesting pages on the connexions between the Stoic doctrine of *πνεῦμα* and fourth-century medical thinking, but I could wish that the writer had not followed what seems to me a very questionable fashion in finding a "Semitic," more precisely a Hebrew, source for the Stoic conceptions of God and Providence. There is really no evidence whatever that any of the Stoics were "Semites," and when one remembers that Tyre and Carthage were at least as Semitic as Jerusalem, it seems very unsafe to argue from "Semite" connexions, even if the connexions were established, to affinities with the Hebrew prophets. In fact, I should have said, and Mr. Bréhier seems to me to confess as much when he is not directly arguing his thesis, the God of Plato's *Timaeus* and *Laws* is very much more like the God of the prophets than the Deity of Zeno is. When Mr. Bréhier denies that the Platonic God "cares for" the individual man, I can only suppose he has for the moment forgotten the argument of *Laws X* against the impugnors of Providence. I commend again, as in the main excellent, the account of the "New Academy" and of the Sceptics, as well as that of the Epicureans, if, in this last case, I may make the reservation that the author seems a little blind to the thoughtlessness of a doctrine which could try to fuse the notion of an absolute up and down with the doctrine of "innumerable worlds".

The treatment of earlier philosophy does not seem to me quite on the same level. It may be prejudice, but I cannot help feeling that the tendency to account for Ionian world-schemes by appeals to theogonies and religious "collective representations" rests on a grave misunderstanding of the very secular Ionian spirit. I think Mr. Bréhier has been a little too much under the influence of writers like Mr. Cornford and Miss Harrison and has not allowed enough for the fact that, as Burnet has put it, Ionia was relatively a "country without a past". Also, I think it unfortunate that, in so rapid a survey, the writer gives more prominence to isolated *placita* which strike his fancy than to the general "picture" of the world before the minds of the various thinkers. As Burnet has said, it was the general account of the *ἀρχή* or *ἀρχαί* which belonged to a school as its doctrine; the meteorological details vary with the individual.

Quite the least satisfactory part of the book, I should say, is the attempt to dispose of the most significant personality in the whole story, Socrates, in seven pages, which really tell us nothing. Mr. Bréhier is alive to the danger of simply accepting any traditional account of Socrates, but unfortunately makes no serious attempt to replace a legendary Socrates by a careful sifting of the traditions and discussion of their age, source, and trustworthiness. I should hope that some day, in a later edition, he

may see his way to replace these perfunctory pages by something different. The treatment of Plato is on a higher level, but has its oddities, such, for example, as the assertion (p. 158) that the *Politicus* places the statesman "above the laws". As though the whole point of the dialogue were not that the *Duce* who can dispense with laws belongs to the world of fairy-tale where animals can talk, not to "our half of the cycle". So I think it at least odd that Plato is several times credited with a 'geo-centric' astronomy, whereas, in fact, the thing which is most certain about Plato's astronomy is that he "repented of placing the earth in the centre". There are a few strange oversights and "misprints" which should be corrected. Pisistratus did not die in 427, the year of Plato's birth (p. 48), nor is it clear why the "Medic" wars should be said on page 81 to have lasted until the year 441, nor by what confusion Aeschines the orator comes to be described (p. 83) as a pupil of Gorgias. Some of the "historical" statements in the section on Plato also surprise me. *E.g.*, what evidence have we that Callicles of Acharnae, the expounder of *Herrenmoral* in the *Gorgias*, was "low-born" (p. 102), or that Euthydemus was not a contemporary of Socrates (p. 103)? Who told Mr. Bréhier that the speeches of Pausanias and Eryximachus in the *Symposium* are parodies of Prodicus and Hippias, or that Aristotle's biological works are his latest productions? (p. 170). I am surprised again by a statement on page 162 which seems to show that the writer is unaware that there exist numerous fragments of the work of Speusippus called *Όμοια* which show that its subject was biological classification, and still more surprised that he can give an account of the Old Academy without making any reference either to its legislative activities or to its mathematical achievements. And I could wish that on page 417 the expression *παδεία ἐγκύκλιος* had not undergone a triple deformation into *παίδια ἐγκυκλική*.

A. E. TAYLOR.

Le progrès de la conscience dans la philosophie occidentale. By LÉON BRUNSCHVIG. Paris: Alcan, 1927. 2 vols., pp. xxiii, 807.

In this learned and charming work, M. Brunschvig makes himself the chronicler and the critic of the reflective consciousness, both theoretical and practical, so far as its character has been set forth in the pages of European philosophy. The story of the remoter past begins, for our author, with Socrates and ends with Rousseau; and M. Brunschvig deals with it by taking the principal philosophers in chronological order. This occupies the first third of his two volumes. When he comes to the nearer past and to the present, however, he prefers to deal, in order, with the major currents of opinion, and therefore traces persons in their relation to movements. We are conducted accordingly from Kant, through Fichte and Hegel, to Nietzsche and Marx; from La Rochefoucauld, through Helvétius and Bentham, to Ribot; from Montesquieu, through De Bonald and St. Simon, to Durkheim and M. Lévy Bruhl; from Condillac, through De Biran and M. Bergson, to the paths that M. Brunschvig himself prefers. If in the first part (with the notable exception of Montaigne) the contributions of humanists, theologians and men of letters are rather markedly neglected in comparison with the works of philosophers *pur sang*, the discussion in the second part casts its net very widely indeed. It is a French net, to be sure, but this in itself should attract British readers.

The general standpoint from which the author regards this varied story is idealistic in the sense, firstly, that he persists in regarding all truth and all science as spiritual achievements renouncing everything merely given

whether by the senses or by some Newton; and, secondly, that he rejects, from the beginning and always, every interpretation of the ego that is based upon materialism or the biology of the body together with all mere psychologism of the *moi psychologique*. As he says on page 718, "The *moi* ceases to be for itself either an absolute point of departure or an ultimate end. Adequate *de jure* to the entire realm of humanity, the moral consciousness is capable of conquering itself, once again, from within, just as the intellectual consciousness makes itself adequate to the entire universe in such fashion as the condition of scientific knowledge permits for the actual constitution of this universe." We are explicitly informed, however, "that the intellectual consciousness has no significance, and consequently no existence, outside the mind of the knower" (p. 706)—indeed it would appear (unconscious science being rejected) that this consciousness has no existence outside the waking consciousness of the knower at its clearest. Thus the collective egoity beloved of certain sociologists, the noumenon of Kant, the Absolute Idea of Hegel, and the mystic egoism of Rousseauism, sentimentalism and romanticism are one and all discarded. All these doctrines, we are told, sin against "la délicatesse de la conscience" and present us either with a sounding fiction, or with credulity run riot, or with generalisations from "science" accepted at their face-value and never thought out. The enemy, in other words, is synthesis, whether shallow or aping divinity. Synthesis of this order is the *salto mortale* of the mind beyond the truth that is in it, and it does not greatly matter whether the fatal step is taken as the result of a false reverence for science or religion or as the result of an insatiable craving for metaphysical transcendence. The truth is always analysis, not in the sense of mere dissection (content so to remain) but in the sense of reflective self-interrogation and self-clarification.

Hence a most interesting series of historical judgments. According to our author, M. Bergson has shown that the fruitful path for any sane philosophy is to affiliate itself directly to the seventeenth century, and to discard the thought of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries except in so far as the critical philosophy, in the measure in which it stuck to its last, helps us indirectly to appreciate the scope of the major philosophical problems (see pp. 693-694 where the immediate affiliation is with Malebranche). The positive result, then, is a return to Descartes, whose forerunner was Montaigne, or to Socrates and to the Platonism of the central books of the *Republic* as opposed to the Plato of the *Timæus*. "In proportion as the *Cogito* is filled with *Cogitatio*, the autonomous function of judgment conquers the dual domain of the physical and of the moral worlds" (p. 158). (M. Brunschvicg thinks, indeed, that Descartes's moral theory was the part of his philosophy most consistent with the Cartesian ideal.) The negative result, as we might expect, is either to deny real greatness to many who are accounted great, or to ask us to revise our opinions concerning the importance of the contributions of this or the other great one. For the former alternative, the scathing comments upon Aristotle, Aquinas and Locke may be mentioned as sufficiently thorough, and for the latter alternative the unusual opinion, already mentioned concerning Descartes, or the opinion, perhaps equally unusual, that Kant "théoricien de l'art" is in advance of Kant "théoricien de la morale".

Very likely, it is unnecessary to consider whether M. Brunschvicg's thesis is convincing in the end. While it has doubtless developed out of an unusually thorough acquaintance with the history of human ideas, it is here presented throughout as a conclusion—that is to say, the touchstone of this method of analytic reflection is simply applied to a succession of philosophers, their shortcomings in view of it explained, and their relative

success noted. From this procedure we can learn a good deal about the professed solution, but in strictness it is never upon its trial. It is always in a condition of stately superiority. Thus it appears to be assumed that mathematical knowledge is just the mind's self-communing, while the Newtonian "mathématisme expérimental" is a surrender of the only possibly authentic verity and a crass acceptance of the given. Herr Einstein, it appears, has overcome any temptation to err with Newton, by uniting matter with form and by proving that "la géométrie est physique, autant que la physique est géométrie". This is taking high ground, but ground that may not be very firm. M. Brunschvicg's reiterated insistence, again, upon the unity of the cogitative ego, and his contempt for any division into faculties, seems, even if it is sound, to be an inadequate way of dealing with the many pressing problems that perplex any serious study of the relations between thought and action. I may add perhaps that when M. Brunschvicg nods, he nods rather abjectly. Take, for example, the following: "To dig a canal, to build a mill, does not add to the material volume of a river, yet confers upon its waters a dignity of discipline and of finality which their spontaneous course could not achieve, and puts them higher in the order of values".

But enough of carping. It is impossible to withhold either cordiality or gratitude from a book like this which is a mine of information and of interest, gracefully written and carefully planned. In regard to a few authors and to a few periods, M. Brunschvicg admits, with perhaps unnecessary modesty, that he has, in the main, had recourse to certain eminent authorities; and he may have quoted too often, though aptly, from commentators. The great bulk of his discussion, however, is the reverse of a compilation, and is to be admired for the fulness of knowledge which extends to minor as well as to major documents, as well as for the skill and subtlety with which a coherent picture is presented.

I have to add with regret that I find the index highly unsatisfactory. In a book of this sort, even an index of author's names is a most onerous undertaking, and M. Brunschvicg has attempted nothing more; but I have failed so often to find what I wanted in his index, that I am inclined to think, even if I have been unfortunate in my choices, that he should have given us either a better index or none at all.

JOHN LAIRD.

The Correspondence of John Locke and Edward Clarke. Edited, with a biographical Study, by BENJAMIN RAND. Oxford University Press, 1927. Pp. xvi, 607.

Dr. Rand, who has added to our knowledge both of Berkeley and of Shaftesbury by the publication of certain of their writings not previously printed, has brought together in this volume the whole correspondence between Locke and Edward Clarke along with some other letters which supplement that correspondence. It was for Clarke's guidance in the education of his young son that Locke wrote from Holland these letters, the main portions of which are repeated, often in the same words, in his *Some Thoughts Concerning Education* (1693). The letters may not add much to our knowledge of Locke's views on education, but they are of interest as showing how his book came to be put together. From the letters may be gathered also many details about Locke personally and his friends, his medical prescriptions, and his share in the coinage controversy of the new reign. To the student of philosophy the most interesting thing in the volume is a new fact which is brought to light concerning the origin of the enquiry which ultimately issued in the *Essay Concerning Human*

Understanding. It is worth while to put this new fact on record here and to estimate its significance.

In 'The Epistle to the Reader,' Locke records that "five or six friends meeting at my chambers, and discoursing on a subject very remote from this, found themselves quickly at a stand, by the difficulties that rose on every side," whereupon he suggested "that before we set ourselves upon enquiries of that nature, it was necessary to examine our own abilities, and see what objects our understandings were or were not fitted to deal with. . . . Some hasty and undigested thoughts on a subject I had never before considered, which I set down against our next meeting, gave the first entrance into this discourse." Locke does not give the date of this meeting, but, chiefly on the evidence of a manuscript note on the copy of the *Essay* belonging to his college friend James Tyrrell, now in the British Museum, it has been generally agreed to have been about eighteen years before the publication of the *Essay*, probably in 1670-71.

This date and Tyrrell's evidence seem to conflict with a letter of Locke's now printed, dated 31st December, 1686, in which he sends to Clarke "the fourth and last book of my scattered thoughts on the *Understanding*," and says, "Of what use it may be to any other I cannot tell, but, if I flatter not myself, it has been of great help to [our first enquiry], and the search of knowledge ever since has been in my thoughts, which is now five or six years. For so long ago is it since some friends upon an accidental discourse [started me] upon this enquiry." The evidence is not so clear as one could wish; for the words in square brackets are presumably conjectures by the editor to replace portions of the text which are indecipherable. But certainly Locke seems to trace back his enquiry to an "accidental discourse" of "some friends": and the reader may naturally assume that he refers to the same meeting as that mentioned in 'The Epistle to the Reader'. If that is so, and if Locke's statement as to the time is anything like exact, it cannot have taken place before the end of 1680.

There are difficulties in the way of this conclusion, however, although Dr. Rand does not mention them. In 'The Epistle to the Reader,' speaking of this meeting, he says distinctly that the subject of his enquiry (i.e., the examination of our abilities to see what objects our understandings were fitted to deal with) had been "never before considered" by him. Now there is ample evidence that he had considered this subject some years before 1680. I do not lay much stress on the extract from his Common-place Book, dated 1671 and beginning "Sic cogitavit de intellectu humano Iohannes Locke," which has been printed by Lord King, for that does not touch the special problem of the *Essay*, though it shows that he was already occupied with psychological reflections. But the Journal which he kept during his residence in France, extracts from which were given by Lord King in his *Life of John Locke* (1829), shows that the problem was distinctly before him at any rate by 1677. Thus, under date 8th February, 1677, he writes: "Our minds are not made as large as truth, nor suited to the whole extent of things; amongst those that come within its reach, it meets with a great many too big for its grasp, and there are not a few that it is fair to give up as incomprehensible. . . . We are sent out into the world furnished with those faculties that are fit to obtain knowledge, and knowledge sufficient, if we will but confine it within those purposes, and direct it to those ends, which the constitution of our nature and the circumstances of our being point out to us." And again, in a series of notes on Study (March to May, 1677), he writes, "It would, therefore, be of great service to us to know how far our faculties can reach, that so we might not go about to fathom where our line is too short; to know what things are the proper objects of our

inquiries and understanding, and where it is we ought to stop, and launch out no further for fear of losing ourselves or our labour. This perhaps is an inquiry of as much difficulty as any we shall find in our way of knowledge, and fit to be resolved by a man when he is come to the end of his study, and not to be proposed to one at his setting out. . . . I shall therefore, at present, suspend the thoughts I have had on this subject." It is clear from these sentences that Locke had been considering the special problem of the *Essay* for some time before 1677, and it cannot have been "never before considered" at the date which Dr. Rand would give to the meeting where the problem was first raised. Further, Locke's residence in France began in 1675, and as it is very unlikely that the occasion of "five or six friends meeting at my chamber" occurred out of England, this brings us still nearer the traditional date. I am therefore forced to conclude that the letter to Clarke, although it raises a problem, has not the decisive importance attributed to it by the editor.

The book contains excellent reproductions of portraits of Locke and of Clarke and his daughter, which are in Nynehead Court, the residence of a descendant of Clarke. It is also admirably produced. A few slips (*e.g.*, "Lady Francis Masham," pp. 14, 605; "Christ Church College," p. 18 n.), might have been corrected in the press; and there is a misprint of 1688 for 1683 on p. 16 which makes a sentence puzzling.

W. R. S.

Religion in the Philosophy of William James. By JULIUS SEELYE BIXLER.
Boston: Marshall Jones Co. Pp. xvii, 225.

This well written and well documented volume sets itself to prove a thesis about the religious philosophy of William James. It was the product of a conflict, not as has often been supposed, between James's religious instincts and his scientific training, but between two antagonistic impulses in his own religious nature. "In the one mood James is ready to scale the highest heaven in his quest for value or to penetrate the deepest abyss in his insistence on the triumphantly conquering and creative ability of the human spirit. In the other his whole being longs for peace, whether of ecstasy or rationality. But in both cases James is religious with the completeness which the intensity his nature required of any mood" (p. 3). Consequently Prof. Bixler (who professes Biblical Literature at Smith College) holds "in opposition to the view of some commentators, that James was the possessor of an active religious faith and faith in immortality," and that "James's religious philosophy can hardly be called the least important part of his work, but that as integrally related to the rest of his thinking, and in places the consummation of it, his religious philosophy deserves a place in the front rank of his work" (p. 4).

This contention is made good by a careful, sympathetic and detailed examination of James's attitude towards the Absolute, the Pluralisms, the Free Will, the Believing Will, the Purposive Will, the Deity, Immortality, Mysticism, and completed by two chapters on Further Characteristics and James's Influence on the Religious Thought of To-day. The argument throughout is supported by plentiful and apt quotations from James's published writings, and also from letters to Thomas Davidson, Miss Calkins, and his cousin, Mrs. Prince, which had not been published. Prof. Bixler's conclusions are that "the more one studies James the more he realizes how completely as well as how accurately James has interpreted the religious aspirations of humankind and how effectively he acts as spokesman for them. The yearning after a saving power has always been fundamental in religion" (p. 201), and

"Pragmatism, pluralism and the active aspect of empiricism are worthy vehicles for the expression of the conquering human will" (p. 208). For (1) pragmatism "offers a God who is a personal friend and ally instead of a formalistic conception" (*ibid.*), (2) it "emphasizes the moral element as religiously essential" (p. 209), (3) "the need for courage" (*ibid.*), and (4) a novel "freshness of outlook" (p. 210). "Pragmatism thus offers a religion worth having, worth believing in, and worth fighting for. It may lack the note of assurance, but it sounds the note of creative achievement" (p. 213). Moreover "as a matter of history religion has been taught experimentally. Men have been told to taste and see that the Lord is good" (p. 216). Finally, it is certain that James's religious attitude "is sure to appeal, and is already appealing, to the generation just coming to maturity. The empirical element appeals to them because they have grown up in an age dominated by scientific activity . . . The pluralistic element will appeal to them because they have seen the war," and finally pragmatism appeals to them "because of its creative faith" (p. 218).

In essentials, it seems to me, Prof. Bixler makes out his case. The religious side of James's pragmatism is valuable and vital, and must not be slurred over. It did not spring from a desperate revolt of superstitious cravings against the negative implications of scientific method: it was as positive and as great a step in advance as the history of religion records. The future of religion looks sufficiently dubious at present, by reason of the unwise policy of its official representatives; but we may be assured that if religion survives at all its claim will rest more and more openly on its psychological appeal, while the sophistries of its metaphysical 'proofs' will gradually be abandoned and forgotten. The doctrine of the will to believe, therefore, is not a desperate dodge to save religion, but a real discovery in human epistemology, which has thrown even more light on science than on religion. It is true that James had a personal tussle with the naturalism of science; but it was not with the help of religion and by the will to believe that he overcame it. It was with the help of Renouvier, and by the affirmation of free will. So, too, his rejection of absolutism, like his affirmation of pluralism, was settled, without recourse to science, on philosophic and religious grounds alone.

But while conceding all this to Prof. Bixler's triumphant argument, I am not quite convinced by his proof that James himself ever hankered after the Absolute. True, he long treated it as a hypothesis deserving of respect, and this is no wonder. For was it not the dominant hypothesis which several of his nearest and dearest had accepted? To James respect for the Absolute meant respect for the judgment of his father and of his friend Royce, and James's Absolute always shows their traits. It is quite a different affair from Hegel's or Bradley's. But it is remarkable that James never adduces any good arguments in favour of this Absolute. It is always represented as just a spiritual craving or idiosyncrasy, and a transparent excuse for a relaxation of the strenuous mood and a 'moral holiday'. And when absolutists object that this is not enough, they are blandly told that there is no other justification for the Absolute.¹ Thus James's plea for the Absolute is only that it is psychologically attractive and not that it is logically sound. Surely this means that James was always aware that the Absolute was merely spiritual dope and was no real guarantee of anything.

Another minor point on which Prof. Bixler seems to me to have expressed himself unguardedly is to be found on p. 97. He says, "James saw that it did not degrade truth to say that it is the valuable, and the valuable is the true". But he would be hard put to it to find a passage

¹ *Meaning of Truth*, p. x.

in which James identified truth and value, or even called it a value. At most truth is *one* of the values, and as such ranks with beauty and goodness. But so small a blemish hardly detracts from the value of a distinguished piece of work.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

The Oldest Biography of Spinoza. Edited with translation, introduction, annotations, etc., by A. WOLF. London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd, 1927. Pp. 196.

The first English edition and translation of the anonymous *La Vie de feu Monsieur de Spinoza* is to be welcomed very heartily as filling one of the obvious gaps in Spinoza literature in this country. It is not necessary to accept the incidental suggestion of its present editor as to its degree of value in order to join in this welcome, for Professor Wolf has with it assembled and translated much other biographical matter of importance, as well as provided an excellent introduction to the whole, and some notes of varying utility. Instructed opinion as to the value of the *Life* has, perhaps, changed somewhat since the days when Pollock brushed it aside as worthless except as "auxiliary and subordinate to Colerus"; had, indeed, changed before the appearance of Pollock's second edition from which his more contemptuous remarks were excluded; but, nevertheless, no real difference of opinion can be sustained as to which of the early accounts of the life and character of Spinoza we could least afford to lose. Other things being equal, as they rarely are, and in this case certainly are not, the earlier the biography the more valuable it is, and there can be little doubt that this is a contemporary document written by a direct or indirect associate of Spinoza, whereas the work of Colerus is of a generation later, and therefore more subject to the peculiar errors that arise from the repetition of hearsay, the misinterpretations of ignorance, and the changing spirit of the age: and yet such is the merit of the latter and the demerit of this enthusiastic panegyric of the Master, that it is Colerus that we could least afford to be without. Happily, however, the choice has not to be made and we are able to compare two independent accounts of Spinoza, one by an ardent and not very wise supporter, the other by a convinced opponent whose scrupulous fairness would have graced a disciple. It is certainly astonishing how closely they agree; nor can there be much doubt about their independence: apart from his self-confessed ignorance of the French language, we can be practically certain that Colerus did not have the earlier work before him as he wrote. The agreement is partly due to the guidance supplied to both by the Preface to the *Opera Posthuma*, but it must also be due to their essential truth. There are two, and those unimportant, points of conflict, *viz.*, the social standing of the Spinoza family, and the philosopher's care about his dress; but as it is the writer who assigns him the more modest origin who emphasises his "gentlemanly" appearance, the conflict is easily reconciled. About all the main outlines of Spinoza's life and personality, though not of course their smaller details, there is substantial agreement: his brilliant youth, his classical studies with Van den Enden, his excommunication, the resignation of his paternal inheritance, his visit to Utrecht and failure to meet Prince Condé, his geniality and persuasiveness of manner, complacency of disposition, weak constitution, sober and frugal habits, his attitude to death, and, of course, all those important details gathered from the *Opera Posthuma* Preface. Beyond its independent witness in these matters, therefore, and its contemporaneity, we naturally look for the special value of the earlier work to the information which it gives but which finds no place in Colerus. And here the reader

is likely to be disappointed, for there is not a great deal, and some of it is expressly contradicted by Dr Wolf, while other is said to be extremely doubtful: "the idea that Spinoza took up the study of Hebrew literature because his father could not set him up in business is erroneous"; again "the account of Spinoza's cheeky answer . . . does not ring true"; again the reason given for the publication of the version of Descartes's *Principia* disagrees with both Spinoza's account and that of his editor; and so on. We are thus left with some additional details of the youth of the philosopher and of his relations with Rabbi Saul Morteira and the synagogue, the statement that he was, and of how he came to be, exiled from Amsterdam after his excommunication, the stories of the De Witt pension and of his conduct with respect to it after the murder, and of his father's early training of him in the detection of hypocrisy by distinguishing superstition from true piety. Such details are by no means worthless, but if the value of a biography were to be measured solely by the number of its original and credible topics our judgment of the oldest life of Spinoza would still be not altogether unlike that of Pollock. A more satisfactory criterion, however, would probably lead us, with Professor Wolf, to a more favourable, and certainly less contemptuous, estimate.

The interest of the book is heightened by some good illustrations, including a possible portrait of the probable author of the *Life*; but it is a matter for regret that the editor has selected for his frontispiece a weak, unimpressive, and unpleasant portrait of Spinoza, and that he leads his readers to suppose that it is the famous Wolfenbüttel painting, whereas it is the Hague copy of that fine work, and bears to it (and surely also to the philosopher himself, if we are to believe his earliest, no less than his later biographer) only the most superficial resemblance.

The translation seems quite adequate, and in many respects admirable, but a careful comparison would have been facilitated if the text and translation had been printed on opposite pages.

Dr Wolf has long been regarded as one of the most learned of English Spinozists, and it is a satisfaction to read his announcement of a forthcoming translation of and commentary on the Correspondence of Spinoza. It is to be hoped that this will include the whole of the extant correspondence unabridged, and that if the original text is to be included the above suggestion may be adopted.

H. F. HALLETT.

La Recherche d'une Première Vérité. Fragments posthumes. By JULES LEQUIER. Paris: Armand Colin, 1924. Pp. 424.

Jules Lequier was born in 1814 and died in 1862. His philosophic fragments were printed privately by Renouvier in 1865: they are now at last published, with biographical and bibliographical notices.

Lequier was a tormented soul with passionate ambition to solve for mankind the central problem, that of free will; but with no real knowledge of how to live. As a talker, with congenial companions, he was inspired; his writings are, we are told, only a pale shadow of the man. But they are intense enough. Of his life, self-tortured and torturing, and its tragic close, M. Dugas has given a moving account in this volume. His writings are significant on account of their influence on Renouvier. They have been discussed by Gabriel Séailles in the *Revue Philosophique*, and by Hamelin in the *Revue de Métaphysique* for October-December, 1920.

There were two sides to Lequier, both full of emotion. He was a Catholic believer with the devotion of a mystic, pondering deeply the words of the Scriptures and finding therein the very words of God.

Renouvrier says of him : " Il spéculait sur la parole du Seigneur dans la Vulgate exactement comme si Jésus-Christ avait, non seulement dit cela, *totidem verbis*, mais parlé latin, le latin de saint Jérôme. Et de même pour les mots de l'Ancien Testament ! " (15). This side of Lequier is seen at its best in his *Abel et Abel*, and his *Cantique à la Conscience*. But besides this there was in him a disintegrating intellect, most characteristically seen in the dialogue between *Le Prédestiné* and *Le Réprouvé*.

The problem by which he was perplexed in this dialogue was that of free will and future contingency, in relation to the divine prescience. He puts it in a most poignant setting. Two monks, one of whom is living a wicked and the other a saintly life, are shown in a vision the decrees of God. The saintly one sees that he is destined to become a sinner and to be damned, the wicked one, that he has been chosen by God to be saved. The Prédestiné rejoices : " Me voici certain de recevoir la couronne réservée à celui qui a bien combattu. Je combattrai plus tard. Encore plusieurs années d'assujettissement au vice ; puis cette grande leçon ménagée par la Providence admirable en ses voies : un retour sincère à Dieu ; de nouveaux égarements et un nouveau retour ; la mort, le purgatoire et le ciel " (150). He thereafter proceeds to give comfort in the name of philosophy to le Réprouvé, in the tone of a Mephistopheles. " You are free," he says ; " all your actions are entirely in your power. " " Vous les ferez avec liberté, avec une liberté pleine et entière : vous pourrez donc ne pas les faire. Or, je vous en supplie, abstenez-vous de vos actions futures ; faites ce qu'il est certain que vous ne ferez pas, et vous ne serez pas ce qu'il est certain que vous serez. Il n'y a rien de plus simple ! Courage et bon espoir " (158). And the dialogue continues to deal with all the dialectic subtleties of the Divines in face of this fact. We should expect him to throw over the divine foreknowledge as incompatible with freedom. The irony of the expositions in the mouth of le Prédestiné is so terrible ; the quiet clearness of vision of le Réprouvé so convincing. See, for example, the dialogue on pages 212-215 ; the whole is too long to quote.

From this kind of situation there could be no outlet, intellectually. " Je vais," says le Réprouvé, " reprendre dans les conditions ordinaires de la vie ce rôle qui m'a été donné et que je ne manquerai pas de jouer avec une ponctuelle exactitude. Je ne l'eusse pas choisi. Je vais retrouver la prière et l'espérance, et me mettre en marche avec elles vers le but assuré. . . . Que Satan serait fier d'apprendre qu'une vie si sainte n'est que le prélude de celle qui doit lui donner tant de joie ! . . . Comme le soleil se lève à l'instant précis . . . j'irai au terme de ma voie. Et encore plus sûrement ; mais librement : car je peux n'y pas aller ; je peux aller au ciel, j'ai ce magnifique privilège de pouvoir y aller. Mais ce ne serait là qu'un privilège honorifique, si, par un art de Dieu qu'on n'admira jamais assez, il n'eût servi à justifier dans l'éternité ma condamnation elle-même " (313-314). The monks wake out of their vision remembering only that they have had a dream : for the one, un songe affreux, for the other, un songe joyeux, of which neither can remember the details. Satan in the background is given the last word. " Je m'y perds. Ce n'étaient pas des songes ordinaires que ceux qu'ils ont eus tous les deux . . . " (316).

The whole dialogue should, I think, be read in the light of the commentary on God's command to Abraham to sacrifice Isaac (322 ff.) and the whole of *Abel et Abel*. " L'obéissance aveugle de l'amour n'était-elle pas ici quelque chose de plus beau que n'eût pu être toute la pénétration de l'amour ? Dieu ordonnait : Abraham devait obéir, et non pas réfléchir sur l'ordre de Dieu. . . . La foi est une victoire : pour une grand victoire il faut un grand combat " (326).

We have said enough to give the reader a taste of the quality of Lequier's

writing. On the problem of truth, he considered it impossible to separate the question of method from the problem of free will. Without the latter the former could neither be put nor solved. The problem of free will he finally puts in the following form: "Deux Hypothèses: la liberté ou la nécessité. A choisir entre l'une et l'autre avec l'une ou avec l'autre" (141). And he resolves it thus: "By a free act I choose liberty!" The problem of science is then presented—not solved—as follows; "La formule de la science: FAIRE, non pas *devenir*, mais faire, et, en faisant, SE FAIRE" (143). Succeeding philosophers have, it is clear, gone along this path.

L. J. RUSSELL.

The Principles and Problems of Philosophy. By ROY WOOD SELLARS, Ph.D. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926. Pp. xiv + 517.

In his *Preface* to this book Prof. Sellars shows that he is aware of the difficulties which beset the writer of an introduction to philosophy. He has, therefore, attempted to write an Introduction that shall be neither a superficial catalogue of problems and their historical treatment, nor a mere résumé of the lives and opinions of the greater philosophers. But he also expresses the hope that "this book will be taken as more than the conventional text. It is meant to be a contribution to philosophy as well" (p. vi). The book must accordingly be judged from two different points of view. To some it may appear rash to combine an "introduction" to philosophy with an attempt to develop further a particular philosophical theory. But is this not what most teachers of philosophy do when they lecture to an elementary class? To present a problem as a difficulty that has to be solved is necessarily to present it from a given point of view. Textbooks that seek to be strictly impartial are apt to fail in the attempt and to be merely dull. Only in making the student aware that philosophical "problems" are in fact difficulties which philosophers are *now* seeking to resolve can the nature of philosophy be revealed. Recognising this, Prof. Sellars has written a book that is capable of awakening and of holding the interest of a beginner who is really a student of philosophy. He writes from the standpoint of Critical Realism and Evolutionary Naturalism; granted this standpoint, his presentation of philosophical problems is satisfactory.

Considered as an introductory textbook, certain points may be noted. Chapter I gives a clear account of the nature and method of philosophy. Prof. Sellars' attempt to define philosophy in a sentence is no more successful than any other; but his indications of what essentially constitutes a philosophical problem are much more satisfactory. The conception of philosophy as a persistent reflection upon the facts and concepts developed by the sciences is a fruitful one, and likely to be suggestive to the beginner. Instead of devoting many pages to a discussion of the method of philosophy, Prof. Sellars shows the method at work in his presentation of problems. Starting from the common-sense view of the external world, he shows how naïve realism breaks down in the attempt to take into account abnormal experiences and the data provided by the advance of the special sciences. The chapters dealing with this topic form an excellent introduction and contain a brief account of the history of the problems involved. Prominence is given to the epistemological difficulties that have been the source of much recent discussion in philosophy. This emphasis on epistemology is, in the opinion of the present reviewer, a merit. That Prof. Sellars is nevertheless aware of the danger of being exclusively dominated by epistemological considerations comes out in his treatment of Value in Part III. He there insists upon the importance of the dis-

tion between cognition and valuation, between knowing *objects* and having that relation to situations which we call *evaluation*. His own theory of value is not sufficiently elaborated to be discussed profitably here. As it stands it is the weakest part of the book. He succeeds, however, in indicating the importance of the problem and in suggesting some of its difficulties. Each chapter contains references for further reading and at the end of the book is a collection of *Questions* which may be of some use in emphasising important points.

Considered as a contribution to philosophy the book is less satisfactory. This contribution consists, first, in the combination of evolutionary naturalism with critical realism. The account of the former theory is clear but necessarily very brief. As a result of this combination Prof. Sellars suggests a theory of the relation of mind to body which he calls the "double-knowledge" theory; this is, however, expounded too briefly to be intelligible to anyone not acquainted with Prof. Sellars' other writings. Secondly, Prof. Sellars attempts to carry further the Critical Realist's account of knowledge. He defends the transcendence of knowledge by insisting upon the distinction between "existence" and "content" already familiar from the writings of Critical Realists. But this crucial distinction needs much more discussion than is given to it in this book; although Prof. Sellars constantly uses the term "existential presence," he nowhere explains exactly what he means by "existence". But it is of the utmost importance for the theory that this should be done. He gives what is, perhaps, the best account yet given by any Critical Realist of the ultimate distinction they affirm between primary and secondary qualities. But again the discussion is too brief to be convincing and suffers from the vagueness of the treatment of space and time—a defect common to all the supporters of this theory.

These defects may be due to the restricted scope of the book, but they are certainly serious flaws in a "contribution to philosophy". Nevertheless, Prof. Sellars says enough to make the reader anxious to learn more of his views.

L. S. S.

Metaphysik des Irrationalen. By RICHARD MÜLLER-FREIENFELS. Leipzig, 1927. Felix Meiner. Pp. xi, 493.

Readers of Dr. Müller-Freienfels's former books will be familiar with the fact that (as I pointed out in reviewing his *Irrationalismus* in No. 131 of *MIND*) 'irrationalism' is his name for what, outside Germany, is more commonly called pragmatism; so that he has now provided what had been declared impossible, *viz.*, a full-blown metaphysic of pragmatism. As moreover he conceives metaphysic as the science of the whole, and not as a merely personal synthesis of the available data of knowledge in which any pragmatist is, on his principles, evidently entitled to indulge if he pleases, he can find a place for his own metaphysic in a general scheme of classification. He recognises three fundamental types of metaphysics, to which he gives the names Rationalism, Sensationalism ('*Sensualismus*'), and 'Dynamism,' which includes 'all forms of voluntarism, intuitivism, and activism,' together with his own 'irrationalism'. All these metaphysics must have a metaphysic of Being and of Value, and consider under the former head theories of knowledge, of the subject, of the object, of the Absolute, and of time, space, and becoming, and under the latter the relations of the valuing subject to the valued object, the principle and the criterion of Value, and the problem of absolute value. This somewhat

elaborate scheme of classification requires him to traverse the history of philosophy repeatedly, in order to establish his conclusion, that his own 'irrationalist' method is the only one which can do justice to all the facts of life. He admits that he is committed to a thorough-going anthropomorphism, or rather 'biomorphism,' but points out that his 'irrational' is "not the unknown but the immediately experienced original phenomenon of all knowing itself, the kernel of all living and knowing, out of which reason and sense-impressions alike develop as modifications and whose support alone renders them fertile. For us the senses as well as conceptual thought are only secondary functions of life; if they could grasp the world-principle, it could only have a secondary character for this reason alone" (p. 490). He claims that the dynamical-pragmatic criterion of truth is "the only criterion of truth which is not rooted in subjectivity," whereas the pure formalism of the rationalists must end in "a wild subjectivism" (p. 489), and the pure experience of the sensationalists is a pure fiction and the matter of the materialists a mere construction (disavowed, moreover, by modern physics), so that neither would offer any guarantee of objectivity if they were adopted. The pragmatic criterion on the other hand can accept both the evidence of the senses and the postulates of reason for what they are actually worth and retains both so long as they work, and by permitting an appeal to reality alone recognises both the subjective and the objective factor in knowledge.

Dr. Müller-Freienfels argues his case very clearly and effectively, and I have no doubt whatever that his general position is perfectly sound, and will be recognised more and more to be so as philosophers grasp the methods and understand the results of modern science. It is only on quite minor points that he seems to me to make needless concessions to the traditional puzzles of metaphysics. Thus it would have been better not to assume the unity of the universe without at least referring to the empirical difficulties which stand in the way of its literal truth, and without indicating that in strict logic it cannot be treated as a proved fact but is only a convenient methodological assumption. Again he seems to take over the notion of an 'absolute' somewhat too easily. He means by it a higher synthesis transcending the antithesis of subject and object (p. 5). But what reason is there for thinking that the world must contain such a thing, or that it would be better, if it did? The whole craving for a unifying principle with which the various monisms make such play, is little more than a pre-logical blunder. Plato conceived the ideal of a purely *a priori* deduction of all reality from a single principle, the Idea of the Good, and wrote about it beautifully; but this is no reason why philosophers should fail to observe that Plato had previously consigned the whole sensible world to 'not-being,' that logical deduction demands *two* principles, and that in physics also the ultimate analysis of the real is into the *two* polar forces of 'electricity'. Finally it may be remarked that Dr. Müller-Freienfels disposes of pessimism somewhat facily, by urging that the active man who affirms life is the standard of the value of life. To this it may be objected that since all values may be negative as well as positive a pessimistic valuation of life cannot, in principle, be ruled out: whether it can be carried through in practice, in view of its inferior survival-value, is another question, which depends on the relation of truth to survival-value; it is a pity that Dr. Müller-Freienfels does not discuss it.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

Ein Weg zur Metaphysik. By R. KYNAST. Felix Meiner, Leipzig, 1927. 10 R.M. Pp. 353.

This is a work of very great ability, though it suffers from a certain excessive abstractness and, in some passages, obscurity. It is also to be regretted that so little reference is made to the views of other authors. The outlook of the writer seems to be much influenced by *Phänomenologie*, although he criticises the latter as too psychological. He assumes the being of non-real objects of thought (even *e.g.*, a square circle) and seems to regard it as one of the chief functions of philosophy to grade these. Philosophy has been generally content to say we know or do not know, but it ought to go further and distinguish different stages, from validity merely for the speaker, as with arbitrarily fixed meanings, to unconditional validity for everyone. This suggestion of the author's is not, however, elaborated sufficiently for clearness, and it is left ambiguous in what sense something can be true for one individual and yet not for everybody. As a parallel in the ethical sphere he treats pleasure as value for me and duty as unconditional value for everyone. But surely if my pleasure is a good at all, it must be true for everyone that it is a good, as is shown by the fact that it is obligatory on others not wantonly to prevent me enjoying it. The circumstance that the pleasure is mine and not anybody else's does not alter this—nobody would say that, if a man breaks his leg, it is only true for him that he has broken it because it is only his leg and not anybody else's. So the cases do not seem to me parallel. The author outlines the project of philosophically establishing and delimiting a sphere of belief with logical principles of its own less rigorous than those of scientific knowledge (*Wissenschaft*) but yet well-grounded and radically different from superstition, and of giving within this sphere a place to metaphysics. However, while the undertaking is a very important one, the distinction requires a great deal more definition and elaboration than is given here. Another ambiguity arises because the author does not define his position adequately in regard to the question of "idealism," while constantly using or assuming "idealist" arguments. He quite definitely holds that it is a necessary condition of the existence of objects that they should be *capable* of being experienced and known, but does not make it clear whether they must also actually be experienced or known. He seems to be much influenced by the fallacy of inferring directly from the necessity of mind for knowledge its necessity for all objects known, and seems to regard the unity of objects as dependent on the Ego for reasons of this type. This insistence on the Ego leads him so far as to make psychology correlative with logic, since all knowledge presupposes the 'I'. In practice, however, he is a philosopher who draws his method and inspiration rather from logic than from psychology, and many both of the merits and the defects of the book are connected with this "logical" point of view.

The main conclusion is that metaphysics is based on and consists in an ordering of reality according to values (a "*Wertangeordnung*"). These values taken together form a real whole within which it is possible to give a logically fixed place to particulars without attempting the impossible task of deducing them from universals. Among the values included here are no doubt truth and logical validity, otherwise metaphysics would lose some of those questions on which the author dwells at greatest length, yet it seems to me that to place them side by side with ethical values will only lead to confusion. On the more epistemological side the author skilfully develops the idea of the "object" as the indeterminate whole which it is the purpose of concepts to make more and more determinate. He agrees with Kant in holding the categories to be a necessary

condition of the being of objects and in deriving their validity from this fact, but he adds to the Kantian type of category a fresh kind intended to give the fundamental classes into which reality must fall. The proof of God given is not clear but seems to rest on the ordinary idealist argument. In conclusion I must say that these criticisms should not be taken as implying any disparagement of the very marked metaphysical ability shown.

A. C. EWING.

The Science and Method of Politics. By G. E. G. CATLIN, M.A., Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Political Science in Cornell University. London: Kegan Paul. 12s. 6d. net. Pp. xvi, 360.

IN spite of digressions into the Philosophy of History, the Free-will controversy and other topics, this book has the very important aim of deciding what Political Science really is and what relations it should have to the other sciences about human nature and society. In Mr. Catlin's view it is the study, not merely of Government (which implies dominance and excludes co-operation) nor even of organised society, but of all 'mutual human relations'. Though it draws its data from history, and can perhaps be of service in the realisation of ethical ideals (the study of it is anyhow undertaken for severely practical reasons), it must be independent in the sense in which economics is independent, and at least as 'scientific'. And it should be constructed in the image of economics: it should seek some unit of quantitative measurement (votes and the power over them rather than money) and pursue the method of abstraction, essential to success in science, by postulating an hypothetical 'political man,' differing from his economic cousin in desiring power rather than possessions or power over persons rather than power over things. If these things are done—and most Political Theorists have left them undone—it should prove no more difficult to construct.

Even if we do not agree with Mr. Catlin that Political Science is 'since Aristotle an almost untouched subject,' we must admit it to be a curiously unsatisfactory one. It is undoubtedly interesting both in itself and as an appendage to general philosophies of life; but it has not had the same clarity of purpose or the same practical influence as economics. As it is potentially at least as important, we should like to know where and why its exponents have erred and how their errors can be corrected. And most of what Mr. Catlin has to say is suggestive and sensible. But his remarks are, by his own confession, unsystematic; and it is questionable whether the economic analogy can, even within the limits that he recognises, be wholly satisfactory. Neither can the process of abstraction, however valuable elsewhere: he admits it even in economics to have been difficult to perform and misleading when performed, and this is not likely to be less so in Politics, where the influences that mould men's behaviour are so much more subtle and complex. And though he is obviously right in demanding ethical neutrality and in maintaining that many political theories have failed to observe it, his elaborate discussions do not seem to do justice to the necessary intimacy between Politics and Ethics, or to notice the extent to which even professedly neutral theories are likely to be vitiated by the unconscious persistence of false ethical (and psychological) assumptions in the minds of their advocates. And is it consistent with his advocacy of abstraction and his high hopes for the practical success of his science to cast its net so wide as to include all social relations whatsoever? In spite of the analogy this would have the effect of reducing economics to a part of politics; and in any case Government is something much more comprehensive than his definition suggests, and not

necessarily exclusive of co-operation. Indeed it is in co-operative organisations that its problems become really urgent and interesting, and the exclusive interest which Political Theorists (including, to some extent, Mr. Catlin himself) tend to display in it is wholly legitimate, however inadequate their methods and results. These difficulties do not, however, eliminate the need for a Political Science such as he demands, even if the demand is not so new or so unsatisfied as he sometimes appears to suppose. And his book is to be welcomed as a full, if unsystematic and at times unconvincing, discussion of the principal conditions of its successful development.

O. DE SELINCOURT.

The Social and Political Ideas of some Great Thinkers of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Edited by F. J. C. HEARNshaw, M.A., LL.D. London: George G. Harrap and Company, Ltd, 1926. Pp. 220.

This volume, the third of a series on "Social and Political Ideas," contains lectures, mainly by historians, on nine of the outstanding political thinkers who "flourished" between 1550 and 1680. In addition to the four really "great" figures of this period, *viz.*, Bodin, Grotius, Hobbes, and Spinoza (expounded by Professor J. W. Allen, the Editor of the volume, Mr. E. L. Woodward, and the Master of Balliol, respectively), the volume contains lectures on Hooker by the Rev. N. Sykes, Suarez by Archdeacon Lilley, King James I by Miss Chew, and Harrington by Miss Levett, as well as a useful Introductory essay by the Editor placing in their historical setting the social and political problems of the period, and tracing their nature and the special changes which gave rise to them.

Although the volume capably performs the offices indicated by its title, it cannot be said that all the lectures are likely to be of equal value to readers of MIND, whose interests are presumably philosophical rather than historical. Undoubtedly there is room for such descriptive outlines where the subjects are less known, or "great" only in a subordinate or oblique sense, but some special qualifications are desirable as an excuse for attempting at this time of day short accounts of the political ideas of such writers as Hobbes and Spinoza, or even Bodin and Grotius.

Let me say at once that this condition is sufficiently fulfilled in the lecture on Spinoza by the Master of Balliol. Dr Lindsay as a trained philosopher has an important advantage over his associates in the volume, and his account of Spinoza and of the place of political theory in his philosophy, and how it arose from the historical background of the Middle Ages, is admirable within the limits of an hour's lecture, though, of course, it adds, and was meant to add, nothing to our knowledge.

As much can hardly be said of some of the other lectures, where the treatment is either discursive and philosophically unsatisfying, or indiscriminating and therefore philosophically negligible. The account of Hobbes, for example, is marked by that peculiar incapacity to realise how surely Hobbes laid down the fundamental principles of political organisation, which is characteristic of a certain type of modern political thought. This appears to be based upon the uncritical assumptions that a motive cannot operate unless it is felt, that a belief in altruism implies that a man's good may be something that not he but another man "enjoys", and that the political organisation of human society can approximate to that of a society of pure empyreal spirits free from the limitations (and advantages) of space and time. In so far as Hobbes realised that the political association of man is governed by his special conditions of existence, as embodied and therefore geographically limited, as mortal and

therefore demanding an external depository of achievement, as individual and therefore subject to caprice, as gregarious and therefore allured by sectional interests, to that extent at least his theory is neither negligible nor outrageous, but a very valuable medicine.

H. F. HALLETT.

Hindu Mysticism : Six Lectures on the Development of Indian Mysticism.

By Prof. S. N. DASGUPTA, M.A., Ph.D. (Harris Lectures for 1926.)

The Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago, London, 1927. \$2.00.

The religions of India have suffered at the hands of Western exponents even more than its philosophies, and yet there is no doubt that a rich field awaits the psychologist who will put aside the prejudices both of the missionary and the atheist. No single Indian word appears to correspond to the term mysticism, but Dr. Dasgupta makes it clear that Indian religions have developed the same phenomenon. It is "the belief that God is realised through ecstatic communion with him". He then widens this definition by describing the goal as the realisation of ultimate truth (which need not necessarily be thought of as a God), and by making the realisation to be attainable not by reason, but by some other means of certitude, this latter point being really implicit in the idea of ecstatic communion.

The author distinguishes five main types of mysticism. These are rather historical stages of development. Some of them have a special importance for the Western investigator, for he will find here the uncurbed exercise of tendencies that were repeatedly suppressed in Christian circles. Bossuet might restrain Madam Guyon from looking upon herself as the Woman clothed with the Sun, but there was nothing to prevent the upanishadic mystic from shouting :—

Ha-vu ! ha-vu ! ha-vu !

I am food, I am food, I am food !

. . . Before the gods, at the navel of the immortal

He that gives me, even he has aided me.

I am food, I eat the food-eater,

I have overcome the whole world.

The Inquisition was always on the lookout to check eroticism from masquerading as the love of God, but nothing restrained Krishna-worship from symbolising this love by means of the most unbridled form of sexual union. These things show what mysticism everywhere is liable to, and Dr. Dasgupta is honest enough not to ignore them, but he has much to tell us of the nobler side both of the older theistic developments as well as of the modern religious movements and saints like Tukaram, the Maratha, and Chaitanya, his own Bengali countryman.

Not the least striking feature of his lectures is the moderation and dignity and sense of spiritual values with which he has treated the subject. It would savour of impertinence to discuss how far a Hindu has fairly expounded a fundamental expression of Hindu thought, but his words ring absolutely true, as we should expect from one who has an unrivalled knowledge of all stages of the literature and the living religions. He has further expressed himself in such a way that Western students will be able to agree upon a common basis of material and ideas for investigation, whatever final conclusions are reached. This augurs well for the more elaborate treatment that he promises.

E. J. THOMAS.

The Scientific Approach to Philosophy. Selected Essays and Reviews.
By H. WILDOX CARR. London: Macmillan and Co., 1924. Pp. viii,
278. Price, 12s. net.

Prof. Carr is always lucid and interesting; and he is an indefatigable student of both modern science and modern philosophy, believing as he does that philosophers and scientists are necessary to one another. His writings are inspired throughout by a broad humanism: thus he does not believe that philosophy is an attempt to give definitive solutions to problems which can be stated once for all, but rather that ever new problems arise as man advances. Hence his interest in the history of philosophy. The third and fifth papers in this collection of "occasional essays," as he calls them, give, I think, his essential attitude: they plead for a reading of the works of philosophy in the light of the concrete life of the age in which they were produced. No less central for Prof. Carr is the point made in the fifteenth essay on Descartes, *viz.*, the importance of the notion of system, both for Science and for Philosophy.

Most of the essays deal with various aspects of the thought of Bergson, Croce, and Einstein. The last essay develops Prof. Carr's own monadic philosophy, with special reference to the question of the possibility of interaction of the monads. The second paper contains an interesting account of the formation and development of the Aristotelian Society.

It is an interesting and romantic experience to read Prof. Carr, and these essays show him in his most stimulating vein.


L. J. R.

La logique des jugements de valeur. By E. GOBLOT. Paris, Colin, 1927.
Pp. ii, 209.

M. Goblot has wide interests as well as extensive knowledge. He is an expert logician (as his well-known *Traité de logique* showed), but he is also a sociologist, a moralist, and a historian. His recent *La barrière et le niveau* was given to the public as a sociological study of the bourgeoisie of the day; but it was a critical, logical study.

In the present book all these interests come together. The first part of it (to p. 110) gives a logical analysis of value, value-judgments and their application, and the second part gives a series of logical analyses of theorems and apophthegms concerning value, ranging from a mere judgment of equivalence (*e.g.*, "Un mille anglais vaut 1609 mètres,") to Marx's theory of value (a most acute analysis) and the values of spirit and matter. M. Goblot pleads advancing years as an excuse for the detached character of the second part, with its air of samples from the workshop instead of a finished product. The theoretical discussion, he explains, did away with the advantage of discussing most of his logical exercises into the meaning and current use of value-notions, and left but a few examples to be appended on account of their special interest. This is one of the apologies that an author ought to make, but a reader does not need.

In the first part of the book values are divided into three classes, *viz.*,



(a) gives us perfections, (or that which has *prévalence*), (b) gives us *preferences*, and the *possessions* of enjoyment or action, (c) is concerned with instrumental efficacy and a profitable return. The reason why a fourth class, that of means to (a), does not find a place seems to be that all perfection is, *ex vi terminorum*, self-complete. This characteristic, however, need not apply to excellence (or *prévalence*); and consequently the fourth class should have been mentioned.

Equity and truth are examples of the first class, and the principle of the third class is apparent. The main theoretical difficulty concerns the relation of the first class to the second. Even with regard to truth and equity, it is difficult to say why they should be good *for us* except in so far as we delight in their possession or suffer from being deprived of them (p. 93). This probably is the profoundest and subtlest problem in moral theory (p. 89). "Good" for a creature merely vital is life and force; for a sensitive animal it is also delight; but would any perfection be good *for us* except in so far as it stimulates vitality or gives rise to enjoyment?

Certainly this is a crucial problem, but I cannot see that it is insoluble. That which is good *in se* either does or does not affect and enter into our being. If it does not, the most we can do is to admit its excellence. If it does, *cadit questio*. But why should it be assumed that pleasure or mere animal exuberance are the only two ways in which this union or influence can come about? Is either of them a sufficient explanation of the value of truth to a knowledgeable being? Even M. Goblot's semi-Platonic remarks on p. 180 (to the effect that injustice is always destructive and, in the long run, bent towards misery) does not seem quite to reach the point.

Plainly, however, this is too large a topic for a short notice. I would only say, concluding, that, in my opinion, every page of this book is acute and pleasing.

JOHN LAIRD.

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VII.—PHILOSOPHICAL PERIODICALS.

BRITISH JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY. Vol. xvii, Part 2. **H. E. G. Sutherland** and **Godfrey H. Thomson**. 'The Correlation between Intelligence and Size of Family.' [Describes method of investigation on about 2000 children, concludes that there is no correlation between intelligence (measured by intelligence tests) and position in family, but that there is a small negative correlation between intelligence of children and size of family.] **C. S. Slacombe**. 'The Constancy of "g" General Intelligence.' [Describes investigations tending to show that 'g' measured by any one single form of test varies, but that when measured by several independent forms it does not vary.] **H. Lowery**. 'Cadence and Phrase Tests in Music.' [States that the only valuable tests of musical ability are those concerned with the ability to understand and interpret music; describes two tests.] **Hans C. Syz**. 'Observations on the Unreliability of Subjective Reports of Emotional Reactions.' [Suggests that personal prejudices (social suggestions) are important factors in producing incorrect reports.] **J. A. Van Heuven**. 'A Method for Measuring Simultaneous Contrast.' **H. Banister**. 'A Suggestion towards a New Hypothesis regarding the Localisation of Sound.' [Summarises experimental facts requiring explanation, describes experiments made, suggests that accepting a resonance theory of hearing and assuming that nervous impulses are aroused in the auditory nerve when the cilia of the hair cells of the organ of Corti are in a certain phase of their motion the various facts can be explained.] Part 3. **William McDougall**. 'Pleasure Pain and Conation.' [Contrasts the hedonic and hormic principles of conation, shows how Ward and Stout held both; attempts to maintain the hormic by reducing apparent exceptions to conformity with it, e.g., pleasures and pains of sense; the taste of sugar is pleasant only when and in so far as the hunger impulse is at work; pain sensation arouses impulse to withdraw the stimulated part and, if this fails to withdraw the sense stimulation, the process is unpleasant in the true sense; suggests that the validity of the hormic principle being established in regard to our more developed activities it is probable that the same principle holds in the lower ranges of experience though it is always obscure to introspection whereas feeling is insistent.] **William Boyd**. 'The Development of Sentence Structure in Childhood.' [Illustrates and analyses sequences of ordinary utterances of a child at different periods of its life, showing that at eight years of age the child studied had an almost adult command of the instrument of language.] **S. Wyatt**. 'An Experimental Study of a Repetitive Process.' [Attempts to determine the degree of dependence between working efficiency and the amount of intelligence possessed by operatives employed in soap wrapping; concludes that amount of intelligence is practically no indication of efficiency, and that a standardised form of the actual industrial process under test conditions failed to give any appreciable correlation with the same operation performed under working conditions.] **G. C. Grindley**. 'Experiments in the Direction of Associations in Young Chickens.' **R. W. Pickford**. 'A Brief Theory of the Organism Suggested

by an Experiment on the Perception of Almost Inaudible Sounds,' **Godfrey H. Thomson.** 'The Tetrad-Difference Criterion.' Part 4. **William McDougall.** 'An Experiment for the Testing of the Hypothesis of Lamarck.' [States the conditions which should be satisfied by experimental tests, the adaptation investigated should be one achieved by the intelligent purposive efforts of the organism concerned, and it should be of such a nature that slight degrees of transmission of the adaptation should be measurable, the experiment should be with a quickly breeding species, and it should be carried through many generations; describes experiments with white rats; maintains that results support the Lamarckian theory and justify further experimentation.] **S. Alexand-r.** 'The Creative Process in the Artist's Mind.' [Characterises creative imagination of art as (1) creative of a new reality by moulding selected material to express a purpose, (2) expressive (a) of the artist's mind, (b) of a certain subject matter, (3) not merely descriptive of something which controls the description but is doubly controlled (a) by the subject matter, (b) by the artist's mind; maintains that the creative action of art is as much an organic reaction as a perceptual response is, but instead of affecting the provoking object produces a new one; analyses the transition from the practical response to art; suggests that the aim of art is to produce in the mind, not the emotions appropriate to the subject matter which stimulated the artist, but the æsthetic emotion from which the artist created; discusses the part played by images in the process.] **C. Spearman.** 'Material versus Abstract Factors in Correlation.' [Replies to G. H. Thomson's Article on the Tetrad Difference Criterion.] **Eric Farmer.** 'A Group Factor In Sensory-motor Tests.' 'Parallelism in Curves of Motor Performance.' **D. Caradog Jones** and **A. M. Carr-Saunders.** 'The Relation between Intelligence and Social Status among Orphan Children.' [Describes investigations and results which suggest that there is a higher level of intelligence among the orphan children of parents of higher social status where this is defined by occupation.]

MONOGRAPH SUPPLEMENT X. H. L. Hargreaves. 'The Faculty of Imagination.' [Investigates the validity of the common belief in a faculty of imagination; describes tests for 'Fluency' and 'Originality' in which broad group factors were found as well as small common factor thus giving some justification for the common belief; analysed these, found no general unitary factor; suggests that the influence of conative factors is marked in both aspects of imagination and that if this hypothesis is confirmed the elements in imagination are not unique mental functions but cognitive and conative processes already recognised.]

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY. xxiv. (1927) 10. **C. W. Morris.** 'The Concept of the Symbol, I.' [Contents that neither the behaviourist nor the introspectionist view is adequate in psychology. The former is 'self-exclusive,' the latter *partially* self-inclusive. What is needed is the "total self-inclusive view" which "implies the validity of a neo-functionalistic view that regards psychology as concerned with the reciprocal relation of the organism and the environment". This is "a radical empiricism that takes the full content of experience at its face value".] **K. Dunlap.** 'The Short-Circuiting of Conscious Responses.' [Explains that his theory of a short-circuiting mechanism located in the cerebellum has been misrepresented in a book by Prof. Max Meyer.] xxiv. 11. **C. W. Morris.** 'The Concept of the Symbol, II.' [Defines the 'symbol,' which must be distinguished from the 'substitute stimulus,' from his standpoint of a radical empiricism, as "any given or experienced substitute stimulus that leads to a reinstatement of the original stimulus in a form that is observable only from the self-inclusive point of view," and so functions as a

'reminder' of some other experience. It is then explained that not all substitute stimuli are symbols, that the reinstatement need not be complete and that high similarity suffices, and that a doctrine of 'meaning' is implied. Only symbols can have meaning (signification; though anything can have 'significance or value'. "For all practical purposes the meaning of any symbol is the object or situation for which it stands." Thus "Symbols are meaningful substitute stimuli".] **A. C. Benjamin.** 'The 28th Annual Meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association' at the University of Minnesota. xxiv. 12. **A. H. Lloyd.** 'Also the Emergence of Matter.' [Suggests that now that "emergences have been taking the place of miracles" it should be proclaimed that "real and natural matter has really and naturally emerged just as truly and just as importantly as either life or mind and that life or mind is certainly just as original as matter". This thesis is supported by an interpretation of the history of Greek thought.] xxiv. 13. **F. S. C. Northrop.** 'Rignano's Hypothesis of a Vital Energy and the Prerequisites of a Sound Theory of Life.' [Expounds and criticises Rignano and concludes that since "life seems to be more a property of matter in a certain state of combination than a force" an adequate theory of the organism must begin "with a careful determination of the peculiar and essential characteristics of this state of combination".] xxiv. 14. **H. C. Brown.** 'The Milesian Background of our Scientific Ontology.' [Argues that the developments of modern physics have antiquated mechanical atomism, and are driving us back to a dynamic conception of matter similar to the Milesian *φύσις*, for which the best term is 'materialism'.] **O. L. Reiser.** 'A Phenomenological Interpretation of Physico-chemical Configurations and Conscious Structures, I.' [Part I, Emergence, Gestalt Theory and Phenomenology. Part II, Wave Motion as a Phenomenological Pattern. Part III, Potential Energy and the Principle of Least Action. Part IV, A Phenomenological Interpretation of Matter. Contains the suggestions that "since novelties are unpredictable, emergence leads to an abandonment of explanation," that "the unity of an electron may be that of a statistical invariant," and that "the molecule is conscious of its own atoms, just as the atom is conscious of its own electrons".] xxiv. 15. **W. H. Sheldon.** 'The Role of Dogma in Philosophy.' [By dint of using 'dogma' not in the accepted sense of a belief imposed by authority but rather in the sense of 'postulate,' the author not only easily proves the necessity of 'dogma' but also arrives at some very curious dicta. The following may be quoted: "to have faith is to accept dogma," "the basis of dogma is practical need," "the being of God is a dogma—a bias, an inevitable faith". "Science is largely dogma," because it assumes an external world, demands verification, and is based on the uniformity of Nature. "There is no universally certain test of dogma. There must be dogmas, but there is no fixed rule which shall distinguish the content of genuine from that of spurious dogma." Finally, "the dogmatic temper is a state of open-mindedness," and "reason is secondary, receptive, feminine; dogma is masculine".] **O. L. Reiser.** 'A Phenomenological Interpretation of Physico-chemical Configurations and Conscious Structures, II.' [Discusses V, Molecular Orientation, Crystals and Organisms, VI, Brain Configurations, Conscious Structures and Chronaxy, VII, Evolution, Growth Potential, and Neurobiotaxis, suggests that "consciousness is simply the electromagnetic field of force associated with the electro-chemical reactions of brain patterns," and concludes that by accepting "an eternalistic singularism the present view approaches closely to that of Spinoza".] xxiv. 16. **S. Hook.** 'The Irrationality of the Irrational.' [Apropos of the eminent *Irrationale* of Nicolai Hartmann's *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*, denies I, that any

'unknowable' explains anything, II, that the *allogical* is irrational, III, that any question can be genuine until we know "what *kind* of answer would be an answer to it," and that 'antinomies' are more than either (a) unsolved problems, (b) novelties, (c) questions wrongly put, or (d) nonsensical questions, IV, that 'chance' is irrational because it can only be understood *after* it has happened.] **F. C. S. Schiller.** 'William James and the Will to Believe.' [Comments on Dickinson Miller's review of Bixler's book on *Religion in the Philosophy of William James*, and points out that Miller has not moved in the past thirty years, and still refuses to admit that its empirical working can verify a belief, and that 'reality,' 'truth,' and 'fact' can *grow*. It is also shown that 'creation,' 'free-will,' 'miracle' and 'novelty' are notions that belong together, and are rooted in James's philosophy, and are religiously more valuable and in the end more 'rational' than is their denial by rationalism.]

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ETHICS. xxxvii, No. 1. **Ralph Mason Blake.** 'Why not Hedonism? A Protest.' [Attempts to defend the view that pleasurable consciousness is always, and that nothing else is ever, ultimately good; critically examines criticisms of hedonistic views, maintaining that they do not destroy the two fundamental theses; and, accepting the view that fundamental ethical principles are accepted or rejected on intuitive grounds, maintains that these establish the first principle and that careful reflection has not revealed anything but pleasurable experience to be ultimately good; concludes that there is no way to refute hedonism and that common criticisms are unreasonable and unjust.] **G. Hanumantha Rao.** 'The Basis of Hindu Ethics.' [Briefly traces Hindu Ethics to its roots in metaphysics on the one hand and in psychology and sociology on the other; shows that according to Hindu philosophy neither religion nor philosophy nor ethics can exist by itself and that spiritual life presupposes a whole course of evolution of individual and social life.] **C. Judson Herrick.** 'Biological Determinism and Human Freedom.' [Maintains that determinism in science does not involve pre-determinism in the theological sense, that the former means that events occupy an assignable place in an observable orderly sequence of natural events and that human freedom, the freedom to express one's inner nature and to change it so as to conform it to a new pattern, is a natural process embracing the noblest human capacities and satisfactions.] **H. Lanz.** 'The Doctrine of Non-Resistance and Its Antithesis.' [Discusses and illustrates the antinomy, criticising attempts at solution, concludes that each is necessary and that one or other will be chosen according to the particular circumstances of the case.] **Hilda D. Oakeley.** 'The Religious Element in Plato's Philosophy.' [Discusses the Platonic problem "Can the source of all value be identified with the power from which the universe proceeds"?] **H. G. Townsend.** 'The Synthetic Principle in Butler's Ethics.' [Expounds the view that Butler synthesises self-love and benevolence under the rule of the principle of reflection.] No. 2. 'A Symposium upon Ethical Objectivity.' **W. D. Ross.** [Analyses the Basis of Objective Judgments in Ethics, maintaining that in the long run the final judgment is intuitive.] **G. P. Adams.** [Maintains that the only basis of objective judgments in ethics lies in the nature of the real world as it is disclosed by experience.] **L. J. Russell.** [Dealing with Value and Existence holds that values must function *a priori* in the building up of experience but that they are not ultimate or unalterable, receiving discipline in the development of experience.] **W. K. Wright.** [Advances the view that ethics has an objective basis in two ways, first in the line of ethical development from age to age and second in the instincts and social organisation evoking the necessity for the same virtues so long as man is man.]

H. E. Cory. 'The Sublime, the Beautiful and the Good.' [Surveys historically the treatment of the Sublime, holds that the mood of the Sublime involves sustained oscillation of attention between the object and oneself, alternations of sentiments and conations, and that the Sublime is not an aspect of the beautiful but may beacon us toward beauty, goodness and truth.] **Sydney Hook.** 'The Ethics of Suicide.' [Suggests that any system of thought refusing to countenance suicide is either irresponsibly optimistic or utterly immoral.] **Marie Collins Swabey.** 'Democracy and the Concept of Quantity.' [Maintains that in democracies quantity should take precedence over quality.] No. 3. **C. Delisle Burns.** 'Progressive Morality.' [Maintains that conventional morality though emphasised by men who desire certainty leaves many areas of life outside its scope; emphasises the importance of heroism in reaching out to the unexplored.] **Louis Arnaud Reid.** 'Beauty and Moral Betterment.' [Holds that intense forms of aesthetic experience involve a feeling of superior insight requiring trained apprehension and that the development of this is of special value for moral insight; develops the analogy of moral life to a work of art, with practical suggestions for increasing aesthetic appreciation.] **Charles W. Morris.** 'The Total-Situation Theory of Ethics.' [Restates certain ethical categories in terms of the total-situation theory which emphasises the complete relativity of individual and society; illustrates by reference to contemporary problems.] **C. F. Taeusch.** 'An Approach to the Science of Ethics.' [Formulates a distinction between moral and ethical—moral when the personal self is involved, ethical when the interest of a group within the human circle is involved—illustrates the latter by problems and codes of professional bodies, doctors, lawyers and others.] **Rupert Clendon Lodge.** 'Platonic Immortality and the Highest Good.' [Suggests that immortality, the life of the immortals, meant to the Platonist the life of a perfect society involving the contemplation of the eternal ideas and living in space-time in which they realise themselves; inquires how far this life realises the absolute ideal of immortality and how far man can participate in it.] No. 4. **John Laird.** 'Of "Right" and "Good" and of Mr. Ross's views.' [Discusses Mr. Ross's account of the relations between Right and Good; amends the meaning of Right to 'probably productive of the maximum good that can be effected volitionally by any agent capable of responding to the good that he sees'; examines the arguments for the view that the probable production of maximum good is not always necessary.] **Ernest N. Henderson.** 'Ethical Bases for Economic Reward.' [Examines and discusses the ethical implications of various bases proposed as determinants of the proper value of services; custom, productivity, supply and demand, disagreeableness, danger or difficulty of the services, the needs of the worker, and that which will best promote the welfare and progress of society.] **C. Williamson.** 'Private Views of the Last Fin de Siècle.' **Donald A. Maclean.** 'Christian Industrial Democracy; its Moral Basis.' [Expounds the view that human rights and the rights of God must again be accorded their due precedence over the 'rights' of greedy speculators.] **Olaf Stapledon.** 'Mr. Bertrand Russell's Ethical Beliefs.' [Maintains that Mr. Russell contradicts his view that goodness and rightness are only a matter of taste.] **Albert G. A. Balz.** 'The Characterisation of Moral Evolution.' [Critically examines the view that moral evolution is from the group to the individual, declares that it is half truth, and that what evolves is human life.] **J. E. Turner.** 'Determinism and Moral Experience.' [Opposes Prof. A. E. Taylor's contention 'that the combination of a genuine libertarianism in ethics with a thorough determinism in the realm of natural science is not really feasible'; maintains each argument or idea contributes its quota in deliberation; suggests that Prof.

Taylor confuses will and action, concludes that "the whole and sufficient motive for any act can be found in its now-discerned goodness and reasonableness *per se*," that there exist for each of us unattainable virtues and irresistible temptations, and that the fundamental issue turns on our efforts to overcome these limitations, and that so long as real personal freedom is the natural evolutionary result of universal determinism it is necessary to 'think nobly of the soul'.]

REVUE NÉO-SCOLASTIQUE DE PHILOSOPHIE. xxviii^e Année. Deuxième série, No. 13, Mai, 1927. **J. Maréchal.** *Le dynamisme intellectuel dans la connaissance objective.* [How does the *species impressa* convey to the knowing subject knowledge of an object other than himself? The Thomistic answer seems to be sometimes that the *species* is essentially relative, sometimes that it is the cognitive *subject* which as such is relative. The object of this difficult but interesting essay is to show that the only tenable interpretation of the two sets of passages is that the "sufficient and necessary" cause of objectivation in the speculative order is constituted by the relativity of the *species impressa* and the "dynamism" of the intellect taken together.] **R. Kremer.** *La philosophie de M. Scheler. Son analyse de la sympathie et de l'amour.* [A lucid résumé of the main points of Scheler's *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*. I trust, by the way, that Fr. Kremer does not share Scheler's opinion that "almost all modern English moralists" confuse love with "benevolence".] **L. Noël.** *La présence immédiate des choses.* [An excellently written defence of the author's doctrine that we have an immediate apprehension of real being in the most elementary sense-awareness against the criticism of Mr. Zamboni, who holds that for such an apprehension we have to go to our consciousness of our voluntary acts, the "being" ascribed to *sensa* being a product of "projection".] **O. Lottin.** *Le créateur du Traité de la syndérèse.* [Text of the tractate on *synderesis* by Philip, chancellor of Paris (d. 1236), preceded by a summary of its contents.] *Tribune Libre.* *Y eut-il une philosophie au moyen âge?* [Opinions of correspondents on the problem raised by M. de Wulf in the issue of February, 1927.] **R. Kremer.** *Une enquête sur le néo-scolastique et la pensée contemporaine.* [Results of inquiries made in 1925 of sixty-five professors in American, Canadian and British Universities, as to the attitude of their various institutions towards scholasticism, reasons for hostility or indifference, prospects for the future, etc. Also of inquiries made from neo-scholastic teachers in various countries about their philosophical programmes.] Reviews of books, etc.

KANT-STUDIEN. Band 31 (1926), Heft 4. **Fritz Medicus.** *Rudolf Eucken zum Gedächtnis.* **Karl Bühler.** *Die Krise der Psychologie.* [A comprehensive survey of modern thought in psychology, concluding in an attempt to reconcile the three main types, introspective psychology, behaviourism and the current German psychology, which develops the conception of "structure" and organic wholes, and looks for its data in "die Geisteswissenschaften" and such joint productions of humanity as language.] **Hermann Jordan.** *Das Apriori bei Tier und Mensch.* [Traces the faculty of "a priori synthesis" in animals, especially in learning and all connexion of means and ends. This will sound very extravagant to some, but all that seems to be meant is a capacity for acting in a way not to be explained by the previous experience of the animal. No clear distinction is however drawn between this and a priori cognition in the proper sense.] **Georg Misch.** *Die Idee der Lebensphilosophie in der Theorie der Geisteswissenschaften.* [Points out how modern thought attempts to bring together the philosophy of life and the philosophy of the sciences and epistemology, which were so sharply separated by Kant.]

Betty Heimann. *Vergleich der Antithesen europäischen und indischen Denkens.* [Very interesting contrast between Indian and European thought, intended to show that our antitheses between rational and irrational and between matter and mind hardly exist for the Indian thinkers. On the other hand the latter, far more than the Europeans, have retained primitive elements in their systems, thus giving rise to contradictions of which they are unconscious. The only antithesis which Indian philosophy consciously develops as such is that expressed in the striving of the individual towards Nirvana and away from the corruptible world.] **Heinrich Maier.** *Alois Riehl.* [Very good summary of the work of one of the greatest German thinkers of recent times.] **Arnold Kowalewski.** *Dietrich Heinrich Kerler.* Reviews, etc. **Karl Vorländer.** *Otto Schöndörffer.* Reports on International Congresses of Psychology and Philosophy. Controversy on *Berkeleys Philosophisches Tagebuch.*

Band 32 (1927), Heft 1. Spinoza-Fest Heft. **Theodor Ziehen.** *Benedictus de Spinoza.* **Harald Höffding.** *Die Verflechtung der Probleme in Spinozas Philosophie.* [These very good articles are already too much of summaries themselves to summarise further.] **Otto Baensch.** *Evigkeit und Dauer bei Spinoza.* [Emphasises conception of eternity as = necessity.] **Gertrud Jung.** *Die Affektenlehre Spinozas, ihre Verflechtung mit dem System und ihre Verbindung mit der Überlieferung.* [A pretty full account of Spinoza's view of the emotions, including their relation to the intellect and a comparison with earlier theories.] **Albert Lewkowitz.** *Die religionsphilosophische Bedeutung des Spinozismus.* [Brings out, briefly but well, on the one hand the importance of God in Spinoza's system (and not only as a logical concept), on the other hand Spinoza's opposition to the moralising tendency in religion.] **Carl Gebhardt.** *Rembrandt und Spinoza.* [Finds similar type of mysticism in both which made them protagonists in a movement to supplement the religious deficiencies of the Reformation. Spinoza is hailed as the founder of the "dynamic synthesis" and of the organic view.] **David Baumgardt.** *Spinoza und der deutsche Spinozismus.* **Paul Menzer.** *Eine neue Spinoza-Ausgabe.* Reviews, etc. **Simon Frank.** *Die russische Weltanschauung* (as supplementary volume). [Very interesting attempt to delineate general characteristics of Russian thought, which is held to be predominantly empirical but so rather in the sense of being "anti-rationalistic" than in the sense of Hume, etc. The experience emphasised is not sense-experience, which is regarded as something external, but a kind of mystical living the object before knowing it. Because they think of our experience as in unity with the object from the beginning, there is no problem of bringing the two together by external means, and hence Russian thought is not troubled by the epistemological dualism of the West. Connected with this is the strong religious, social and practical interest. A Russian cannot think of the individual except as part of the social whole, hence all Russian philosophers are would-be reformers also.]

ANNALEN DER PHILOSOPHIE. Band 5, Heft 9-10. **Hans Driesch.** *Kritisches zur Ganzheitslehre.* [Reply to many detailed criticisms from various sources, especially Koffka and Krüger. He differs from Koffka chiefly in denying physical "Gestalten," but does not prove the validity of this denial. Expresses high appreciation of Watson's work, while insisting on the enormous gaps left by Behaviourism and on the impossibility of denying the fact of mental experience just because that experience is not amenable to "exact" treatment by the ordinary methods of physical science. Expressly identifies "Ganze" and "Sinn" towards end of article.] **Gerhard Ledig.** *Irrationales in Kants Erkenntnislehre.* [Classes as irrational elements both given sensations and those features of the phenomenal world which cannot be explained without teleology,

and argues that Kant's idealism does not really escape the assumption of an inexplicable correspondence between our cognitive faculties and their objects, so that it would be better to give up the limitations of our knowledge fixed by Kant and admit the possibility of a teleological metaphysics.] **Gerhard Ledig.** *Gegenständlichkeit und Wirklichkeit in Kants Erkenntnislehre.* [Summarises Kant's account of what constitutes an object (Gegenstand) and what constitutes phenomenal reality (Wirklichkeit), and argues that unified objects are not confined to the (phenomenally) real world because they are also a feature of, e.g., dreams.] **Thorleif Schjelderup-Ebbe.** *Zur Theorie der Mengenlehre.* [Defends the new philosophy of number against the objections that it is inconsistent in treating a plurality also as a unity and in admitting a one-class.] **Hans Lungwitz.** *Biologische Philosophie.* **Martin Loesche.** *Die auditive Welt und das Ding als Erlebnis.* Reviews, etc.

Band 6, Heft 1. **J. K. von Hoesslin.** *Die schöpferische Einheitlichung.* [Deals with organic unities in aesthetic experience.] **S. Skreb.** *Ein Verhältnis zwischen Arithmetik, Geometrie und Physik.* [Claims to establish the possibility of two systems of arithmetic besides the normal one, just as there are supposed to be other systems of geometry besides the Euclidean. The two are formed by arbitrarily ending the series of cardinal and the series of ordinal numbers respectively, while leaving the other in either case infinite. This he thinks could be secured by postulating that in the one case numbers are diminished and in the other case increased by addition. On each of these arithmetics he would base a separate possible geometry, kinematics and physics.] **Martin Loesche.** *Die Hypothesen der Metaphysik sind biologisch gegründet.* **Wilhelm Koppelman.** *Ist die Arithmetik ein logisch korrektes Lehrgebäude? I.* [Emphasises logically unsatisfactory character of many of the assumptions of arithmetic, e.g., in connection with negative and imaginary numbers.] Reviews, etc. Beiheft. **Hermann Triepel.** *Die zweite Schicht des Denkens in den Naturwissenschaften und im Leben.* Pp. 117. [An examination of the use of what might be called second order abstractions in the various sciences (abstractions based on what is already abstract). The author, while emphasising the importance of these, is suspicious of their cognitive value. More than half the book is devoted to biology and consists of brief comments on the views of leading figures in that field, taken one by one. The author maintains without adequate justification a standpoint that can on the whole be described as materialism, even of what seems at times a rather crude sort. The concluding section emphasises the value for daily life itself of the more abstract type of abstractions.] Heft 2 and 3. **Wilhelm Koppelman.** *Ist die Arithmetik ein logisch korrektes Lehrgebäude? II. (Schluss).* [The answer is in the negative, arithmetic though the nearest of all sciences to that ideal has not attained it. In the present article the author gives a specially clear criticism of the treatment of ∞ and 0 as numbers.] **Friedrich Kottje.** *Das Problem der vitalen Energie.* [States the argument against mechanism from the self-regulating character of the organism and its vast complexity, supporting his case by much detailed scientific knowledge.] **Walter Meckauer.** *Angewandter Rigorismus.* **Martin Loesche.** *Der biologische Mensch und das Wertuteil.* Reviews, etc.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA. Anno xviii, No. 2. April-June, 1927. **G. Vidari.** *Dal primo al sesto Congresso Filosofico Internazionale (Parigi 1900-Cambridge 1926).* [Gives the history of International Philosophical Congresses up to that held in 1926; of this a résumé is given, which is followed by generalisations and reflections on the question how best to propagate "Italianità" in America.] **E. Juvalta.** *Per uno studio dei*

conflitti morali. [There are two moralities, that of the good, which is personal, and that of the laws, which is social. These must be harmonised in the life of individual and community; but their difference of origin and direction generates moral conflicts. The Christian Religion re-united the two, but in theory, as well as in practice, the dualism is constantly re-appearing.] **P. Martinetti.** *Il Numero.* [What is Number? Does arithmetic bear to the "form" (Kant) of time the relation which geometry bears to the "form" of space? Martinetti discusses the views held on this and kindred problems by Mill, Frege, Schuppe, Wundt, Natorp, Moog, Husserl, Schultz, Riehl, Rickert. For himself, he argues for the affirmative answer to the latter question and finds in Number "the expression of a secret rationality of things, . . . the representation, in the symbols of sensible intuition, of infinite Unity and divine perfection".] **G. Tarozzi.** *Rassegna di Estetica.* [Calls attention to numerous books and articles on the subject of Aesthetics which have appeared of recent years in various countries.] Reviews (especially of W. D. Ross: Aristotle's *Metaphysics*), Obituary, and Notices.

RIVISTA DI FILOSOFIA NEO-SCOLASTICA. Anno xix, Fasc. 1. January-February, 1927. *Cronica della Facoltà di filosofia dell'Università Catholica del S. Cuore.* **Mariano Cordovani.** *La filosofia della morte nell'idealismo gentiliano.* [A caustic criticism, from the Catholic standpoint, of Gentile's theories of human immortality, sovereignty, peace and war, education and art.] **Paolo Rotta.** *La biblioteca del Cusano.* [A valuable description of those books in the library of Nicholas of Cusa which he seems to have studied with most care and profit. Marked and annotated by his own hand, the major books of his still surviving library testify to the amount learned and adopted by Nicholas of Cusa from (especially) S. Augustine, pseudo-Dionysius, Erigena, Peter the Lombard, Bonaventura, Albertus Magnus, Aquinas, Bernard of Clairvaux, Duns Scotus, Eckhart, Suso, Lully, as well as Aristotle and the Neo-Platonists.] **Antonio Zamboni.** *Se gli sviluppi superiori della geometria introducono elementi gnoseologicamente puri.* [Discusses the question whether modern developments of mathematics throw any light on the status of such exact sciences as pure geometry: and whether it contains an ultimate intuitive element which cannot be reduced to anything purely logical.] Reviews, notices, extracts from other philosophical periodicals, etc. Fasc. 2-3. March-June, 1927. *L'insegnamento della filosofia nei licei.* [Discussion of the new State instructions for the teaching of philosophy in Italy.] **Amato Masnovo.** *Guglielmo d'Auvergne.* [An account of the philosophy of William of Auvergne, concerning the existence, essence, attributes and works of God.] **Giacomo Franceschini.** *L'opera filosofica di Francesco Bonatelli.* [An appreciative account of Bonatelli's not very important philosophical views.] **Emilio Chiocchetti.** *La filosofia di Herbart.* [Sketches briefly the philosophy of Herbart in respect of its anti-idealism, its "mathematism," its treatment of religion and history.] **Mariano Cordovani.** *Il pensiero cristiano nel messaggio di Benedetto Croce ai filosofi americani.* [Vigorously attacks, from the direction of Catholic philosophy, Croce's summary dismissal of Christian philosophy and religion, as expressed in his message to the International Congress of 1926.] **Carlo Mazzantini.** *Come si pone il problema epistemologico.* [Accepting the Scholastic-Husserlian position in respect of the intentionality of psychic acts and the objectivity of the existence-essence dualism, Mazzantini argues cleverly that all judgments are existential and so that there are no objects of thought which are conceptual but unreal. He attempts a methodical reduction of universal, possible and necessary to crypto-existential judgments; but seems to overtax the powers of the faculty of Imagination, which must supply on

demand individual subjects, imagined as existing, to actualise the synthesis of essences to which our ordinary 'Alls' and 'Ifs' give inexact expression.] **Giuseppe Zamboni.** *Per l'analisi gnoseologica della geometria.* [Continues the argument begun in the last number, analysing the demonstrations of Euclidean geometry.] Critical notice, reviews, notices, obituaries.

Logos. Anno ix, Fasc. 4. October and December, 1926. **N. Abbagnano.** *L'idealismo inglese contemporaneo.* [This concludes his series of articles on modern English Idealism with an account of the philosophy of A. E. Taylor and Joachim. Finding fault with their treatment of Nature's Error he gives his own account of truth and error in terms of Life and Symbol.] **P. Gatti.** *Filosofia del linguaggio.* [This third and last article on the philosophy of language maintains, in strenuous opposition to Croce, the position that language is "in principle and essentially the fruit of logical or intellectual activity".] **A. Baratonò.** *Il pensiero come attività estetica.* [This is an Introduction to Kant's Critique of Judgment, in which work the author, by operating with the category of value, enables himself to find the clue to the unsolved difficulties of the Critique of Pure Reason.] **R. Pavese.** *Risposta alle accuse di agnosticismo e di panteismo.* [Pavese briefly defends himself from the charge of being guilty of the crimes named in the title of this article.] **M. Fatta.** *L'atto e la potenza nella filosofia tomista.* [A rapid description of (parts of) the Thomist doctrine of actus and potentia.] Reports, reviews, notices.

Anno x, Fasc. 1-2. January-June, 1927. **G. Carlotti.** *Il Concetto della Storia della filosofia.* [As philosophy is but one of the daughters of religion, its history must be controlled by the history of religion; and a not very profound sketch of Greek religious ideas and practices is accordingly provided as the clue to the interpretation of pre-Christian philosophies.] **P. Reginaldo Fei, O. P.** *Che cosa è l'anima?* [Expounds the teachings of Thomas Aquinas about the nature and destiny of the soul—thus rebutting theories held on the same subject by certain modern thinkers.] **L. Bandini.** *Bene, virtù e "senso morale" nello Shaftesbury.* [Straightforward exposition of Shaftesbury's ethical doctrines.] **A. Baratonò.** *Il pensiero come attività estetica.* [Continuation of the argument begun in the previous issue.] **A. Mochi.** *Le basi, i limiti e il valore della Psicologia Scientifica.* [States and criticises, at some length, several views which have been held by psychologists (e.g., Le Dantec, Kretschmer, Bleuler, Jaspers, Wernicke, Freud, etc.) as to the status, functions, limits, and methods of psychology, in relation to those of other sciences; he takes his examples from the special fields of the theories of the Unconscious and the Comic. His own theory allows psychology to be a (possible) science, given certain modifications of the prevailing concept of what science and scientific method are.] Reviews and notices.

VIII.—NOTES.

A REPLY TO SOME CRITICISMS.

My somewhat too speculative article on 'Time and the Absolute' has provoked a good deal of criticism and I have to acknowledge that some of it is just. It is clear, in particular, that I was wrong in my reference to a conceivable 'clearing house' for the co-ordination of positions in the temporal series; and I must thank Mr. Murray for calling attention to the grounds that make it impossible. Perhaps I may be allowed to explain briefly how it was that I was led to that conception. It seemed to me, and still seems, that the temporal order stands on a somewhat different footing from the spatial order. The limitation of the spatial order, which appears to be now universally acknowledged, can be understood as meaning that it contains a curvature and may be regarded as a sphere. I understand that the dimensions of that sphere have been definitely estimated. So far as I can see, the temporal order could not be regarded in any quite similar fashion unless it could be supposed that it returns into itself, which hardly seems to be a conceivable hypothesis. Otherwise it would appear that it has to be thought of as a straight-forward march with a definite beginning and end. Prof. Alexander, if I understand him rightly, postulates an endless series of temporal universes; but that appears to be a very questionable supposition. If we accept the view that there is a limited temporal order, it would seem to be theoretically possible to measure distances in it and determine the place of any event relatively to others. But it does not follow that there is any practical method by which this could be done. This is, of course, a question for mathematical physics, not for speculative philosophy; and I admit that I went 'beyond my last' in expressing an opinion about it.

With regard to Mr. Fawcett's note about Chance and Contingency, I may state that it does not appear to me that my general view of the place of creative imagination is to be identified with that of Frohschammer, who regarded it, if I understand him rightly, from a purely biological point of view. I admit that I do not give so large a place to creative imagination as Mr. Fawcett assigns to it. Thought and valuation, as well as imagination, seem to me to be involved in creative activity. Hence it does not appear to me necessary to postulate an element of chance in the universe. I admit contingency in the sense that the limited universe in which we live may be only one of a number of possible universes. A sequence, such as Prof. Alexander postulates, is not inconceivable. If there are a number of universes, they may be supposed to differ from one another in many respects; and these differences would simply have to be accepted. But it does not seem right to say that they are there by chance. They may be part of a comprehensive plan. Even Hegel admitted that there is an element of contingency in nature in the sense in which I use the term. It still seems to me important to distinguish this from chance.

There is another point in my paper to which my attention has been directed. I referred to McTaggart as one who had emphasised the unreality of Time. It may be a question whether he meant to affirm its unreality in any other sense than that in which I should be prepared to admit that it is unreal. There are at least two distinguishable senses in which time may be said to be unreal. Bosanquet distinguished them by urging that time is in reality (or the Absolute), but reality is not in time. This may be contrasted with Prof. Alexander's view, according to which all reality is in the spatio-temporal system; and I think it may also be distinguished from McTaggart's view, according to which reality in the strictest sense contains a scale of values but not what can be properly characterised as a temporal process. Unfortunately the final volume, in which his view about this is fully expounded, has (at the time when I write) not yet been published. The difference between Bosanquet's view and McTaggart's is a somewhat subtle one; but it seemed to me that the conception of a limited spatio-temporal system helped to bring out its significance. It enables us to recognise that our universe is spatio-temporal and yet to believe that the Cosmos is not limited by spatio-temporal conditions. I am afraid that I may not have succeeded in making this distinction clear.

I am well aware that there are other defects in my article; but I hope they are not such as to be seriously misleading. I hope to return to the subject when I have time to think it out more fully.

J. S. MACKENZIE.

ERRATUM.

In the last number of *MIND*, p. 366, l. 25 from bottom, for "Why is that there?" read "What is that called?"

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MSS. and other Communications for the Editor should be addressed to
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MIND

A QUARTERLY REVIEW

OF

PSYCHOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY.

EDITED BY

PROF. G. E. MOORE,

WITH THE CO-OPERATION OF F. C. BARTLETT, M.A., AND C. D. BROAD, LITT.D.

CONTENTS.

PAGE

I.—The Nature of Universals (III): NORMAN KEMP SMITH	393
II.—How Hegel came to England: J. H. MUIRHEAD	423
III.—What does Mr. W. E. Johnson mean by a Proposition? (I): H. W. B. JOSEPH	448
IV.—“The Idea of Necessary Connexion” (I): R. B. BRAITHWAITE	467
V.—Critical Notices:— James Ward: <i>Essays in Philosophy</i> : H. BARKER	478
Bernard Bosanquet: <i>Science and Philosophy</i> : J. S. MACKENZIE	483
S. Radhakrishnan: <i>Indian Philosophy</i> : EDWARD J. THOMAS	490
J. E. Boodin: <i>Cosmic Evolution</i> : A. K. STOUT	496
VI.—New Books	500
VII.—Philosophical Periodicals	525
VIII.—Notes	535

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